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ABSTRACT
Socrates' assertions about the relationship between the cardinal virtues of 
justice, temperance, piety, courage, and wisdom have long been a source of 
controversy among scholars. While it is generally held that his position can be 
described as suggesting a unity among the virtues, the precise nature of this 
unity is debated. In this dissertation I argue that throughout the early dialogues 
Socrates is committed to the position that the various virtue terms are merely 
different names for virtue proper. I further argue that according to this view 
Socrates is committed to a position which entails that the virtue terms are 
synonymous with one another. I develop my argument by responding to four 
major alternative interpretations of Socrates' doctrine of virtue.
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' The Unity Thesis and the Identity Thesis refer to the same basic view: that the virtue 
terms all refer to the same entity. Gregory Vlastos coins the term Identity Thesis' to designate 
this interpretation of the UVD while Terry Fermer prefers to use 'Unity Thesis'.
Chapter I 
Introduction
Alfred North Whitehead once asserted that the Western tradition of 
philosophy is little more than a footnote to Plato.^ While this is undoubtedly 
an exaggeration, it captures the importance of the works of Plato in the canon 
of philosophy. And if Plato is central to the history of philosophy generally, 
Socrates is central to Plato's philosophy. Although it is certainly not the case 
that Platonism is merely a footnote to Socrates, it is hard to imagine Plato 
without the influence of his mentor, the Athenian gadfly. So what was it 
about the snub-nosed, bug-eyed common citizen of Athens that motivated 
the aristocrat Plato to devote himself to the pursuit of wisdom rather than a 
military or political career more suited to his birth? Plato undoubtedly 
struggled with this question himself after Socrates' death. 1 believe this is a 
significant part of the motivation behind Plato's authorship of the Apology 
and undoubtedly many of what we call the early or 'Socratic' dialogues. The 
doctrines we find in these early works of Plato reveal a complex if not 
paradoxical set of views and these views continue to be of philosophical 
interest today. One of these enigmas,^ the so-called 'Unity of Virtue 
Doctrine', is the subject of this dissertation.
 ^ "The safest general characterization of the European philosophical tradition is 
that it consists of a series of footnotes to Plato." A. N. Whitehead, Process and Reality: An 
Essay in Cosmology. (New York: The Free Press, 1969), 53. Bertrand Russell expresses a 
similar admiration for Plato in A History of Western Philosophy. (New York: Book-Of-The- 
Month-Club, 1995), 104.
 ^I use the term 'enigma' here, as in the title, intentionally. The English term is the 
transliteration of the Greek aiVL”yp.a which is best translated as 'mysterious saying' or 
'riddle'. Socrates himself uses a cognate of this term ( i.e., u ii/ iT T E T U i)  to relate the story of
A. Socrates and the Early Dialogues
Before I delve into the enigma that is the focus of this work there are 
some pre lim in ary  questions which must be addressed. First, so far as we 
know, Socrates did not write philosophy. There are no works attributed to 
him surviving today. Further, there are no reliable ancient witnesses to 
philosophical writings by Socrates, so it is probably safe to assert that there 
were none. Thus, we are dependent upon secondhand sources for our 
knowledge of his thought. Thankfully, there are some very good sources 
about Socrates which do survive. He appears as a leading character in at least 
one of the surviving plays of Aristophanes, an Athenian playwright and 
contemporary of Socrates.^ Xenophon, another contemporary of Socrates, 
also leaves us a record of his existence—a potentially rich source of 
information about his life and thought. Additionally, Socrates is occasionally 
mentioned by Aristotle, however, they were not contemporaries and his 
knowledge of Socrates is second-hand. But by far the richest source of 
information about Socrates comes to us from Plato, his younger 
contemporary and devoted follower. ^
the Delphic Oracle's assertion that "no one is wiser than [Socrates]" (Ap. 21b). 'Puzzle' is 
another acceptable alternative although it suggests that an unrecognized solution is likely, 
wtdle 'enigma' leaves open the possibility that no clear solution exists. Since the debate 
over the Unity of Virtue Doctrine has been so protracted, it is perhaps wise not to assume too 
quickly that there must be a clear solution.
3 The play Socrates appears in is The Clouds, one of Aristophanes' early plays, c. 423 
BCE. Moses Hadas, ed. The Complete Plays of Aristophanes. (New York: Bantam Books, 
1988), 101-141.
^ In the following sections I lay out some of the classical arguments given by 
commentators who have already addmssed the problem of the historical Socrates in some 
detéûl. It is not my intention to provide new or substantially original arguments to justify my 
position on the historical Socrates; that would require a research project quite independent 
from the one at hand. Rather, I merely intend to clarify the working assumptions underlying
A.1 The Problem of the Historical Socrates^
One serious problem facing anyone interested in the reconstruction of 
Socratic philosophy is that the ancient sources do not yield a unified picture 
of the historical Socrates. In feet, some of these sources seem to contradict 
each other. In Aristophanes' The Clouds Socrates is a distracted nature 
philosopher and atheist who teaches sophistic skills for money; he is 
interested in esoteric metaphysical concerns and meteorology.^ Xenophon's 
Socrates is more like a retired gentleman than a philosopher. He never tires 
of handing out religious, moral and practical advice to his friends.^ Aristotle 
refers to Socrates passingly to highlight ethical views or philosophical 
methodology that he usually goes on to argue are either incomplete or 
incorrect.® However, most of the references we find in Aristotle are so brief 
and seem to parallel Plato's dialogues that they offer little independent
my research. I should point out that my view has been significantly shaped by the work of 
Gregory Vlastos in Socrates: Ironist and Moral Philosopher (New York: Cornell University 
Press, 1991), 45-131. For a more complete discussion of the debate over the historical Socrates 
see the works cited below in notes 10,13,14,23, 26, 28, and 30.
® This is normally referred to simply as The Problem of Socrates' but for reasons that 
will become clear below, I will break with this tradition.
® It is no accident that Plato takes direct aim at Aristophanes' portrait of Socrates.
It is clear that he thinks the caricature of Socrates in The Clouds is in large part responsible 
for his mentor's demise (Ap. 18a-e).
 ^This attitude can be seen in Xenophon's Estate-Manager (OlKOi/opLKCS). 
Xenophon, Conversations of Socrates, ed. Robin Waterfield, (New York: Penguin Books, 
1990), 289-359. What troubles me about Socrates' attitude in Xenophon is that it seems 
inconsistent with the philosophically cautious Socrates we find in the early dialogues of 
Plato.
® The references to Socrates in Aristotle are numerous, but their content scant; for a 
few examples, see On Sophistical Refutations 183b. Posterior Analytics 2:13, Metaphysics 
1:6,13:4; Nicomachean Ethics 3:8, 4:7, 6:13, 7:2-3.
4information about the historical character.^ Plato's 'Socrates' differs from 
both Xenophon's and Aristophanes', though more radically from the latter.
So the first problem we m ust foce is, which is the real Socrates? Which of our 
ancient sources gives us the most accurate picture of the historical Socrates?
A .l.a Aristophanes on Socrates
I am inclined to discount the Aristophanic Socrates' on literary as well 
as philosophical grounds. First, none of the characters we find in the 
comedies of Aristophanes are realistic characters. They are, as we should 
expect, caricatures, and Socrates is no e x c e p t i o n .  Even the playwright 
Euripides, who appears in Thesmophoriazuase and The Frogs—and who gets 
far better treatment at the hands of Aristophanes than Socrates—would not 
be mistaken for a realistic character. The comedic form of Greek drama 
demanded recognizable, but exaggerated characters. But this is not peculiar to 
Aristophanic comedy; the characters of Greek tragedy were generally, so far as 
we know, larger than life as well.^^ Second, Aristophanes' 'Socrates' bears 
scant resemblance to the character we find in Xenophon or Plato. In fact, the 
Aristophanic 'Socrates' is so unlike the character we meet in Xenophon and 
Plato it is difficult to imagine they are based on one and the same historical
 ^However, Aristotle does, from time to time, draw a distinction between the 
doctrines of Socrates and Plato which will be useful information as we shall see below.
For a concise discussion of dramatic figures and their role in popular morality, see 
BC.J. Dover, Greek Popular Morality In the Time of Plato and Aristotle. (Indianapolis: 
Hackett Publishing Co., 1994), 14-23.
One only has to consider the willful 'Antigone' or the curious 'Oedipus' to recognize 
this pattern in Greek drama. Often the protagonist is not even fully human, being a super­
human hero or god like Aeschylus' 'Prometheus' or 'Agamemnon'.
5person.12 Finally, Aristophanes never claims to give us an accurate portrait 
of the historical Socrates; it simply was not his goal to defend Socrates or his 
views. Thus, since Aristophanes was a playwright and not really interested in 
drawing realistic portraits of particular historical figures, we should not take 
his ^Socrates' too seriously nor be troubled by the fact that he is inconsistent 
with the character we find in other sources.
A.l.b Plato vs. Xenophon on Socrates
When comparing Xenophon and Plato, it is much harder to decide 
who gives us a more accurate picture of Socrates. Both seem to be motivated, 
at least in part, by a desire to vindicate Socrates to the Athenians who put him 
to death, if not to posterity as well. Both authors claim to have been well 
acquainted with—if not intimates of—Socrates. Both wrote accounts of his 
trial (although Xenophon was not actually present at the proceedings)^^ as
It seems to me that the character we find in Aristophanes is more a caricature of 
philosophical sophism in general, rather than of Socrates in particular. Socrates would 
have been an easily identifiable person because of his high public profile and thus a good 
choice for Aristophanes' purpose. However, the fact that Plato takes such pains in the 
Apology to distance the "real" Socrates from the Aristophanic character, together with the 
fact that we do not find Aristophanes' view of Socrates shared by other ancient sources is 
good reason to be doubtful of the authenticity of the character we find there.
Some might argue that my dismissal of Aristophanes is to too quick. After all, if 
he gives us a caricature of Socrates, must it not be the case that there is some significant 
resemblance between his 'Socrates' and the historical figure? While 1 feel the weight of this 
argument, it need not tell against my project. There is nothing in the Aristophanic Socrates' 
which impacts on the Unity of Virtue debate which is my focus. For more detail on the 
Aristophanic 'Socrates' see Kenneth Dover, "Socrates in the Clouds," in The Philosophy of 
Socrates: A Collection of Critical Essays, ed. Gregory Vlastos, (Notre Dame: University of 
Notre Dame Press, 1980), 50-77; Martha Nussbaum, "Aristophanes and Socrates on Learning 
Practical Wisdom," Yale Classical Studies. 26 (1980): 43-97; also Paul A. Vander Waerdt, 
"Socrates in the Qouds," in The Socratic Movement, ed. Paul A. Vander Waerdt, (Ithica: 
Cornell University Press, 1998), 48-86.
Xenophon's apology is reportedly the eyewitness account of Hermogenes and 
ApoUodorus who were also counted among Socrates' circle of friends. Xenophon, Socrates' 
Defense, trans., Robin Waterfield, (New York: Penguin Books, 1990).
6well as dramatic dialogues which feature him as a main character. Plato's 
Socrates is clearly brighter than Xenophon's, but that is no real indication of 
which is closer to the historical Socrates; Plato was the literary and 
philosophical genius that Xenophon was not. Also, Plato's Socratic dialogues 
are more numerous than Xenophon's; Plato leaves us twenty-one dialogues 
in which Socrates plays a significant role compared to only four from
Xenophon.15
The most significant distinctions between the 'Socrates' we find in 
Plato and Xenophon are doctrinal. First, Plato has Socrates assert, quite 
contrary to traditional Greek morality, that we ought never seek revenge for a 
harm committed (Cr.. 49b). Xenophon, on the other hand, has Socrates 
defend revenge and harming one's enemies as virtuous.l^ Thus, Xenophon's 
Socrates defends a traditional Greek notion of moral and social obligation 
while Plato's character explores a radical alternative.i^
Second, in both Plato and Xenophon, Socrates defends an intellectualist 
view of virtue and thus denies moral incontinence (ÙKpaoLa or, weakness of 
will). However, they disagree on the consequences of this view. For example, 
Xenophon has Socrates assert that courage is a natural capacity which is 
enhanced by training and exercise (i.e., knowledge),!® while for Plato's
15 The Platonic dialogues in which Socrates has a significant role are (in 
alphabetical order) the Apology. Charmides. Cratylus. Crito. Euthydemus. Euthyphro, 
Gorgias. Hippias Major. Hippias Minor. Ion. Laches. Lysis. Meno. Parmenides. Phaedo. 
Phaedrus. Philebus. Protagoras. Republic. Symposium, and Theaetetus. Xenophon's four 
dialogues featuring Socrates are the Apology. Economist. Memorabilia, and Symposium.
15 Xenophon, Memorabilia, trans. Hugh Trednnik, revised and edited by Robin 
Waterfield. (New York Penguin Books. 1990), 105 (2.1.19), 107 (2.1.28), 115 (2.3.14), 183, 
(4.2.16), 204 (4.5.10).
1  ^For more on the Greek popular notion that it is virtuous to harm your enemies see 
Dover, Greek Popular Morality. 180-195.
1® Xenophon, Mem.. 160-69 (3.9).
7Socrates, courage just is knowledge. There also seems to be a difference in 
motive for the two characters: "Xenophon attributes to Socrates the 
Aristotelian response . . . that the virtuous man naturally desires good."20 
For Plato's Socrates, knowledge alone is a sufficient motivation for virtuous 
action. Thus, he is not required to speculate further or make 
pronouncements on human nature. So while both authors agree on Socratic 
intellectualism and a denial of akrasia, they disagree on the particulars of this 
doctrine.
Third, Plato's and Xenophon's 'Socrates' demonstrate quite different 
dispositions in relation to their knowledge. One of the most striking claims 
of Plato's Socrates is that he has "no claim to wisdom great or small" (Ap.. 
21b).2l Indeed, throughout the earliest dialogues of Plato we find numerous 
denials of knowledge by Socrates.^ The consequence of this is that if Socrates 
is serious, he is not in a position to teach anyone anything. Teaching
Plato, Protagoras. 360d, Laches 199d. Unless otherwise indicated all translations 
are from Plato: The Collected Dialogues, eds. Edith Hamilton and Huntington Caims, 
(Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1961).
Robin Waterfield, Xenophon: Conversations of Socrates. "Introduction," 15. 
Waterfield's assertion is clearly supported by Xenophon's text. For example Xenonphon has 
Socrates, during a conversation about the nature of courage, assert, "I think that every 
natural disposition can be developed in the direction of fortitude by instruction and 
application" (Mem. 3.9.5). When contrated with Plato's Socrates in the Laches it is clear 
that we have distinct views about the acquisition of the courage. It is not at all clear that 
Plato's Socrates thinks courage is a "natural disposition" or that one needs practice at being 
courageous. In fact, in the case of the latter it seems that one need no more than a certain kind 
of knowledge to be courageous (La. 199d, e).
I should point out that we find a similar distinction internal to the Platonic corpus 
as well. This is discussed in more detail in § A.2 below.
^  One of the defining characteristics of the early dialogues of Plato (which I will 
discuss in more detail below) is that Socrates' denial of knowledge is ubiquitous. For 
example, see Apology 20c, 21d, 23b; Euthyphro 5a, 15c, 15e-16a, Charmides 165b, 166c; Lysis 
212a, 223b; Laches 186b, 186d, 200e; Hippias Minor 376c; Hippias Major 286c, 304d; Meno 71a, 
80d; and Republic I:337e.
8presupposes superior knowledge on the part of the teacher. If Socrates has no 
knowledge, he is not in a position to be a teacher; but if he teaches others, he 
must have some knowledge to pass on. From a literary perspective, the point 
Plato seems to be making is that Socrates cannot be guilty of teaching the 
youth of Athens corrupt doctrines if he himself does not believe he knows 
anything significant. Xenophon, on the other hand, puts a great deal of 
confidence in the mouth of Socrates, emphasizing the point that he taught 
only moral doctrines.^ As with morality, on the subject of rehgion his 
'Socrates' reveals great confidence in defending popular conventions.^'^
Again in stark contrast to Plato, Xenophon says "it is obvious . . . that Socrates 
used to reveal his opinions candidly to his c o m p a n i o n s .  " 2 5
Finally, Xenophon asserts that Socrates deliberately scuttled his own 
defense because he wanted to die: "he had already decided that for him death 
was preferable to l i f e . " 2 6  In fact, Xenophon goes so far as to have Socrates 
claim that he believed his death was divinely o r d a i n e d . 2 7  This is his 
explanation for Socrates' "arrogant" tone toward the jury at his trial. We get 
no indication from Plato, however, that Socrates intentionally scuttled his 
defense. His Apology shows Socrates giving serious arguments against the
23 See Donald R. Morrison's excellent essay, "Xenophon's Socrates as Teacher," in 
The Socratic Movement. 181-208.
24 Xenophon, Mem.. 89-93 (1.4), 191-195 (4.3).
25 Ibid., 211 (4.7).
26 Xenophon, Apology. 41. However, as Vlastos points out, it takes quite a stretch of 
the imagination to suppose Üiat Socrates, after having committed his life to the rational 
pursuit of morality for himself and others, would suddenly stoop to emotional rhetoric in 
order to cause his own death so as to avoid the pains of old age. Vlastos, Socrates: Ironist and 
Moral Philosopher. 291-293. As indicated above, 1 am in essential agreement with Vlastos' 
approach to the problem of the historical Socrates.
27 Ibid., 42.
9official indictment of corrupting the youth and introducing new deities, as 
well as explaining the popular prejudice against philosophers in general and 
himself in particular.^ It is not until after the jury has already found 
Socrates guilty that he adopts a strong sarcastic tone suggesting that the 
punishment most befitting him would be life-time maintenance at the 
Prytaneum  (Ap. 37a).
For all their similarities, it is troubling that there are such significant 
dissimilarities between the characters we find in Plato and in Xenophon. 
Unfortunately, there is little in either account which gives us unquestionable 
warrant to suppose one is a more accurate portrait of the historical Socrates 
than the other. Both authors have independent agendas that motivate their 
authorship of Socratic dialogues. In terms of content and style, Plato is clearly 
a superior philosopher and dramatist to Xenophon, but that tells us nothing 
about the real Socrates. It is the case that Aristotle tends to confirm the 
Platonic version of Socrates, but this might be deemed irrelevant since he was
Plato initially draws a distinction between these causes of Socrates' trial at 
Apology ISaff. The informal indictment, and the more difficult to defeat, comes from 
Aristophanes: 1) Socrates is wicked in that he is a nature philosopher (and by implication 
an atheist), 2) he intentionally uses fallacious reasoning to win arguments, and 3) he teaches 
his sophistic skills to the youth of Athens. The formal indictment is brought by Meletus, 
Anytus, and Lycon and is essentially two-fold: 1) Socrates corrupts the youth of Athens with 
false doctrines, and 2) Socrates introduces new deities (Ap. 24b). Socrates attacks the formal 
charges directly by showing that the indictment does not apply to him and that the 
prosecution (in the person of Meletus) does not believe the indictment applies to Socrates (Ap. 
25c-26a, 26b-27e). The informal charges are disarmed by demonstrating first of all that 
Socrates, unlike his namesake in The Clouds, is not interested in Natural Philosophy (Ap. 
19d). Nor is it the case that he takes fees for teaching anyone anything since he specifically 
claims not to have knowledge of the fine and good (Ap. 19e). There is thus no indication in 
Plato that Socrates did not give full effort to his defense, nor that he knew prior to the trial 
what the outcome would be, although he does admit that he is not surprised at the outcome 
( Ap- 35e). For an excellent discussion of the formal indictment, see Thomas Brickhouse and 
Nicholas Smith, "The Formal Charges Against Socrates," in Benson, Essays on the 
Philosophy of Socrates (New York: Oxford Press, 1992), 14-34.
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Plato's student and may very well have learned everything he knew about 
Socrates from the Platonic dialogues.^
From a philosophical point of view, one way to deal with the problem 
of the historical Socrates is simply to set it aside. Without further evidence, it 
is impossible to be certain who provides a more accurate picture of Socrates 
and his thought. Such a conclusion, however, in no way prevents us from 
pursuing a reconstruction of Socratic philosophy. Since Plato has provided us 
with such a philosophically interesting character, we can take 'Socrates' to 
refer to the person we find in his dialogues, and temporarily suspend the 
question of historical authenticity. Thus, when I refer to 'Socrates' I mean the 
character we find in the dialogues of Plato regardless of whether or not this 
character is an accurate representation of the historical Socrates.^
There is a further interpretive problem which arises when we focus 
solely on the Platonic 'Socrates', however: can we clearly distinguish Socratic
As suggested by Waterfield, 18.
^  In all fairness, I should state that I am inclined to accept the Platonic 'Socrates' as 
most closely representing the historical figure. I am so inclined for two reasons: first, there is 
a good deal of weight in the philosophical tradition which has held that Plato's Socrates is 
the historical Socrates. But more importantly, it is hard to figure out why the Athenians 
would want to execute Xenophon's Socrates, while it is easy to see why they would want to 
get rid of Plato's. As a staunch defender of the traditional morality and religion, the only 
motive the prosecution could have had against Xenophon's character is intellectual jealousy, 
which hardly seems sufficient. Plato's Socrates, on the other hand, was a genuine public 
nuisance to the democratic leadership attempting to reestablish themselves after their 
defeat at the hands of Sparta and the rule of the Thirty Tyrants. Plato gives us a sufficient, 
though still unjust, motive for Socrates' condemnation and execution. The best arguments both 
for and against the historical authenticity of Plato's Socrates are offered by Gregory Vlastos 
and Charles Kahn respectively. Vlastos gives a compelling argument for the Platonic 
Socrates' authenticity in Socrates: Ironist and Moral Philosopher (Ithica: Cornell 
University Press, 1991), 81-106; for an overview of his position see Vlastos, "The Paradox of 
Socrates" in The Philosophy of Socrates: A Collection of Critical Essays, ed. Gregory Vlastos 
(Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1971. Without actually denying the 
authenticity of Plato's Socrates, Charles Kahn strongly warns against reading too much 
history into Plato: Kahn, "Did Plato Write Socratic Dialogues?" in Benson, 35-52.
11
from Platonic philosophy? That is, once we focus exclusively on the Platonic 
corpus, why should we think the doctrines we find in the early dialogues are 
anything other than the youthful doctrines of Plato? In the following section 
I address this problem.
A.2 The Problem of the Platonic Socrates
Thus far I have argued that when engaged in the reconstruction of 
Socratic philosophy we can legitimately set aside worries about whether or 
not Plato's 'Socrates' is historically authentic since the philosophically 
interesting 'Socrates' is Plato's 'Socrates'. Thus, we need not be disturbed if 
there is not precise agreement among the ancient sources on what Socrates 
believed. However, when we closely examine Plato's 'Socrates' it becomes 
evident that there are distinctive styles and doctrines in various dialogues.
For example, in some dialogues Socrates is interested exclusively in the 
question "how ought we to live?" and issues related to moral philosophy. In 
other dialogues, Socrates' moral preoccupation is overtaken by the more 
speculative philosophical concerns of epistemology and metaphysics. And 
where the emphasis shifts from one set of topics to another, there are 
corresponding changes in philosophical methodology as well as Socrates' 
personality. Thus, many commentators conclude "there appears to be more 
than one Socrates in the dialogues of Plato. This has led scholars to divide 
Plato's dialogues into distinct categories corresponding to the different 
doctrines and literary styles we discover, and these are generally believed to 
correspond to his overall intellectual development. So what specifically are
Hugh Benson, Essays on the Philosophy of Socrates (New York; Oxford, 1992), 4.
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the divergent elements that demarcate the stages of Plato's intellectual 
development, and what do they tell us about Socratic as opposed to Platonic
philosophy ?32
A.2.a Differences in Plato's Texts
I would argue there are three significant touchstones which mark the 
distinction between the different stages of Plato's thought: 1) doctrinal focus,
2) Socrates' attitude, and 3) methodology. In those works which have come to
32 To give a complete list of the differences we find among the individual works in 
the Platonic corpus would occupy a study all its own. In the interest of time and space, 
therefore, I will note here only those I think most important. I should note, however that I 
am focusing primarily on what Guthrie calls "philosophical content" and for the most part 
avoiding literary criticism and stylometry. I avoid the former because of its highly 
subjective nature. Consider for example Taylor's justification for placing the Protagoras in 
the middle period of Plato's development along with the Republic. Phaedo. and Symposium: 
"The absurdity of regarding the dialogue as a juvenile performance is sufficiently ^ o w n  by 
the perfect mastery of dramatic technique ... No beginner, however endowed with genius, 
produces such a masterpiece of elaborate art without earlier experiences of trial and failure." 
Taylor's position rests on two unjustified assumptions: 1) the Protagoras demonstrates a 
h i^ e r  "mastery of dramatic tedinique" than the Euthyphro or Laches, or any other early 
dialogue, and 2) that an author's work necessarily gets better with time. Both assumptions 
are, in my opinion, highly suspect. A.E. Taylor, Plato: The Man and His Work (New York: 
Meridian Books, 1956), 20,235.
As a method of dating dialogues, stylometry rests on a more firm foundation than the 
Literary approach, so long as we are thinking of relative dating. The nearly two hundred 
years of stylometric investigation have led to the consensus among scholars that Plato's 
dialogues can be divided into three general periods of chronological development: early, 
middle, and late. There is always the danger, however, of thinking that stylometry will 
provide an absolute dating system which is much more problematic. For instance, there is no 
reason to think that Plato wrote only one dialogue at a time; he may well have had several 
works in progress at any give time. Further, it might be the case that some works received 
later revisions and editing while others did not Still others might have been conceived and 
begun in one period of his development and finished later. (This is arguably the case with 
the Meno and the Republic, for example.) VV.K.C. Guthrie, A History of Greek Philosophy:
IV Plato: The Man and His Dialogues. Early Period (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 1975),41-54; and for a comprehensive view of the stylometric endeavor see Brandwood, 
The Chronology of Plato's Dialogues (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990); or, for a 
more concise overview of these issues see Brandwood, "Stylometry and Chronology," in The 
Cambridge Companion to Plato, ed. Richard Kraut, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
1992), 90-120.
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be associated with Plato's earliest intellectual period we find that Socrates is 
focused almost exclusively on moral philosophy. "What is the right way to 
live?" "Who knows the right way to live?" "Can we teach others the right 
way to live?" "What motivates us to live the right way once we've 
discovered what it is?" "Is virtue an innate disposition of the soul or is it a 
special skill or knowledge which can be attained through education?" "Is 
virtue one thing or skill, or is it a general name for a set of different things or 
skills?" These practical questions are associated with Socrates' desire to know 
the nature of virtue and occupy center stage in his thought. Thus, the 
Socrates we encounter in the earliest works of Plato is a moralist.
Socrates the moralist stands in sharp contrast to Socrates the 
epistemologist, metaphysician, and psychologist we find in another set of 
dialogues. While he is still interested in virtue in these works, the 
explanation of what virtue is has been altered by the development of a 
complex metaphysical and epistemological system lacking from the early 
works. Socrates the metaphysician believes there are two distinct ontological 
realms—one sensible, temporal, and material, the other non-sensible, eternal, 
and immaterial. Our ability to know reality is directly tied to this distinction: 
objects of knowledge (èfTiaTqpri) are limited to the Ideal realm, while the 
sensible world is restricted to mere opinion (56xa). In this second period, 
Socrates also maintains a complex psychology corresponding to his ontology 
and epistemology. Humans are fundamentally divided into two distinct 
parts: a material body and an immaterial soul. Second, he holds that the soul 
itself is divided into distinct parts with distinct functions (i.e., appetite, spirit, 
and reason). The well-being, or health, or excellence (i.e., dpeni) of a person
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depends upon the harmony between these different parts of the soul.33 
However, we find no similar psychological speculation or division of the soul 
in the dialogues thought to be from the earlier period of Plato's intellectual 
life .^
The second distinction that can be observed between the characters in 
Plato's dialogues is attitude. While less obvious than the doctrinal differences 
mentioned above, a careful analysis of the text reveals subtle but important 
differences in the personality of 'Socrates' in different groups of dialogues. In 
the early works, Socrates seems quite unsure about what, if anything, he 
knows. And as I mentioned above, there are numerous occasions where 
Socrates completely denies competency or knowledge in philosophically 
important matters.35 This epistemic hesitancy on the part of the early 
Socrates is strangely rare for Plato's later character. Beginning with the Meno. 
Socrates undergoes a dramatic transformation. For the first time he offers 
philosophically satisfactory solutions to his own questions. The solutions he 
offers, as well as the speeches he begins to give, get longer and more complex. 
The Socrates we find in the second period is more didactic, confident of the 
views he presents to his interlocutors, while the earlier character seems 
deficient in the confidence which accompanies secure beliefs.^ Whether or
33 This doctrine is clearly expressed in Republic IV (336-444) and Phaedo {237dff,
246a-d)
34 In fact, the Socrates of the early period is not even sure if there is a soul distinct 
from the body which survives death fAp. ^ dff).
35 Strangely enough, this sometimes occurs after he has helped construct a convincing 
argument. Good examples of this are Laches IQOejf and especially Gorgias 508eff where he 
says the conclusion of their argument has been "buckled fast and clamped together. . .  by 
arguments of steel and adamant;" but only moments later he goes on to claim a complete 
ignorance in the matter under discussion.
36 One might object to the distinction I am drawing by arguing that it makes perfect 
sense for the Socrates of the early dialogues to be more circumspect than his later counterpart.
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not the early Socrates is actually dubious of his knowledge or is just being 
ironic is a question that must be answered later.37
Finally, and closely associated with the difference in attitude, is the 
philosophical methodology of the different periods of Plato's work. Here we 
find three distinctions rather than two. In the early works, Socrates' method 
of investigation focuses on eliciting opinions from those around him and 
then demonstrating that their views are inconsistent. This form of 
questioning or cross-examination (i.e., èXéyxos) focuses attention on the 
person who claims to have knowledge rather than on Socrates. Thus, he is 
able to demonstrate that others do not have significant moral knowledge 
without being forced to offer his own positive views as an alternative.
In later works, Socrates still asks questions, but his method has shifted 
from elenctic to hypothetical dialectic. This second interrogative 
method—associated with the works of the middle period—is designed to lead
Many of the early dialogues are dramatically set in Socrates' later life when we would 
expect that years of philosophical inquiry had taught him to be circumspect. The youthful 
Socrates we meet in many of the middle and later dialogues would naturally be less cautious. 
There are two reasons to reject this view: first, not all the dialogues thought to be part of 
Plato's early period unambiguously represent an elderly Socrates. Hence a simple 
developmental view of Socrates' character based on the dramatic date of the dialogues is 
unacceptably simplistic. Second, even if all the early, and epistemically moderate, 
dialogues represented an elderly Socrates, there is no indication in those works that his 
youth was characterized by any other attitude. For example, if he had been less cautious in 
younger years, we might expect the Apology to include a disclaimer of his youthful mistakes. 
However, there is no hint in his defense, or any of the early dialogues, that Socrates thought 
his youth to have been characterized by a significantly different philosophical attitude 
from that which he now holds.
37 Aristotle seems doubtful as to the truthfulness of Socrates' disclaimers, 
characterizing him as "mock-modest" 4:7,25 [1127b]). Irwin disagrees, claiming Topics 
183b demonstrates Aristotle's acceptance of Socrates' disclaimers. While 1 disagree with 
Irwin about what Aristotle thought, I tend to agree with his view of the legitimacy of 
Socrates' denials. See Irwin, Plato's Ethics (New York: Oxford Press, 1995); for the very best 
essay on the subject to date, see Vlastos, "Socrates' Disavowal of Knowledge," in Socratic 
Studies. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 39-66.
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an interlocutor toward a conclusion Socrates already seems to believe. This is 
accomplished by Socrates or an interlocutor offering a premise/definition and 
then inferring what should follow from the initial assumption. These 
conversations are proleptic, indicating that Socrates now has answers to his 
own questions, while the elenctic interrogations of the earlier dialogues are 
much more ambiguous in reference to his knowledge.^
In what have come to be thought of as the latest dialogues a new 
methodology—the method of division—emerges fPhdr. 265c-266b; Soph. 
218eff). Reminiscent of Aristotle's procedure in the Categories or the 
biological works, Plato's method of division begins with the abstract idea, or 
universal, and then proceeds toward the particular. By asking of the 
universal, "to what does it apply?" or by seeking two differential 
predicates—and then taking one of those and seeking its differential 
predicates, and so on—the interlocutors move down the ontological 
hierarchy until they reach something which carmot be divided further (Phd., 
277b; Soph. 229d).
Taking the doctrine, methodology, and attitude of 'Socrates' as signs of 
Plato's intellectual development, we find the following sort of division 
among Plato's dialogues. Socrates the elenctic moralist who is epistemically 
hesitant—if not sceptical—is found in the Apology. Charmides. Crito.
^  One of the clearest examples of this occurs when Socrates questions Meno's slave 
about how to double the size of a square. There are obviously numerous layers (or subplots) in 
this conversation, but it is quite clear that Socrates believes he knows how to cause the slave 
to recall the geometrical knowledge already in his soul. Leaving aside the epistemological 
and metaphysical doctrines introduced here, there are few conversations in the early 
dialogues which are similar. The only one which comes close is the Speech of the Laws in Cr. 
50-54c, but this is a unique dramatic experiment which, unlike the dialectic method, does not 
become a regular feature of Plato's work.
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Euthydemus. Euthyphro. Gorgias. Hippias Major. Hippias Minor. Ion. Laches, 
Lysis. (Republic I) and Protagoras. Socrates, the confident epistemologist and 
metaphysician, who practices the method of hypothesis, is found in the 
Cratylus. Phaedo. Phaedrus. R e p u b l i c . 3 9  and Sym posium . Socrates, the critic 
of the doctrine of Forms, who uses the method of division is found in the 
Parmenides. Philebus. Theaetetus. Sophist. Timaeus. and Critias.
That leaves the M eno. as a Platonic dialogue which features Socrates as 
a significant character, but which does not easily fit into the groups above.^
In the Meno we seem to find both the early and middle Socrates together: we 
find the elenctic methodology employed against Meno early in the dialogue 
(71e-79e) and the method of hypothesis used later with Meno's slave (82c-85b). 
We find classic denials of knowledge (71b, 71c, 80c) representing the 
epistemically cautious Socrates, as well as the more didactic character when 
the doctrine of reincarnation is introduced (Slhjf). We also find an early
Some scholars take the first book of the Republic to be from the early period.
Taken by itself it has all the hallmarks of an early dialogue (i.e., investigation of the 
definition of a moral term—'justice', a Socratic denial of knowledge, no definite conclusions 
reached, etc.). The speculation is that it was written during Plato's early phase (perhaps 
called the Thrasymachus) and later edited and appended as the introduction to the mature 
work known as the Republic. This is suggested not by the philosophical content, but also by 
the stylometric evidence. Other commentators such as Guthrie disagree; he says, it "remains 
difficult to conceive of book 1 as ever intended for any other place than that which it now  
occupies." Guthrie, History of Greek Philosophy. 437; see also Julia Annas, An Introduction to 
Plato's Republic. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1981), 16-58; Brandwood, "Stylometry 
and Chronology," in Kraut, The Companion to Plato. 90-120; Nickolas Pappas, Plato and the 
Republic (New York: Routledge, 1995), 27-38.
I have intentionally left out the Menexenus. not because I doubt its authenticity 
(Aristotle believed it to be genuine, and should have been in a position to know—Rhetoric 
1367b, 1415b), but because it is in  a class by itself. It carmot really be characterized as a 
dialogue, and it tells us virtually nothing about Platonic or Socratic philosophy. I leave it to 
others to explore its purpose and m erit See Guthrie, A History of Greek Philosophy: IV 
Plato. 312-323; Charles H. Kahn, "Plato's Funeral Oration: The motive of the Menexenus," 
Classical Philology fOctober 19631: 220-234. and Kahn. Plato and the Socratic Dialogue:
The Philosophical Use of a Literary Form (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 54, 
55; A.E. Taylor, Plato: The Man and His Work (New York: Meridian Books, 1956), 41-45.
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exploration of epistemology in the doctrine of recollection (i.e., àvdnivT\cric:, 
85d) which is developed in detail in the Phaedrus and Phaedo. Since the 
Meno gives us a little of both of the first two Socratic characters, it is 
reasonable to assume this dialogue marks a clear shift in Plato's thought—the 
movement from one period to another. We are therefore reasonably justified 
in classifying the M eno as a transitional work between the early and middle 
period of Plato's development. What we carmot know for certain is whether 
this dialogue was intentionally constructed to demonstrate the change in his 
thought or whether it was initially begun in the early period and set aside 
only to be finished after his Pythagorean conversion.
A.2.b Socratic vs. Platonic Philosophy
Having draw n a distinction between three different periods in Plato's 
intellectual development, we can now ask what this tells us about Socratic 
and Platonic philosophy. We must ask why we take the first group of 
dialogues to be the earliest of the Platonic corpus, and then we must ask why 
this might reflect the doctrine of Socrates, rather than merely reflecting the 
mind of young Plato.
There is external evidence for considering the third group of dialogues 
to be last in the chronological order of the Socratic dialogues.^! According to 
Aristotle and Diogenes Laertius, the Laws is the latest of Plato's works.'^ 
Stylometric evidence suggests that the Statesman. Sophist. Timaeus.
Keep in mind that I am here using the term 'Socratic' only to refer to those works of 
Plato which feature Socrates as a major figure, not, as w ill be the case below, to refer to works 
which reflect the philosophy of Socrates.
^  Aristotle, Eûl- 2:6 ,1264b; Diogenes Laertius, Lives and Opinons of Eminent 
Philosophers. 3:37.
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Parmenides. Philebus. and Theaetetus were written in a similar style, which 
is significantly distinct from any of the other Platonic w orks.^ Further we 
have internal evidence firom the dialogues themselves: the Statesman is 
supposed to be the sequel of the Sophist, and it, in turn, is supposed to be the 
sequel of the Theaetetus. The Timaeus seems to be later than the Republic 
because it begins with a summary of the main arguments of the former. 
Further, the Parmenides raises serious difficulties for the doctrine of Forms 
espoused in the Republic and Phaedrus and seems to be a critique of this 
doctrine. Thus, the Parmenides. Philebus. and Tim aeus are most likely 
among the latest Socratic dialogues, written toward the end of Plato's 
intellectual career. These works reflect the mature philosopher who has 
come to recognize weaknesses in his earlier thought.
If Plato's latest thought is represented in works such as the Parmenides. 
Philebus and Timaeus. and if these are at least in part a response to the 
doctrines we find in the works of the second group, then the first 
group—which ignores these issues altogether—most likely represents the 
earliest work of Plato. But just because these are the earliest of Plato's 
dialogues, why should we think this tells us anything about Socrates' 
philosophy? That is, if we take the philosophy of the middle and late periods 
to reflect the mind of Plato, why should we think the philosophy of the early 
period is Socratic and not Platonic?
First, when I refer to the early dialogues as 'Socratic', I do not mean to 
suggest that Plato was "recalling, in form and substance, the conversations of
Most striking is a concern for the rhythm of his prose including a decline of hiatus 
among the works of this later group which probably reflects Plato's response to the influence 
of Isocrates. Brandwood, "Stylometry and Chronology,"
20
his master w ithou t. . . adding to them any distinctive doctrines of his 
o w n ."^  I believe the early dialogues are Plato's attempt to capture the 
substance and style of Socrates' philosophy but not to report what he heard 
Socrates say. After all, Plato could not have been present at many of the 
conversations recorded in the early dialogues, and thus they could not 
realistically be thought of as literal reports of those conversations. The 
consistent dramatic style of the early dialogues casts further doubt on their 
pure historicity. Plato was as much a dramatic as philosophical genius and 
most of the early dialogues exhibit a strong dramatic flair. As such it is 
difficult to escape the conclusion that the character we find in the early 
dialogues is to some degree a Platonic creation.
On the other hand, it is perfectly reasonable to expect Plato's early 
intellectual development to be significantly shaped by his interaction with the 
historical Socrates. If he had students at all—in the broadest sense of that 
term—then Plato was the best and brightest of them all. We also have good 
reason to think Plato an intimate of Socrates, not only because he tells us he 
offered to secure the monetary penalty of thirty minae at his trial (Ap.38b). but 
apparently he, along with other close friends of Socrates, abandoned Athens 
for a time after his e x e c u t i o n . 4 5  Whether he fled out of fear or disgust we do 
not know, but that his flight was caused by Socrates' execution seems reliable 
and indicates their close association. If Plato was indeed the pupil and close 
friend that he seems to have been, we can expect that he would have been 
strongly influenced by Socrates' thought. Therefore, it is not unreasonable to
^  Guthrie, A History of Greek Philosophy. 67. 
Diogenes Laertius Lives. 3:6.
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think of the early dialogues as Plato's attempt to expound the doctrines of the 
historical character and explore their implications in a systematic way. So if 
the character—'Socrates'—we encounter in the early dialogues is essentially 
Platonic, we also have good reason to believe that the mind of Plato, in the 
early stages of its development at least, is significantly Socratic.
There is also some external evidence for thinking the early dialogues 
may give us insight into Socrates' philosophy. This evidence comes from 
Aristotle, where he distinguishes the doctrines of Socrates from those of 
Plato. What we find is that his testimony basically reflects the character we 
find in the early dialogues. Aristotle tells us that Socrates' methodology 
consisted solely of elenchus: a question or series of questions he would pu t to 
an interlocutor but which he could not answer himself (Soph. El., 183b). 
Aristotle also tells us that Socrates was occupied only with questions of 
morality, and that he had no interest in investigating the natural world apart 
from moral considerations (Met. 1:6). Finally, Aristotle tells us that while 
Socrates was interested in universals (i.e., his famous "What is F-ness?" 
questions), he did not 'separate' them from the sensory world as did Plato.^
If Aristotle is to be believed, his testimony seems to confirm that the 'Socrates' 
we encounter in the early dialogues defends the doctrines of the historical 
character, which were substantially distinct from the mature philosophy of 
Plato.
^  . for two things may be fairly ascribed to Socrates—inductive arguments and
universal definition, both of which are concerned with the starting-point of e7TiaTq[iT|: but 
Socrates did not make the universals or the definitions exist apart; they, however, gave 
them separate existence, and this was the kind of thing they called Ideas." Aristotle, Met.. 
13:4. Unless otherwise noted all citations of Aristotle are firom The Basic Works of Aristotle. 
ed. Richard McKeon, (New York: Random House, 1941).
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Thus, if we set aside the works of Xenophon and focus exclusively on 
the works of Plato, we can proceed to tease out elements of Socratic 
philosophy. While we cannot be certain, it is very likely that the doctrines we 
encounter in Plato's early dialogues are those espoused by the historical 
Socrates. It is also likely that the character we find there, while no doubt 
embellished at times for literary effect, is a fairly accurate likeness of the 
common Athenian moralist philosopher executed in 399 BCE on charges of 
impiety and corrupting the youth of Athens. From this point on, therefore, I 
will refer to the early dialogues of Plato as 'Socratic', not only to indicate the 
central role of Socrates, but also to distinguish them from those works where 
Plato expresses what I take to be his own philosophical insight. 1 will also 
dispense hereafter with the cumbersome references to 'the historical Socrates' 
or 'the historical character' or 'Socrates' assuming, for present purposes, that 
there is no significant philosophical difference between Plato's character and 
the Fifth-Century BCE philosopher.
A.2.C The Reconstruction of Socratic Philosophy
Having argued that we are justified in thinking the early dialogues 
give us insight into Socratic philosophy, there is a further methodological 
problem to quickly address: Can we find philosophically interesting doctrines 
which Socrates held in the early dialogues? Throughout the early dialogues, 
Socrates consistently claims to have no significant moral/philosophical 
knowledge; therefore, he believes he cannot teach others how to live the 
moral life. Further, the Socratic dialogues almost universally end in 
aporia—without an explicit resolution of the question under consideration. 
For example, the Lysis asks, but does not answer, the question "What is
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friendship?", the Charmides "What is temperance?", the Laches "What is 
courage?", the Euthyphro "What is piety?", the Republic I "What is justice?", 
the Hippias Major "What is beauty?", and the Protagoras "Is virtue 
teachable?" So if Socrates and his interlocutors do not come to any 
affirmative conclusions about the basic terms of morality or their proper 
application, how do we know what he believed? How can we in good 
conscience assert that Socrates firmly held any particular doctrine if he 
himself is so careful not only to avoid such assertions but to deny he knows 
anything morally significant?
There are two contrary solutions available to those interested in 
exploring Socratic philosophy. On one hand, we might say Socrates' denials 
of knowledge prevent us from recovering any positive doctrines which he 
would have held. Most of what we can legitimately affirm about Socrates on 
this view is what he does not believe since he makes relatively few positive 
assertions in the early dialogues. If we took this conservative approach, our 
comments about Socratic philosophy would be limited to a handful of 
assertions such as:
1) Socrates does not believe he knows anything morally 
significant;
2) Socrates does not believe anyone he has met knows anything 
morally significant;
3) Socrates does not believe the gods lie;
4) Socrates does not believe bad things happen to good people;
5) Socrates believes he is on a divine mission;
6) Socrates believes it wrong to disobey one's superiors.
This approach to Socratic philosophy is objectionable not only because it is 
philosophically uninteresting (i.e., all we can say of Socrates is what he 
himself says), but also because it seems unnecessarily cautious.
24
The alternative approach gives us more freedom. On this view we can, 
on the basis of what Socrates affirms (and often on the basis of what he 
denies), reconstruct what he would have believed or what he should have 
believed even though he himself may not clearly assert these positions. This 
view is usually referred to as the "constructivist position" and it is the 
position cautiously adopted in this d i s s e r t a t i o n . ^ ^  ;  leave i t  to others to give a 
full defense of this approach^ and restrict myself to the following comments: 
A limited constructivist position is more interesting—philosophically—than 
its conservative counterpart. Further, constructivism seems the appropriate 
attitude for the history of philosophy as opposed to a more historical or 
textual investigation of the philologist since we are interested in 
understanding why Socrates would have made many of the claims that he 
makes, not just that he made them. However, we must be vigilant not to 
read too much into the text. There are some commentators who, in my
It seems to me that any philosopher interested in the history of Philosophy w ill 
be a constructivist to one degree or another. If not, it seems reasonable to wonder why he is a 
philosopher and not just an historian.
Scott Calef gives a rather extensive list of scholars who take the 'constructivist' 
position especially on controversial passages in the Euthyphro: see "Piety and the Unity of 
Virtue in Euthyphro lle-14c," Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 13 (1995): 1, n.3. For a 
more general account of constructivism see Terence Irwin, Plato's Ethics (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1995), 20-21; Brickhouse and Smith, Plato's Socrates. New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1994,64, n.49. One of the most interesting examples of a constructivist thesis 
is the 'Bonitz Principle' which holds that anything not clearly refuted in a Platonic dialogue 
represents affirmative doctrine; H. Bonitz, Platonische Studien Berlin, 1966. Terry Penner 
also suggests a constructivist principle for reading the early dialogues: "Always assume 
Socrates has some particular thing in mind that he wants us to see, even though his 
interlocutors do not see it." Penner, "What Laches and N idas Miss-And Whether Socrates 
Thinks Courage Merely a Part of Virtue," Ancient Philosophy 12 (1992): 3. These seem to me 
good examples of unrestrained constructivism: such broad interpretive rules can easily obscure 
the limitations of context and dramatic irony. While they may gives us some help as general 
guidelines, I think they should always be applied cautiously.
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opinion, take too much liberty with the text as will become evident in the 
course of my argument.
B. The Unity of Virtue Paradox
In the Socratic dialogues of Plato numerous philosophical 
conundrums manifest themselves. Many of these arise as a consequence of 
the focus on moral philosophy to the exclusion of the metaphysical and 
epistemological doctrines necessary for an adequate ethical theory. Some, 
however, are puzzling in their own right. As I have already pointed out, for 
example, most of the time Socrates denies having any significant moral 
knowledge. But there are occasions when he claims assurance of substantive 
moral propositions that seem to contradict his ubiquitous denials of 
significant moral knowledge.^^ Socrates claims that no harm can come to a 
good person regardless of what fortune he suffers (Ap. 41 d), which seems 
prima facie false. He holds that virtue (dperq, which is also translatable as 
'excellence' or 'competency' depending on context) is a kind of expert 
knowledge (tcxvti) like medicine or horsemanship or ship-piloting, and that 
having this special knowledge is necessary and sufficient to make one act 
virtuously. Socrates' intellectualism leads him to deny moral incontinence 
and to assert that no one ever commits immoral actions intentionally.
Perhaps the most glaring example of this occurs at Ap. 29b, where Socrates 
specifically denies any knowledge of the afterlife, and by implication denies possession of 
any significant knowledge, and then immediately asserts: "I do know, however, that it is 
wicked and shameful to do wrong, to disobey one's superior, be he god or man." Plato, 
Complete Works, ed. John Cooper, (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1997). As the context 
makes clear, the implication of this passage is that Socrates believes failure to follow a 
lawful command of a superior should lead to a punishment of some kind, which is, in itself, a 
substantial moral claim.
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Believing virtue to be a species of technical knowledge, he also seems to assert 
that the cardinal virtues (i.e., justice, courage, temperance, piety, and wisdom) 
are indistinguishable from one another. It is this last paradox—that courage, 
temperance, justice, piety, and wisdom are essentially the same thing—which 
is the focus of this dissertation. Commentators on Socratic philosophy have 
christened this enigma the U nity of Virtue' or U nity  of the Virtues' 
doctrine.50
Numerous commentators have addressed themselves to clarifying the 
Unity of Virtue Doctrine (hereafter ‘UVD') with varying results. Despite their 
efforts, however, there are several fundamental questions that remain 
unresolved among the commentators interested in this Socratic paradox:
1. What exactly does Socrates intend by the UVD when he introduces 
the issue in the Protagoras?
2. Is there a single UVD in the early dialogues or is Socrates 
inconsistent on the matter?
3. Is there a way to understand Socrates' doctrine of virtue that is 
rationally consistent?
4. Is the UVD consistent with other doctrines Socrates accepts?
5. Finally, is Socrates' doctrine correct?^!
In the chapters that follow 1 attempt to put some of these issues to rest. I will 
argue that there is indeed a single coherent doctrine rightly referred to as the 
'Unity of Virtue' which is a common thread running through many of the
50 Some commentators argue that Socrates thought of virtue as a composite thing and 
prefer 'Unity of the Virtues' while others, m yself included, hold the view that virtue is not 
divisible and therefore prefer 'Unity of Virtue' as the label for the doctrine. I adopt the 
latter convention in this work.
51 The first and third questions are suggested by Irwin; the second question arises 
because of Daniel Devereux's insistence that the version of the UVD found in the Protagoras 
is inconsistent with the versions found in other early dialogues. See Terence Irwin, Plato's 
Ethics. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 336, n.5.
27
Socratic dialogues. I will argue further that this doctrine is most appropriately 
understood to imply a strong unity among the cardinal virtues; this 
interpretation denies that virtue, in any philosophically meaningful sense, is 
divisible. Also, I will suggest why we can understand the UVD to be 
compatible with other important doctrines Socrates holds in the early 
dialogues. However, I have little interest in whether or not Socrates' moral 
theory is correct, and any attempt to argue for or against his position would 
take me far afield from the current project. Therefore, I leave it to others to 
attack or defend Socrates' view as a viable moral thesis.
That these issues remain unresolved after so many years of 
investigation by excellent scholars indicates what an enigma the UVD 
actually is. I therefore undertake this project with more than a little 
trepidation. However, I think understanding Socrates' view of virtue is 
paramount if we are to understand Socratic philosophy. As a philosopher so 
keenly interested in moral questions, the concept of virtue must play a central 
role in his overall philosophical perspective. If we are to understand 
Socrates, therefore, it seems to me we must come to grips with this problem. 
My approach is to investigate the major interpretations of the UVD that have 
been proposed by various commentators. I evaluate each in terms of its 
overall coherence, but more importantly its textual justification. No matter 
how compelling an interpretation may be, it must meet the ultimate test of 
the text itself. However, before giving an overview of the alternative 
interpretations of the UVD discussed in the chapters below, I should first give 
an overview of the texts containing evidence suggestive of the doctrine.
The problem of the UVD is most clearly articulated in the Protagoras at 
329dj5^ , where Socrates asks the famous sophist for whom the dialogue is
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named, if virtue is composed of distinct parts and if he thinks so, how these 
parts are related to one another. Protagoras defends the common-sense view 
that 'virtue' is the general name for distinct dispositions such as the tendency 
to behave justly, or bravely, or moderately, or piously. He asserts that there 
are five distinguishable parts of virtue (i.e., justice-ôucaioCTui/Ti, courage- 
dvSpeia, temperance-a<j<})poauvTi, piety-omoTqg, and wisdom-ao<J)La) each 
characterized by a unique ôi)vap.Lç (i.e., 'power', 'function', or 'ability') as well 
as name.52 He further maintains that a person may have one or more of 
these dispositions, but need not have them all. On this view the just person 
might be impious, the wise person intemperate, the foolish person 
courageous, and so on. Socrates sets out to dislodge his interlocutor firom this 
position with a series of elenchoi designed to demonstrate that Protagoras' 
position is inconsistent.^^ After a dramatic interlude the list of virtues is 
repeated at 349b and Protagoras argues that even if justice, piety, temperance, 
and wisdom are basically the same thing (a position Socrates forces him to 
admit), courage is substantially different from the rest. By the end of the 
dialogue {36\ff) Protagoras is forced to concede that if their assumptions are 
correct, even courage is not significantly different from the other virtues. 
Although Protagoras is brought to this conclusion reluctantly, he can take 
solace in the fact that it supports his initial assertion that virtue is teachable 
(Prot. 361b).54
52 For a list of Plato's use of these terms in the early dialogues see Appendix I, below.
53 Precisely what Socrates' position is supposed to be is the central matter of debate.
I give an overview of the main alternative interpretations in § C below.
54 Interestingly enough, Socrates admits that this contradicts the position he held at 
the beginning of their conversation (320c), although the irony of his admission should give us 
pause. It may w ell be that Socrates believed all along that virtue was teachable, but that a
29
To date, the majority of scholarship on the UVD (with the notable 
exception of Daniel Devereux) has focused primarily on these passages, taking 
the other dialogues as occasional supporting evidence for one or another of 
the various interpretations of Socrates' position in the Protagoras. I agree that 
the Protagoras is the logical place to begin an investigation of the UVD since it 
is the dialogue that explicitly raises this paradox. I also believe, as will become 
clear later, that this dialogue should be considered hermeneutically dominant 
over the others. However, we are not limited to the Protagoras for our 
knowledge of Socrates' view of virtue. Other Socratic dialogues are concerned 
with the nature of virtue and contain important clues to Socrates' view. Like 
the Protagoras many contain lists of the virtues, although these lists vary in 
their content. For instance, at Meno 74 the list of virtues includes courage, 
temperance, wisdom, and dignity (or 'high-mindedness'- (xeyaXo-rrpeTreLa). 
Interestingly, piety and justice are left out of the list, and this is one of the few 
places where high-mindedness is numbered among the virtues.55 The 
Euthydemus lists temperance, justice and courage as virtues (279b, 281c) and 
the Republic includes temperance, courage, and wisdom along with its 
primary focus—justice—but makes no mention of piety as a virtue. In the 
Charmides. it is suggested that temperance and wisdom are identical (174d), 
but there is no mention of the other virtues. The Laches focuses almost 
exclusively on the nature of courage but at 198b justice and temperance are
Sophist was not the right kind of teacher; this is suggested by the introduction of the 
dialogue (310-314c), where Socrates warns young Hippocrates about Sophists in general.
The list is repeated at 88a and the term appears in the Republic VI, YU, and VIII; 
see Appendix I below. It should be pointed out that this list of virtues is offered by Meno, and 
unlike the passages in the Protagoras, it is debatable whether Socrates thinks this list 
accurate or complete.
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included in the discussion of virtue as well. The Euthyphro goes so far as to 
suggest that piety is a proper part of justice, and implicitly that justice is a part 
of virtue as a whole (12e).56
By far the most complete list of characteristics labeled 'virtues' in the 
early dialogues comes from the Protagoras. And, as mentioned above, since 
the nature and relation of the characteristics called virtues is one of the 
primary philosophical questions, if not the primary question, of that dialogue, 
I think we are justified in taking it to be the central and therefore controlling 
dialogue for any investigation of Socrates' view. That is, if we can decipher 
Socrates' view of virtue in the Protagoras, it seems natural to use it as the 
paradigm when similar questions arise in other dialogues. However, it is an 
important part of my project not merely to assume, but to provide arguments 
that the view Socrates holds in the Protagoras is not confined to that dialogue, 
but is a view consistent with the Socratic dialogues at large.
C. Alternative Interpretations of the UVD
As I mentioned above, numerous commentators have, over the years, 
addressed themselves to a resolution of the UVD paradox. In this work I will 
focus on the four contemporary interpretations which dominate the current 
debate. I examine each in turn, devoting a chapter to the explication and, 
where necessary, refutation of their views. The first three chapters focus 
squarely on the problem of identifying exactly what Socrates' view is, while
This is the only place of which I am aware where it is explicitly asserted that the 
individual virtues may themselves have parts. Brickhouse and Smith argue that the "parts 
of gold" analogy at Prot. 329d supports the assertion that the individual virtues are proper 
parts of virtue as a whole as w ell as proper parts of each other. I reject this view in Chapter 
Four and argue that there are no proper parts of virtue in Socrates' view.
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the fourth raises the issue of consistency (i.e., whether there is more than one 
view espoused by Socrates in the early dialogues of Plato). In the final chapter 
I summarize my findings and argue that the properly interpreted UVD is 
consistent with other significant doctrines held by Socrates in the early 
dialogues. Below is an overview of the positions addressed in Chapters Two 
through Five.
C.l Gregory Vlastos and the Biconditionality Thesis
The contemporary debate on the nature of the UVD is due in large part 
to the work of Gregory Vlastos, who placed the issue of Socrates' view of 
virtue on the front burner of Socratic scholarship. In his opinion there had 
been a failure to appreciate the depth of the paradoxical nature of Socrates' 
view of virtue by previous commentators. In order to rectify this oversight, 
he set out to clarify Socrates' view once and for all.
Vlastos ultimately argues that the position Socrates takes on virtue in 
the Protagoras can best be defined as a 'biconditional' relation between discrete 
entities. This view (the Biconditional Thesis, or BT) entails that virtue is the 
general name of five distinct entities or dispositions (i.e., justice, temperance, 
courage, piety, and wisdom), but that in order for a person to be virtuous, she 
must instantiate all five characteristics. Thus, according to the BT, anyone 
who is wise will also necessarily be just, courageous, temperate, and pious. If 
a person has one of the virtues, then he must have them all; if one lacks any 
of the virtues, he lacks them all.
Vlastos is driven to this view by two primary considerations: first, he 
takes it to be obvious that Socrates is committed to the view that virtue is 
composed of proper parts (the Parts of Virtue Doctrine, or PVD) because of
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passages in the Euthyphro. Laches, and Meno. If Socrates is to be consistent, 
which Vlastos thinks he is, there cannot be any incontinuity between the 
view we find in the Protagoras and that which we find in the other early 
dialogues. The second element that leads Vlastos to the BT is the realization 
that the only other reasonable interpretation of Socrates' view in the 
Protagoras is the Unity Thesis (i.e., UT), which he takes to entail absurd 
consequences for Socrates. The UT holds that all the virtues are one and the 
same thing, and Vlastos believes this entails that the virtue terms are 
synonymous. Since it is clear, Vlastos argues, that 'courage' does not mean 
the same thing as 'piety' or 'temperance' etc., it carmot be the case that Socrates 
could rationally hold any view with this consequence.
I will argue that Vlastos' view is essentially mistaken, by showing that 
there is no compelling reason to think Socrates is committed to the PVD in 
the early dialogues and by showing why the UT does not suffer the absurd 
consequences Vlastos thinks so obvious.
C.2 Terry Penner and the Identity Thesis
In Chapter Three I explore the interpretation of the UVD offered by 
Terry Penner. He takes the view that, in the Protagoras at least, Socrates is 
committed to the identity of the so-called virtues. The Identity Thesis (or IT, 
which is the same as Vlastos' UT) straightforwardly holds that all the virtue 
terms refer to one and the self-same thing. The reason Socrates believes the 
just man will also be pious, brave, temperate and wise is that 'justice', 'piety', 
'wisdom', 'temperance', and 'courage' all refer to the same psychological 
disposition. Though the terms are not synonymous, Penner argues that they 
all point to the same reality: a disposition of the soul to behave in certain
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prescribed ways which is caused by knowing the difference between good and
evil .57
I take Penner to be essentially correct in his reading of the Protagoras 
although there are some eccentricities in his view about Socrates' epistemic 
project that 1 think are problematic and must be corrected. Another 
significant weakness of his view is the failure to address the question of 
consistency, particularly in relation to those passages in other early dialogues 
which Vlastos and others takes as evidence against the IT. I will argue that a 
revised version of Penner's view is consistent with the other early dialogues 
and the most reasonable interpretation of Socrates' UVD.
C.3 Thomas Brickhouse and Nicholas Smith on the Unique Role of Wisdom 
Among the Virtues
The fourth chapter is devoted to the most recent interpretation of
Socrates' UVD offered by Thomas Brickhouse and Nicholas Smith. Like
Vlastos, they argue Socrates is committed to the PVD in the Protagoras as
elsewhere. However, they go on to argue that Socrates is not only committed
to virtue's being composed of proper parts; they argue some of the virtues
themselves (e.g., justice) are composed of parts. In their view temperance,
courage, justice and piety are technical skills and all elements of a larger body
of knowledge (i.e., wisdom). Hence, anyone possessing wisdom will
necessarily have the requisite knowledge to perform related skills. For
Brickhouse and Smith, wisdom plays the unique role among the virtues.
57 Penner as w ell as many other commentators on Plato translate èTTlOTrjpq f) TTepl 
uavT(iiV dyaSwv' re k o I  KUKWi/ as "knowledge of all good and evil." I, however think 
KUKog and its cognates are better rendered "had' or 'wicked'. I give an argument for this in 
Appendix HI.
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tying them together while at the same time demonstrating their 
distinctiveness.
I argue that the interpretation of the UVD offered by Brickhouse and 
Smith, though interesting, rests on a fundamental misreading of key passages 
and must therefore be rejected. In my response, I show how a careful reading 
of the text demonstrates that Socrates cannot be committed to the positions 
central to their interpretation. Once these misreadings are exposed, it 
becomes clear why the Brickhouse and Smith view is untenable.
C.4 Daniel Devereux and the Consistency Problem
Chapter Five is devoted to the view of Daniel Devereux. His work on 
the UVD focuses on the consistency p r o b l e m . 5 8  He argues that Socrates is 
inconsistent on the UVD, holding different views in different dialogues. 
Specifically, Devereux argues that the position Socrates stakes out in the 
Protagoras is different from the one defended in the Laches. He goes on to 
speculate that this might reflect development in Plato's early thought: the 
Protagoras representing his earliest reflections on Socrates' view of virtue, 
and the Laches representing a more developed view.
Since it is my view that there is a coherent UVD in the early dialogues,
I reject Devereux's position. In my response to his argument, 1 demonstrate 
why Socrates cannot be committed to the view Devereux attributes to him in 
the Laches. If my argument is successful, it will demonstrate that there is no 
inconsistency in the views Socrates espouses in these two early dialogues.
He agrees with Penner that in the Protagoras, at least, Socrates is committed to 
the IT. See Chapter Five, below.
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There are, of course, many other commentators who have weighed in 
on each of these topics and their views will be considered in the context of the 
chapters that follow. Thus, here I have given only the barest outline of the 
material to be addressed. It has been my intention simply to provide the 
reader a feel for the direction of this work, not to adequately present, defend, 
or reject these views. That is the substance of the chapters below.
Chapter II 
Vlastos on the Unity of Virtue
The contemporary debate on Socrates' doctrine of the Unity of Virtue is 
due, in large part, to Gregory Vlastos' groundbreaking 1972 paper. 1 In that 
paper Vlastos tries to meet head on a problem which had either eluded or 
baffled scholars up to that time:^ Socrates' position at Protagoras 329c-330b on 
the relationship between the virtues (i.e., justice, piety, temperance, courage, 
and wisdom). Vlastos thinks he can solve this problem without committing 
Socrates either to logical inconsistency or s o p h i s t r y . ^  He argues that Socrates 
is committed, at most, to a biconditional relationship between justice, piety, 
courage, temperance, and wisdom, which are distinct parts of virtue. Any 
stronger logical relationship between the virtues, Vlastos believes, would 
undermine Socrates' clear commitment to the doctrine that virtue is 
composed of parts.
^"The Unity of the Virtues in the Protagoras" was originally published in Review of 
. 25 (1972): 415-458; a revised edition, to which I will always refer unless 
otherwise noted, appeared in Platonic Studies 2nd ed., (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1981), 221-265.
^Vlastos mentions A. E. Taylor (1937) and Shorey (1933) as examples of those who 
sim ply fail to recognize the significance of the problem, while Friedlander (1964) and Allen 
(1970) recognize the problem but do not make a serious effort toward a solution. Friedlander 
takes Socrates' position to be indefensible since it implies a strict identity of the virtues, 
which in turn suggests that he is engaged in irony. Allen, on the other hand, takes Socrates to 
be intentionally advancing fallacious arguments. Vlastos, of course, rejects these positions 
since he thinks it possible to take Socrates' arguments seriously and make good philosophical 
sense of them. Vlastos, Platonic Studies. 222 n. 2,223 ns. 4 and 5.
3lbid., 223.
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I believe we must reject Vlastos' interpretation, however, precisely 
because Socrates cannot be committed to the Parts of Virtue Doctrine (or 
PVD). I will argue that there is insufficient evidence to support Vlastos' claim 
that Socrates believes virtue is a composite whole of distinct parts. 1 use this 
as a foundation to argue later for a more robust version of the Unity of Virtue 
Doctrine. I divide this chapter into two sections: first, 1 analyze Vlastos' 
construal of the Unity of Virtue Doctrine and its dependence upon the Parts 
of Virtue Doctrine. Second, 1 argue that the text in no way forces us to accept a 
Socratic commitment to the PVD as Vlastos thinks. I argue further that if his 
reading were accurate, some of the very texts he uses to defend his position 
would commit Socrates to unacceptable inconsistencies.
A. The Vlastos Interpretation
Vlastos begins by looking carefully at the text in which we first discover 
the UVD: Protagoras 329c-330b. There he identifies three distinct disjunctive 
propositions put to Protagoras by Socrates. Each disjunction is exclusive so 
that Protagoras must choose only one disjunct from each of the propositions. 
But, Vlastos notes, none of them is meant to stand alone.^ Each is related to 
the others in some significant way that will become clear when they are 
closely examined. From each of the disjunctions, Vlastos identifies distinct 
propositions and names them the Unity Thesis, the Similarity Thesis, and the 
Biconditionality Thesis respectively (or, UT, ST, and BT) since they seem to 
imply three different views of the relationship between the virtues.
^Vlastos claims, "they are not treated in the text as logically disjoint tenets, but as 
successive moments in the elucidation of a single doctrine. That is how Protagoras himself 
understands them." Ibid., 224.
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Ultimately, Vlastos will argue these do not in fact represent three distinct 
views, but only one. How we ought to interpret the first two theses, according 
to Vlastos, is unclear at best—but not so the last. It is his strategy, therefore, to 
find a way of reading the UT and ST through the interpretive lens of the BT.
A.l The Three Theses
The first proposition, which Vlastos designates the Unity Thesis, is 
derived from Socrates' question (329d) to Protagoras after the latter's long 
speech on Zeus' dispensation of the virtues to humanity. Socrates asks:
Is virtue a single whole, and are justice and self-control and 
holiness parts of it, or are these latter all names for one and 
the same one thing?
This disjunction can be divided into its separate terms and stated more clearly
as:
PI) Virtue is a composite whole and justice, piety, 
temperance [courage and wisdom] are parts of it.
P2) Justice, piety, temperance [courage and wisdom] name the 
same thing.
Protagoras responds to Socrates' question by affirming the first element of the 
disjunction: virtue is a single thing composed of parts. In light of his choice, 
it is tempting to suppose that Socrates would choose P2) in opposition to 
Protagoras. The second term is the proposition that Vlastos refers to as the 
UT; the virtue terms all name the same thing.5 So is Socrates committed to 
the UT? Vlastos attempts to warn us off this option by claiming that PI) is 
"standard Socratic doctrine; therefore, on this point there can be no difference
^There are actually two formulations of the UT: the first at 329c, the second at 349b. 
Vlastos thinks Socrates is committed to the second but not the first See § B.l below.
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between him and Protagoras [his emphasis]".^ Vlastos offers two pieces of 
evidence to support this claim: first, Socrates' discussion with Meno (M. 78d- 
79e) seems to indicate that he is committed to virtue being composed of 
p a r ts / Second, Vlastos thinks the consequences of P2) are too bizarre even 
for Socrates to have considered. If Socrates were committed to P2), it would 
seem that all the virtue terms are synonymous; and if they are synonymous, 
other passages reflecting Socratic doctrine would be made false or rendered 
nonsense.8 So, according to Vlastos, on the disjunction from which the UT is 
derived, we find Socrates and Protagoras in fundamental agreement: both 
reject P2) in favor of PI).
The second disjunction, from which the Similarity Thesis is derived, 
immediately follows Protagoras' affirmation of PI). Socrates asks him to 
clarify the nature of the parts which he claims make up virtue:
Do you mean, I said, as the parts of a face are parts—mouth, 
nose, eyes, and ears—or like the parts of a piece of gold.
6lbid., 225.
^Vlastos actually makes a much stronger claim. He says "that Virtue is a 'whole' 
and that Justice, Temperance, etc. are its 'parts' is unequivocally affirmed and strongly 
emphasized. . . it is the doctrine on which the elenchus pivots" (my emphasis). Ibid., 225, 
n.8. But other commentators (e.g., Penner, Taylor, and Irwin) dispute that this is as clear as 
Vlastos thinks. He thus offers a fuller defense of this position in "Socrates On 'The Parts of 
Virtue'," Ibid., 418-423. I w ill have more to say about this defense in the section below.
^Vlastos points to two passages which seem difficult to square with P2): first, "there 
is one ideal form by which all holy things are holy" (Bi. 6d) and second, "the part of justice 
which is religious and is holy is the part that has to do with the service of the gods" Œu. 
12e)." In both cases synonymy of the virtues seems to play havoc with the sense of these 
passages. So, if these passages, as well as the Meno passage quoted above, represent 
Socrates' position, it makes sense for him to reject P2). I argue below, however, that we have 
good reasons to doubt that these passages represent "standard Socratic doctrine." Further, 
Penner w ill argue there is no reason to think P2) entails that the virtue terms are synonymous; 
there are many words in the English language which are not synonymous yet refer to the same 
thing. For example, in some parts of the United States soda' and coke' both name one thing 
(i.e., a carbonated beverage or soft drink), but they are clearly not synonymous terms. If there 
is not a problem of synonymy and Socrates is not committed to the PVD, then he may have 
been committed to P2) after all!
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which do not differ from one another or from the whole 
except in size (329d)?
Again we can clarify this disjunction by dividing it into its basic terms:
Pl.a) The parts of virtue are like the parts of a face [each with 
distinct properties].^
Pl.b) The parts of virtue are like the parts of a piece of gold, 
which do not differ from one another or from the whole 
except in size.
That this disjunction is intended to highlight the nature of the parts of virtue 
by identifying their differences seems prima facie clear. Socrates begins the 
question with troTepov (literally, "which of these" or "which of the two"), and, 
as already noted, it immediately follows Protagoras' affirmation of PI). In 
effect Socrates is saying "If Virtue is composed of parts, what are they like?" 
According to Vlastos, Socrates and Protagoras, agreeing there are distinct parts 
of virtue, diverge on the nature of the parts: Protagoras believes they are like 
the parts of a face (each with a distinct nature and Suvapis, 330a) while 
Socrates thinks they are more like pieces of a lump of gold (distinct only in 
there relative size).
If this is the correct reading of the text, Vlastos thinks we face a serious 
problem. Socrates' affirmation of Pl.b) seems to have troubling consequences:
To take the analogy at face-value we would have to take 
[Socrates] to mean that the virtues are alike in respect of all 
their qualities—that they are qualitatively undifferentiated 
dispositions . . . could Socrates really mean that? 10
^It is clear that Socrates thinks this option entails that there are distinct properties 
for each of the virtues just as there are for the parts of the face because the second half of the 
disjunct makes clear that there are no distinct properties except size if this option is taken, 
and second, when Socrates follows up the analogy at 330a he proposes what is only implied 
here: that each part would have its own 8uvap.LÇ. 
lOviastos, 230.
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That is, on a literal reading of the text the parts of gold analogy will not allow 
Socrates to assert any significant (i.e., essential) difference between the parts of 
virtue. So why is he committed to parts of virtue at all? Since Socrates 
apparently rejects P2), there must be some other way to understand Pl.b) that 
would not commit him to the belief that the parts of virtue share all the same 
essential properties. Vlastos thinks Socrates must not really mean what he 
seems to affirm in Pl.b). But if he does not believe the virtues share all the 
same essential properties, what does he mean?
The answer, Vlastos believes, is to be found in the final disjunction 
Socrates puts to Protagoras. Socrates wants to know, if virtue is composed of 
parts, and if the parts are like the parts of a face:
Then, do men so share in these parts of virtue that some 
have one and some another, or must a man who possesses 
one of them possess all (329e)?
Once again for clarity we can divide the disjunction into two distinct
propositions:
Pl.a.i) A person may possess one part of virtue without 
having all the rest.
Pl.a.ii) A person possessing one part of virtue must have aU 
the rest.
Protagoras emphatically affirms Pl.a.i) asserting that it is possible for someone 
to be brave without being just, while others are just without being wise.^^ He 
takes this to be common sense. However, Socrates (according to Vlastos) 
champions Pl.a.ii) which asserts, having any one of the parts of virtue entails
^^The list of proper parts of virtue is here expanded to include 'courage' and 'wisdom' 
(329e-330a), making a set of five proper parts of virtue: justice, piety, temperance, courage, 
and wisdom.
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having all the others.^ Thus, Socrates is affirming a necessary biconditional 
relationship between the parts of virtue: one has courage, iff one has justice, 
iff one has piety, iff one has temperance, iff one has wisdom. Vlastos believes 
this biconditional relationship between the parts of virtue is, unlike the UT 
and ST, " c r y s t a l - c l e a r .  "^3 Unlike the Unity Thesis, which denies a Socratic 
doctrine (for which Vlastos thinks there is independent evidence) and forces 
Socrates to accept the synonymy of the virtue-terms, and unlike the 
Similarity Thesis, which forces him to claim the parts of virtue are not 
significantly distinct at all, the Biconditionality Thesis does not force him into 
inconsistency or error. Therefore, since the BT is clearer than either the UT 
or ST, Vlastos argues we should take it as the paradigm from which to 
interpret the other two.
A.2 Reinterpreting the Unity and Similarity Theses
Vlastos has argued that of the three possible interpretations of the PVD, 
it is difficult to see how Socrates could be committed to either the UT (as 
expressed at 329d) or the ST. But his endorsement of the pieces of gold 
analogy at 329d5 seems to commit him to the ST, while his restatement of the 
initial disjunction at 349b seems to commit him to some version of the UT.
On the other hand, Socrates' commitment to the BT at 329e presents few 
exegetical difficulties overall. Therefore, Vlastos argues, we should think of it 
as the key to interpreting Socrates' view of the other two theses.
12viastos, Ibid., 232.
^^Ibid. It is not at all clear, as 1 w ill argue below, why Vlastos thinks the disjunction 
from which Pl.a.ii) is drawn is any clearer than the previous two.
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If Vlastos is correct and Socrates is committed to the BT, we have a 
convenient way to interpret the troublesome propositions that seem to 
commit him to the UT. Socrates makes four separate assaults (330c-331b, 
332a-333b, 333c, 349d-350c) on Protagoras' position where he concludes 
propositions such as:
a) Justice is holiness (331c);
b) Temperance is wisdom (333b);
c) Wisdom is courage (350c).
On the surface these statements are puzzling if Socrates denies the UT as 
Vlastos thinks. What sense then can it make to claim there are distinct parts 
of virtue and to claim those parts are essentially the same? But Vlastos 
argues these can be interpreted in a way that does not commit Socrates to 
anything too u n u s u a l . 4^ T h i s  is because the BT entails a proposition that, 
Vlastos thinks, will link all three theses together:
L) Virtue, wisdom, temperance, courage, justice, piety are 
interpredicable.45
That is, if the BT holds, it should be possible to understand the predicates of 
the propositions asserted in a), b), and c) to be "asserted not of their abstract 
subject[s], but of [their] concrete instances."^^ The difficulty with this view is 
finding a way to ignore the prima facie reading of those propositions while 
maintaining the peculiar logical relation implied by the BT. Reading them
^4ibid., 259-265. Also see Vlastos, "Self-Predication and Self-Participation in 
Plato's Later Period," and "Plato's 'Third Man' Argument fParm. 132al-b2): Text and Logic;" 
both in Platonic Studies. 2nd ed.
^^The designator of this proposition— L'—represents the linking function Vlastos 
takes the BT to play. Ibid., 234; n. 32.
16lbid., 252.
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literally just seems to commit Socrates to the UT: justice is piety, piety is 
wisdom, etc. To avoid the implications of this problematic siufece grammar, 
Vlastos appeals to what he calls Pauline Predication.^^ The Pauline 
Predication Thesis simply asserts that propositions which predicate one part 
of virtue of another, or one part of virtue of itself, should not be read as
i) X is Y;
or
Ü) X is X; 
but rather as
iii) Anyone who possesses the property X also possesses V; 
or the tautology,
iv) Anyone who possesses X, possesses X.
Using Pauline Predication to get around the surface grammar, Vlastos 
thinks we should translate "Justice is wise" as "Anyone who has justice is 
wise." And this is just what the BT suggests: having any one of the virtues 
logically entails having all the rest. Thus, using biconditionality as an 
interpretive lens, the UT need not imply that the parts of virtue are 
synonymous or identical. All the UT need imply is what the BT demands:
^^Vlastos refers to these locutions as 'Pauline' after the Apostle Paul. He takes 
Socratic propositions such as "Justice is pious" to be similar to St. Paul's assertion of I 
Corinthians 13:4 that "Love (f| à-ydlTTi) is long-suffering, love is kind, is not jealous; love 
does not boast [and] is not base. . (my translation). St. Paul is not asserting that love has 
the properties of patience, kindness, etc. but that a person who possesses love is patient, kind, 
etc. Likewise, Socrates is not c la im in g  that the universal justice has the property of 
piousness but that the person who is just is also pious. In other words, we o u ^ t not predicate 
one universal of another as seems to be suggested by the UT, but rather predicate each and 
every one of the virtues of any person who demonstrates possession a single virtue. Ibid., 235, 
n.33, 252-259.
45
the parts of virtue "are attributes necessarily instantiated in one and the same 
class of persons [his emphasis]."^®
Vlastos uses the same strategy to reinterpret the ST. It will be recalled 
that on Vlastos' reading of the Protagoras. Socrates supports Pl.b)—the parts 
of virtue are like the parts of a piece of gold, which do not differ from one 
another or from the whole except in size—which seems to deny any 
significantly distinct qualities among the parts of virtue. But if we read Pl.b) 
through BT (and therefore L), Socrates is only committed to the claim that the 
ST  is necessary (but not sufficient) for the BT.^^ If the parts of virtue are 
interpredicable, Vlastos argues, there is "a five-point similarity between them: 
each is like the rest in all five of these respects."20 Thus, what Socrates means 
when he claims that each of the parts of virtue are 'similar' is that each will 
have the others predicated of it. That is, "justice is like piety" in that "justice 
is just, wise, temperate, courageous, and pious," and "piety is pious, just, wise, 
temperate, and courageous," etc. 'Justice' and 'piety' share many of the same 
predicates, so they are similar without being identical.
I can now summarize Vlastos' argument for the UVD as follows. 
Socrates presents Protagoras with three pairs of propositions meant to 
elucidate the latter's view of the nature of virtue. Protagoras holds virtue to 
be a whole composed of parts [PI)], which are like the parts of a face [Pl.a)], 
and which may be possessed independently of one another [Pl.a.i)]. Socrates
l^Ibid., 246.
^^Vlastos puts it as follows: "if each virtue has the qualities of all the rest [which 
is the implication of the ST], then to have one virtue is to have all the rest as well." Ibid., 
247.
20ibid. Vlastos also points out that a "corresponding similarity w ill hold between 
the dynameis of the virtues," n. 73.
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agrees that virtue is composed of parts [Pl)],^^ but holds the parts are more 
like pieces of a chunk of gold [Pl.b)], the essential properties of which cannot 
be possessed independently from one another [Pl.a.ii)j. The biconditionality 
of the parts of virtue is the key to understanding Socrates' position. If having 
one part of virtue necessarily entails having them all, we should understand 
the chunk of gold analogy to exemplify the strong similarity of the virtues 
without committing Socrates to their identity. Thus, the analogy is not as 
troublesome as it might at first appear. As for the 'unity' of the parts of 
virtue, they are 'one' only in the sense that if they are found at all, they are all 
found in the same type of person, i.e., the virtuous person. So for Vlastos, the 
UT and the ST should be interpreted through the BT; if we do so, he thinks 
an internally consistent view of Socrates' doctrine emerges.
B. Problems w ith the Vlastos Interpretation
Vlastos' interpretation of the UVD (i.e., the Biconditionality Thesis), 
while both novel and interesting, is not convincing. It is motivated primarily 
by the belief that Socrates could not have accepted the strong version of the 
Unity Thesis expressed in P2). And his belief that Socrates could not have 
accepted P2) is in turn motivated by the belief that it is contrary to "standard 
Socratic doctrine," which maintains that virtue is composed of parts (the Parts 
of Virtue Doctrine).^ He believes there is textual evidence (outside the
2^See note 9 above.
^V lastos was taken to task for his initially undefined claim that Socrates is 
committed to the PVD. In response to numerous criticisms, he wrote "Socrates on the Tarts of 
Virtue.'" The objections I raise to the PVD here are by and large distinct from those he 
answers in that paper. See Vlastos, Platonic Studies. 2nd ed., 418-423, and the starred notes 
to "The Unity of the Virtues in the Protagoras." 428-430.
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Protagoras) which supports his view that Socrates is committed to the PVD.
In particular, there is data from the M eno and Laches that, he believes, make 
it impossible for Socrates to have accepted P2); thus, he concludes Socrates 
along with Protagoras must have been committed to P I ) . 23 I  am unmoved by 
Vlastos' argument, and I desire to demonstrate why I think his interpretation 
of the UVD should be rejected. This requires that I focus squarely on his 
fundamental assumption: that P2) is contrary to standard Socratic doctrine. 
The primary goal of this section is to do just that: I argue that the texts of the 
early dialogues do not demonstrate a Socratic commitment to the PVD  as 
Vlastos maintains. In addition to this, I argue that Vlastos faces an exegetical 
problem internal to the Protagoras that makes the BT less attractive still. If I 
am correct, the combination of these objections will undermine the warrant 
for Vlastos' rejection of P2) as Socrates' position on the UVD. That will, of 
course, leave Socrates' position to be spelled out later.
B.l Some Textual Problems in the Protagoras
Before examining the texts of the Meno and Laches for their alleged 
support of the PVD, I want to highlight some problems for the Vlastos 
interpretation internal to the Protagoras.24 First, if he is correctly reading the 
text of the Protagoras. Vlastos is forced to confront, and ultimately explain
23Daniel Devereux points to the same evidence but draws a different conclusion: 
there is no consistent Socratic doctrine of the Unity of Virtues in the early dialogues. He 
takes the Protagoras to reflect Socrates' uncritical speculations on the nature of virtue, while 
the Laches and Meno represent later Platonic revisions of Socrates' thought. I treat 
Devereux's argument in detail in Chapter Five below.
2^ 1 do not want to leave the impression that this is a completely original objection 
against Vlastos. Indeed, he makes it clear that he is aware of this problem in "UVP," 225- 
228 (and the corresponding stared notes). However, I find Vlastos' solution to this problem  
unconvincing. Devereux also raises this objection in "The Unity of Virtues," 768-770.
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away, a prima facie inconsistency on Socrates' behalf. It will be recalled that, 
according to Vlastos, Socrates and Protagoras agree in their rejection of P2): 
'justice', 'temperance', 'piety' ['courage', and 'wisdom'] are all names of one 
thing. Since the disjunction of PI) and P2) is exclusive, Socrates and 
Protagoras must also agree that the names of the virtues refer to distinct parts 
which taken together compose virtue as a whole (i.e., PI)). The difference 
between Socrates and Protagoras, he goes on to argue, is how they understand 
the nature of the parts: Protagoras believes they are like the parts of a face, 
while Socrates thinks they are more like parts of a piece of gold. Socrates' 
elenctic efforts thereafter, according to Vlastos, are to dissuade Protagoras 
from the face analogy and its attendant consequences.
However, if Socrates and Protagoras agree that the virtue-terms are 
used to designate discrete parts of virtue at 329d, Vlastos is faced with a 
problem when Socrates reiterates the original disjunction at 349b. At that 
point Socrates seems to reject what Vlastos says he must accept: the PVD. It is 
a long passage but it is worth quoting in full because in it Socrates attempts to 
make clear Protagoras' position, and by contrast his own:
The question, if I am not mistaken was this. Wisdom, 
temperance, courage, justice, and piety are five terms. Do 
they stand for a single reality, or has each term a particular 
entity underlying it, a reality with its own separate function, 
each different from the other? Your answer was that they are 
not names for the same thing, but that each of these terms 
applies to its own separate reality, and that all these things are 
parts of virtue, not like the parts of a lump of gold all 
homogeneous with each other and with the whole of which 
they are parts, but like the parts of a face, resembling neither 
the whole nor each other and each having a separate 
function.
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In this passage Socrates restates the initial set of disjunctions presented at 329d 
but in slightly different terms:
PI') 'Wisdom', 'temperance', 'courage', 'justice', 'piety' are five 
terms that refer to different things each with a particular 
entity underlying it.
P2')'Wisdom', 'temperance', 'courage', 'justice', 'piety' are five 
terms that refer to one thing.
Pl.a') The parts of virtue are like the parts of a face, each 
having a separate function.
Pl.b') The parts of virtue are like parts of a lump of gold 
homogeneous with each other and the whole.
Protagoras reaffirms his commitment to PI) and Pl.a) by affirming PI') and
Pl.a'). So both Socrates and Protagoras accept 349b as an accurate restatement
of the original set of disjunctions at 329d. Thus, if Socrates had accepted PI),
he could not possibly accept P2') without committing himself to a most
obvious inconsistency! Since Socrates seems intent on dislodging Protagoras
from his commitment to PI) (and as well PI')) as demonstrated by his
continual elenctic probing, it would seem that Socrates accepts P2) as well as
P2') (or at least prefers them to the Protagorean alternatives).
According to Vlastos, however, this is an incorrect reading of the text.
He argues Socrates accepts P2') while at the same time rejecting P2) since the
former is put "in a form which is not associated with the denial of [Pl)]."^ If,
on the other hand, we read P2') as a natural linguistic variation of P2),
Socrates would be faced with the same objections raised earlier: first, he
would have to think "the five virtues are the same virtue," and second, he
2 5 v i a s t o s ,  UVP, 226.
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would think "that their names are synonyms [his emphases]."^ Both 
alternatives are unacceptable to Vlastos since they would be contrary to 
Socrates' commitment to the PVD. However, Socrates' commitment to the 
PVD is a core issue and cannot be assumed. Further, there is nothing in the 
context of this passage that suggests Socrates understands P2') to have a 
different logical import than P2). In fact, the context clearly demonstrates that 
both Socrates and Protagoras believe they amount to one and the same 
proposition!
Thus, if Socrates affirms P2')—which we have every reason to believe 
he does—and if the natural reading of the text suggests he believes P2') and 
P2) amount to the same thing, Vlastos needs some compelling reason to 
think he would not also affirm P2). But taken by itself, the Protagoras gives 
him no such reason. The text seems to indicate that Socrates rejects the PVD 
which follows from PI), in favor of the stronger IT which follows from P2). 
Therefore, the evidence on which Vlastos' thesis must depend will have to 
come from other early dialogues. But as I argue in the next section, the 
evidence for a Socratic commitment to the PVD in the other early dialogues is 
dubious.
^^This is what Vlastos takes to be the consequences of the IT, Ibid., 227. While I 
have no problem with the first objection, I am more dubious of the second. According to 
Vlastos, Plato's semantic theory is rather restrictive since “Form-naming words get their 
sense through their reference" ("UVP" starred notes, 433). Thus, for Socrates there carmot be 
two non-synonymous terms with the same reference. But as far as I can tell there is no clear 
evidence in the early dialogues that Socrates believes abstract terms must get their sense 
from their reference, or that Socrates had any systematic semantic theory at all! Neither is 
it clear that Socrates believes there is for each genuine abstract term a corresponding 6 l5 o ç . 
That is, 1 am doubtful that the 'Socrates' of the early dialogues has formulated a theory of 
Forms.
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The second problem—internal to the Protagoras—Vlastos faces 
concerns the way he understands the initial set of disjunctions put to 
Protagoras at 329d-330b. We should recall that, according to him, the three 
disjunctions are meant to elucidate "a single doctrine." Further, the 
disjunctions are exclusive, not inclusive, so only one disjunct from each can 
be affirmed. From the first disjunction we get:
PI) Virtue is a composite whole and justice, piety, 
temperance (courage and wisdom) are parts of it;
and
P2) Justice, piety, temperance (courage and wisdom) name the 
same thing.
Since, according to Vlastos, both Socrates and Protagoras reject P2), Socrates 
poses the next disjunction as a clarification of PI) and we get:
Pl.a) The parts of virtue are like the parts of a face;
and
Pl.b) The parts of virtue are like the parts of a piece of gold, 
which do not differ from one another or from the whole 
except in size.
Here they part company, Protagoras affirming the first and Socrates the 
second. Both disjunctions clearly fall under PI) and are rightly understood as 
an elucidation of it. So far, so good. But what about the third disjunction? 
From it we derive:
Pl.a.i) A person may possess one part of virtue without 
having all the rest.
and
Pl.a.ii) A person possessing one part of virtue m ust have all 
the rest.
These two disjuncts are clearly meant to be an elucidation of Pl.a) which, 
according to Vlastos, Socrates rejects in favor of Pl.b). But it is from Pl.a.ii)
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that Vlastos' BT is derived. So how can Pl.a.ii) represent the clearest 
formulation of Socrates' position if it is derived from a proposition which he 
rejects (i.e., Pl.a))?
It would appear that Vlastos must surrender at least one of a number of 
claims important to his thesis: either he gives up the claim that the 
disjunctions are exclusive, or he yields the claim that Socrates is committed to 
the parts of gold analogy, or he gives up the last disjunct from which the BT is 
derived. The text seems to preclude the first option and the importance of 
Pl.a.ii) to his thesis precludes the last. That leaves the parts of gold analogy. 
But if Socrates rejects that, he would be committed to Pl.a) which entails that 
the virtues have distinct functions or powers, which is the Protagorean 
position he attacks throughout the rest of the dialogue.
There is another possibility open to Vlastos. He could argue that while 
the first and last disjunctions are exclusive, the second is not. While this 
would be ad hoc, it would allow him to maintain a Socratic commitment to 
the parts of gold analogy. The question then is how consistent is the parts of 
gold analogy and the BT? That is, does the BT really clarify the gold analogy 
at aU? Of this I am rather dubious. Further, if the face and gold analogies are 
not exclusive of one another, does the BT also clarify the face analogy and if 
so, how?
The point of these observations is that if Vlastos is correctly reading the 
text, we are faced with a number of exegetical problems. There is, however, a 
simple way to avoid these difficulties. There is what I take to be a more 
natural reading of the text. We could read the text as conunitting Socrates to 
P2) instead of PI) and then we avoid the need to explain away the prima facie 
inconsistency between Socrates' position at 329d and 349b because there would
53
be no inconsistency. Further, we avoid any ad hoc attempts to interpret the 
relationship between the disjunctions at 329d-330b. But this reading of the 
Protagoras would commit Socrates to the UT which is contrary to the PVD.
So if I am right about how we should read the Protagoras we fece two 
possibilities: either the Protagoras is inconsistent with other early dialogues, 
or Vlastos is wrong about Socrates' commitment to the PVD. Since I reject 
the first alternative, I must now go on to argue against what Vlastos calls 
"standard Socratic doctrine."
B.2 Vlastos on Standard Socratic Doctrine
I have argued that the text of the Protagoras provides no positive 
evidence for a Socratic commitment to the PVD. In fact, I think the text 
precludes such a commitment. So what other evidence is there in the early 
dialogues which might support the claim that Socrates is committed to 
virtue's composite nature? Vlastos believes we find significant affirmation of 
the PVD in two early dialogues: the Laches and the M eno.^  ^ In both cases, he 
argues we find Socrates clearly committed to the PVD. I will argue, however, 
that there is no such evidence to be found in the Laches, and that the Meno is 
ambiguous on the issue and further, as a transitional dialogue should not be 
taken as evidence for Socratic doctrine.
also believes Socrates' commitment to the PVD is demonstrated in the 
Euthyphro. There are two reasons I w ill not deal with that passage in the text of this 
chapter. First, Vlastos himself spends very little time on it focusing instead on the text of 
the Laches and the Meno. Second, and more importantly, the Euthyphro raises as many 
problems as it solves for Vlastos. According to the Euthyphro justice entails piety, but not 
vice versa. At lle-12e Euthyphro and Socrates seem to agree that piety is a part, not of 
virtue, but of another part of virtue, namely justice. It seems that Socrates believes justice 
divides into two subsets: pious justice and non-pious justice. It would evidently be the case, 
therefore, that every pious action is just, but there w ill be some just actions that are not pious. 
This is clearly inconsistent with Socrates' conclusion at Prot. 331b as w ell as Vlastos' BT.
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B.2.a Evidence from the Laches^
The argument for Socrates' commitment to the PVD in the Laches 
hangs on the implication of three passages: first, it is Socrates who introduces 
the idea that virtue is composed of parts (190d); second, it is Socrates who re­
emphasizes the division of virtue to Nicias (198a); and third, it is Socrates 
who, at the end of the dialogue (199e), points out that they had supposed 
virtue to be composed of parts throughout their conversation. Since it is 
Socrates who continually emphasizes the premise that virtue is composed of 
parts, are we not justified in claiming he is committed to its truth?
I do not think the text of the Laches will bear out the assertion that 
Socrates is committed to the PVD. There are two arguments against this 
seemingly natural reading of the text. First, the text itself does not actually 
commit Socrates to anything. Consider the introduction of the PVD; Socrates 
says:
I would not have us begin . . . with inquiring about the whole 
of virtue, for that may be more than we can accomplish. Let 
us first consider whether we have a sufficient knowledge of a 
part; the inquiry will thus probably be made easier to us 
(190d).
We can read this passage quite naturally as Socrates suggesting they assume 
virtue is composed of parts to make the inquiry easier. Because it is an 
assumed premise, we have no reason to think he is actually committed to its 
truth; he simply puts forward an hypothetical premise for the sake of 
argument. The question is, why? It is possible that Socrates actually accepts
^Because I deal with the Laches at length in Chapter Five below, 1 w ill offer only 
an overview of that argument here.
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the PVD and thinks it would be easier to inquire about a part rather than the 
whole. It is equally possible that while he rejects the PVD, he is also aware 
that his immediate discussion group not only accepts it, but could not 
imagine denying it. Perhaps what Socrates wants his interlocutors to see is 
that this assumption is a mistake.29 Whichever of these two options is 
correct, it is the case that this text in isolation cannot resolve the issue.
If the text is ambiguous about Socrates' commitment to the PVD, is 
there any reason to favor one reading over the other? The answer is a 
resounding "Yes!" A few lines before Socrates introduces the PVD as a 
methodological assumption, he and Laches agree that in order to be an 
acceptable advisor on the education of children they must "first know the 
nature of virtue." Then Socrates says: "We say then. Laches, that we know 
the nature of virtue." Now, this is an extraordinary claim and Socrates 
cannot mean what he says! If Socrates did believe he knew the nature of 
virtue as a prima facie reading of this passage suggests, what are we to make 
of his standard denial of knowledge at 186e:
Socrates avers that he has no knowledge of the matter—he is 
unable to decide which of you speaks truly—neither 
discoverer nor student is he of anything of the kind.
Either this is a bold-faced lie, or Socrates really does not know the nature of
virtue. It seems to me that what this passage demonstrates is that Socrates is
aware that Laches, and very probably Nicias, Melesias, and Lysimachus as
well, think they know what virtue is, even though they do not. And, a
significant element of what they think they know about virtue is that it is
fact, I think that is precisely what he wants them to see, as w ill become 
presently evident.
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composed of p a r t s . 3 0  I f  we read 190d in this context, it becomes clear that 
Socrates is setting out to demonstrate to his interlocutors that a significant 
common assumption about virtue is at best questionable, at worst f a l s e . ^ l
In light of this evidence I maintain that the provisional nature of the 
claim at 190d is sufficient to cause us to doubt that Socrates himself is 
committed to its truth. The centrality of this seemingly uncontroversial 
presupposition throughout the dialogue is a further clue for the reader to 
seize upon. Each time Socrates reminds an interlocutor of the PVD, the 
provisional nature of the initial claim is reinforced. This claim—"virtue is 
composed of parts"—appears to be what we are expected to recognize as 
problematic and which we are therefore expected to critically evaluate.
Thus, when considered as a whole, one point the dialogue makes is 
that if we suppose virtue is composed of parts—and it is in fact composed of 
parts—it should be easier to arrive at knowledge of a part rather than the 
whole. But if virtue is not divisible in this presupposed way, pursuing a part 
of it should lead to a dead end. And this is precisely the aporatic quandary 
the dialogue highlights. Thus, a re-evaluation of the initial premise is 
suggested by the conclusion of the final elenchus at 199e where Socrates sets 
the PVD against N idas' seemingly Socratic definition of courage. He makes it 
clear that the proposition "courage is a part of virtue" is contradictory to
30% take it to be rather uncontroversial that most, if not all, of Socrates' 
contemporaries made precisely this assumption (e.g.. Là- 198a, 199e, Mr 74a, Prot. 329d). It is 
Socrates' claim that virtue is a single thing that is the revolutionary philosophical claim.
^^This does not entail that Socrates actually knows what virtue is, only that he is 
confident that it is not composed of parts. It is quite consistent for him to know that, and 
perhaps even why, a particular assertion about virtue will fail and for him to claim that he 
does not know what virtue is. Penner takes a similar line in "What Laches and Nicias 
Miss—And Whether Socrates Thinks Courage Merely a Part of Virtue," Ancient Philosophy. 
1992,1-27.
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"courage is all of virtue." If Nidas' definition is correct, then the assumed 
premise must be false. On the other hand, if the assumed premise is true, 
N idas' definition must be false. But notice that Socrates only dedares that 
they have failed to discover what courage is (199e). It is not dear which of the 
two claims is true; what is dear is that the two are inconsistent. The 
implication is that both propositions must be carefully re-examined if the 
truth is to be discovered. If Socrates had been committed to the truth of the 
initial assumption, he could have boldly pronounced N idas' definition false. 
His feilure to do this only serves to emphasize its provisional nature.
The condusion of these considerations is that a careful reading of the 
Laches gives us no reason to think Socrates is committed to the claim "Virtue 
is composed of parts." In fact, the context of the PVD's introduction makes it 
entirely implausible to think Socrates could believe it is true. Socrates is no 
more asserting the composite nature of virtue than he is daim ing to know 
the nature of virtue! I take the aside between Socrates and Laches at 190c as a 
dramatic cue; we should mark that something significant is about to happen 
in the dialogue. What follows is an assumption that turns out to be 
incompatible with what appears to be Socrates' own view. So while the 
characters of the dialogue end in a state of aporia, we are meant to recognize 
the cause of their confusion: the assumption that virtue is composed of parts.
B.2.b Evidence from the Meno
The most important text in support of Socrates' commitment to the 
PVD, according to Vlastos, is Meno 71d - 79e.^2 In this section of text, Meno
is clear that the text from the Meno is more important than that of Laches, even 
though Vlastos never says it explicitly. This is clear because he devotes only the last
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offers a series of definitions of virtue, all of which are rejected by Socrates.
But throughout the exchange, virtue is spoken of as consisting of parts. From 
this, Vlastos concludes that Socrates must in fact be committed to the PVD. 
Specifically, he points to two analogies as support for this view.
First, there is the bee/virtue analogy at 72b-d where Socrates 
emphasizes the kind of universal required to answer the "What is virtue?" 
question.33 In response to the initial "What is virtue?" question, Meno offers 
five distinct varieties of virtue: the virtue of 1) a man, 2) a woman, 3) a child 
(male or female), 4) an old man, and 5) a slave (71e). Socrates rejects this 
swarm (CTfifjvoç) of virtues as failing to capture the essence (ovaias) of virtue.
If there is a distinction between the virtues (bees), it m ust be because they 
have a distinctive property; they are not distinct qua virtue (72b). Meno 
agrees that this must be the case, but at the same time fails to see how to apply 
this to the "What is virtue?" question (72d).
The importance of this analogy, according to Vlastos, is that Socrates "is 
already implying that virtues do differ in various ways and are 'the same' 
only in respect of 'that single form they all possess by virtue of which they are 
all virtues.'"34 Just as there are different varieties of bees, so too there must
paragraph of his defense of the "parts of Virtue" doctrine on the Laches. The rest of the 
paper is devoted to the text of the Meno as a response to what he calls the "Penner, Taylor, 
Irwin objections" to his earlier claim that the "parts of virtue doctrine" is "standard Socratic 
doctrine." Vlastos, "SVP," 423.
33Nehamas is correct in pointing out that Meno does not fail to provide a universal as 
his response to the "What is F-ness?" question. Managing the city, the household, etc., 
which Meno proposes as the definition of virtue (71e), is not an example of particulars; 
rather it is an example of universals. However, these universels are insufficiently broad to 
answer Socrates' question. Alexander Nehamas, 1975, "Confusing Universals and Particulars 
in Plato's Early Dialogues," The Review of Metaphysics 29,296; see also Hugh Benson, 1992, 
"Misunderstanding the 'What-is-F-ness?' Question," in Essays on the Philosophy of Socrates.
34viastos, 1980, SPV, 418.
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be different varieties of virtue. So, according to Vlastos, we can take Socrates' 
use of this analogy as evidence of his belief that the virtues are individually 
distinct while unified under some common form.
But the bee analogy, as Vlastos points out, is flawed because it is too 
"loose." An individual bee might belong to a subspecies of bee while also 
participating in general bee-hood. For example, a bumble bee is different 
from a honey bee, while both are bees. Therefore, Vlastos believes this 
analogy too imprecise in relation to virtue. The virtues are different because 
"the [individual] virtues are varieties of virtue [in general]" (his emphasis).^ 
It appears that Vlastos does not think there are subspecies of virtue.
To rectify the shortcoming of the bee/virtue analogy, Vlastos claims 
that Socrates suggests a more precise analogy of the relationship between the 
virtues and virtue. Here Socrates parallels the justice/virtue relationship 
with the round/shape (74b) and the white/color (74c) relationships: i.e., 
justice is to virtue as round is to shape, or white is to color. When 
considering the round or roundness, we call it a shape (crxfjixd t l )  precisely 
because there are other shapes besides it (74c). The same is true when we 
consider whiteness; it is fl color (xpw|id ti)  because there are other colors 
besides. Vlastos interprets this passage as Socrates struggling to help Meno 
understand that in all such cases there are multiple (non-identical) universals 
that are properly predicated of some more general universal. Thus, this 
second analogy depends upon justice being understood as a virtue (dpern t l ) 
rather than virtue (73e). The point emphasized by these distinctions is that
35lbid.
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in Socrates' view the fact that the name 'virtue' applies to all 
the virtues no more confounds their distinctness from virtue 
and from each other than the distinctness of roundness from 
straightness is impugned by the fact that each is [a] f i g u r e . 3 6
Thus, according to Vlastos, Socrates' commitment to the parallel 
relationships—round/shape, white/color—demonstrates more clearly than 
the bee analogy his belief that virtue is properly conceived as a composite of 
distinct parts. From the first analogy, we only get a hint that Socrates might 
be committed to the PVD, while from the second analogy, we get much 
stronger evidence of such a commitment. Taken together, Vlastos is 
confident that these analogies, suggested by Socrates himself, represent 
sufficient textual evidence that the PVD is genuinely Socratic.
But is Vlastos' analysis of the Meno accurate? Do these analogies 
accurately represent Socrates' own view of virtue? I am doubtful for two 
reasons. First, it is not so clear that the bee/virtue and round/shape (and 
white/color) analogies commit Socrates to the PVD. Consider them in order: 
first the bee/virtue analogy. It is true that Socrates interjects the analogy of 
the swarm in response to Meno's first definition of virtue. However, there 
are two important limitations on this analogy that are worth highlighting. 
First, Socrates is being ironic when he suggests the swarm analogy in the first 
place. He says, "I seem to be in luck. I wanted one virtue and I find that you 
have a whole swarm of virtues to offer" (72a). This assertion is clearly ironic! 
Socrates does not really count himself lucky to have discovered more virtues 
than he was searching for. Rather, he is gently teasing Meno for 
misunderstanding the question.
36lbid., 420.
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If we are not to take Socrates seriously about being lucky, should we 
take him seriously about finding many virtues? The irony by itself is 
insufficient to cause serious doubt about his commitment to a multiplicity of 
virtues. However, after Socrates has made clear to Meno why his first 
definition was insufficient, and he draws Meno's attention back to the 
question of virtue, he says.
Then do the same with the virtues. Even if they are many 
and various (icdi/ el iToXXal kuI irairroSairal eiciv), yet they all 
have some conunon character which makes them virtues 
(my emphasis) (72c).
Socrates is saying, not that he himself is committed to a multiplicity of
virtues, but rather that even if there were many virtues, it would be
irrelevant to the "What is virtue?" question. The purpose of the analogy is to
demonstrate what follows from Meno's definition, not to highlight Socrates'
beliefe about the nature of virtue. Meno proposed that there were many
virtues as a response to the "What is virtue?" question, and Socrates responds
by saying that this is irrelevant to the question he asked. Socrates is only
responding to what Meno has said; he is pointing out how Meno's answer is
inadequate.
Thus, when we consider both the ironic tenor of the analogy and 
Socrates' dismissal of the significance of their being many virtues, it is 
difficult to see why we should take this as hard evidence that Socrates 
endorses the PVD. It seems the most we can construe from the analogy of the 
swarm is that Socrates is, at best, agnostic toward there being many 
virtues—maybe there are, and maybe there are not.^^ Therefore, we have
37 should élise note that the multiple virtues being discussed at this point are the 
virtues of a man, woman, child (male and female), old man, and slave (M- Tie). These are not
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good reason, to be sceptical about Vlastos' claim that Socrates is here implying 
that there are different virtues that have distinct properties.
But even if I am right that we should not take the first analogy to 
represent Socrates' position, what about the second? Does it not clearly 
represent Socrates' own belief that virtue is a universal composed of the 
lower level universals courage, temperance, wisdom, and dignity introduced 
by Meno at 74a? Again, I think a careful reading of the text shows that there is 
insufficient evidence to attribute this view to Socrates.38
First, the white/color - round/shape analogies are not offered as a 
clarification of the bee/virtue analogy as Vlastos indicates.39 In fact, it seems 
quite implausible to read them as related in any significant way except 
sequentially.40 The bee/virtue analogy is inextricably tied to Meno's first 
definition of virtue; it is Socrates' attempt to show Meno why his first 
definition of virtue is inadequate. Having recognized Socrates' point, Meno 
tries again:
the kinds of virtues suggested in any of the other dialogues (i.e., the cardinal virtues) and 
make it even more clear that Socrates is not asserting his own view, but merely exploring the 
assertion put forward by Meno.
^  While it is not a significant part of my argument, it is worth pointing out that the 
list of parts of virtue is offered by Meno, not Soaates. Further, the list includes 
p.eyaX.OTrpeTreta which is never mentioned by Socrates as a virtue, nor does it appear in the 
list of carclinal virtues in any of the other early dialogues.
39viastos says of this analogy, "To explain the relation more precisely Socrates 
moves to a more exact analogy: 'justice' is to virtue' as is 'the round' to 'figure' and 'white' to 
'color'." Ibid., 419. The two analogies are tied together in his mind; they are not just 
sequentially related, but both seek to clarify the same question: "What is the relation 
between justice and virtue?" Thus, I do not believe I am being uncharitable toward Vlastos in 
this criticism.
4^ 1 should note here that Meno seems to commit the same error as before; he offers an 
insufficiently broad universal as a definition. So w e can justifiably say there is this relation 
between the two definitions, and to the degree the analogy is meant to show Meno that his 
definition has failed, the analogies are related. But this does not suggest that the latter is 
intended by Socrates as a clarification of the former.
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It [virtue] must be simply the capacity to govern men, if you 
are looking for one quality to cover all the instances (73d).
The second analogy (74b-c) follows this proposed definition of virtue and 
Meno's inadvertent admission that justice is virtue (73d). Therefore, why 
should we think it is supposed to be a clarification of the weaker bee/virtue 
analogy that was a response to Meno's first attempted definition of virtue? It 
makes fer more sense to read the round/shape analogy as Socrates' attempt to 
demonstrate to Meno that he has once again failed to comprehend what 
Socrates expects as an answer to the "What is virtue?" question. In fact 
Socrates clearly asserts that Meno has once again failed to answer the question 
that has been asked. After he lists 'courage', 'temperance', 'wisdom', and 
'dignity' as virtues that go along with justice, Socrates says:
This puts us back where we were. In a different way we have 
discovered a number of virtues when we were looldng for 
one only. This single virtue, which permeates each of them, 
we cannot find (74a).
Meno has once again bungled the definition. The round/shape analogy is
Socrates' response to Meno's second definition of virtue (i.e., "... the capacity
to rule men..." 73d), not, as Vlastos claims, a clarification of his own position
only weakly conveyed in the previous analogy. Socrates is not asserting
anything about his own views; he is only exploring the implications of
Meno's assertions in an attempt to help Meno answer the question that was
asked in the first place.
But suppose Vlastos were to grant all this, saying he never intended to 
claim so strong a connection between the two analogies. Is his claim that the 
second analogy demonstrates Socrates' belief that virtue is a composite whole 
still justified? 1 am doubtful for two reasons. First, the context of the analogy
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does not necessitate that it represents his own view, and second, Socrates 
would commit himself to an inconsistent position if it did represent his own 
view. We should recall that the analogy is only introduced as a response to 
Meno's inadvertent claim that "...justice is virtue" (73e). This is clearly a slip- 
of-the-tongue on Meno's part, and Socrates inquires to see if Meno really 
believes, or comprehends the logical consequences of, what he has just 
claimed. In fact, Meno does not believe that justice is virtue, but that it is one 
of many virtues (73e). And Socrates, if he does not know, has very good 
reason to suppose this is Meno's view; it is the consensus gentium. That is 
why he immediately stops Meno and asks for a clarification (73d9). Socrates 
does not believe, that Meno believes, what he has just said. And, had Meno 
not made this blunder, there would be no reason for this distinction to be 
introduced at all. But does not the fact that Socrates tests Meno on this point 
demonstrate that he himself believes that there are many distinct virtues? I 
do not think so. All we can legitimately infer is that he is surprised to hear 
Meno deny what everyone else, including Meno himself, believes.^l 
But, Vlastos may retort, when Socrates spells out the distinction 
between justice being virtue and justice being a virtue with the round/shape 
analogy he is indicating solidarity with the consensus gentium. Meno is 
initially unclear about the distinction being made; so Socrates says.
Take roundness, for instance. I should say that it is a shape, 
not simply that it is shape, my reason being that there are 
other shapes as well [emphasis added] (73e).
^^See note 26 above.
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Is this not proof enough that Socrates believes not only that there are many 
different shapes but that he also believes there are many different virtues as 
well?
1 might be inclined to agree with Vlastos if this passage stood by itself. 
But it does not. First, consider the analogical argument which goes 
something like this:
1) Justice is to virtue as round is to shape.
2) There are many shapes, not just roundness.
C) Therefore we say roundness is a shape not shape.
3) Likewise, there are many virtues, not just justice.
C') Therefore we say justice is a virtue not virtue.
This argument tells us that if virtue is like shape, and there are many
different shapes, then there must be many different virtues as well. Meno
understands the argument and lists other virtues (i.e., courage, temperance,
wisdom, and dignity, etc., 74a) which he takes to be analogous to other shapes.
We should expect Socrates to accept this as an adequate response since it is the
logical consequence of the analogy he posed to Meno. But Socrates does not
accept this response. Why? Meno has not violated the analogy in any way;
he reaches the most probable conclusion given the parameters of the analogy.
Yet, Socrates is unsatisfied with the conclusion Meno reaches. 1 think his
response is in part motivated by the fact that the virtue/shape analogy does
not fairly represent his own view. Since Socrates does not fault the analogy,
and yet he rejects the conclusion, he may have doubts about the premise
around which the analogy is built. If Socrates is committed to the analogy
between shape and virtue, he should accept Meno's conclusion that there are
many different virtues. Since he doubts the conclusion, we may legitimately
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conclude that he has doubts about the antecedent comparison of virtue and 
shape.
Vlastos might object by saying that it is I who fail to see what actually 
motivates Socrates' rejection of Meno's list of virtues at 74a. He might go on 
to say that a perfectly plausible reading of the text suggests that Socrates is only 
trying to remind Meno of what was concluded earlier; namely, even if there 
are many different virtues, it is irrelevant to the "What is virtue?" question. 
Therefore, Socrates could object to Meno even though he agrees that all the 
things he has just listed are indeed virtues. Meno has proposed a new 
definition of virtue which reduces to a list of universals each too narrow to be 
a candidate for the F-ness in question. Thus, Socrates could consistently hold 
both positions; he could agree with Meno that there are many different 
virtues and still claim that this is irrelevant to the "What is virtue?" question 
he has asked.
This looks like a strong response to my suspicions about Socrates' 
commitment to the virtue/shape analogy. After all, I have not given a single 
piece of evidence that, on its own, decisively shows that Socrates could not 
have agreed with Meno about the parts of virtue. So, suppose that I am 
completely misguided and that my objections thus far are totally without 
warrant. Suppose Vlastos is correct; the virtue/shape analogy does in fact 
represent Socrates' own view. If Vlastos were to make this rebuttal, then it 
seems to me that Socrates is committed to, at best, a paradoxical position, at 
worst, an inconsistent one.
Vlastos' justification of Socrates' belief that virtue is a composite whole 
rests directly upon the strength of the analogical argument: justice is to 
virtue as round is to shape (and white is to color). But there is good reason to
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think Socrates would never accept this analogy. The multiplicity of colors 
and shapes depends upon their constituents being significantly different from 
one another. Each must have at least one unique quality that makes it 
impossible to affirm any two simultaneously of the same thing in the same 
way. Thus, if X is white, it is not red in the same way; if Y is round, it is not 
straight in the same way. Take the Diet Coke can on my desk: it is silver, red, 
white and black. The areas that are silver are not red, black, or white. The 
areas that are red are not silver, black, or white, etc. That is, in relation to the 
can, the colors are significantly differentiated from (i.e., contrary to) one 
another; it is not—and cannot be—silver, red, white, and black all over. So if 
Vlastos is correct and Socrates believes that virtue is analogous to color, he 
ought to believe that justice is contrary in some significant way to piety, 
courage, wisdom, temperance, etc. In fact, each of the virtues must be 
contrary to each of the others in a way similar to the way that particular colors 
(or shapes) are contrary to one another: they are not coextensional.
So what are the practical consequences of accepting the round/shape 
and white/color analogies? In relation to shape, no object can have two 
shapes simultaneously: a cylinder cannot be a cube, a triangle cannot be a 
circle, etc. In a similar way, no particular area can be more than one color all 
over at one time. Thus, if the analogy holds between virtue and color or 
virtue and shape, should we not also draw similar conclusions about the 
virtues? Would it not seem to follow that if virtue were like shape in the 
way suggested no person could be both just and temperate, pious and 
courageous, just and wise, etc., in the same way at the same time? Yet 
Vlastos' own interpretation of Socrates' position in the Protagoras commits 
him to the belief that the virtues are like pieces taken from a lump of gold.
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differing from one another and the whole only in their size (Prot. 329d). 
Further, the Biconditionality Thesis of the UVD holds that anyone who has 
any one of the virtues not only can have others, but must have them all! If 
Socrates thinks the virtues are like pieces taken from a lump of gold, it is hard 
to see how he could also believe the virtues are like colors or shapes which 
differ so significantly from one another. If the analogies in the Meno 
represent Socrates' view of virtue, he should agree with Protagoras that the 
parts of virtue are more like the parts of a face (Prot. 329d).
If Socrates would be unwilling to accept the consequences of the 
shape/color analogies, and we have very good reason to think he w ould ,^  he 
seems to have committed a sophomoric oversight in his commitment to 
them. He does not recognize they will force him to claim the virtues are 
contrary to one another in some significant way. Likewise, he fails to 
recognize that this is inconsistent with the position he defends in the 
Protagoras.^  Of course, another possibility is that he does not really think 
virtue is analogous to shape and color after all. Perhaps these analogies are 
only designed to show Meno the errors in his definitions of virtue. I think it 
would be rather uncharitable to think Socrates fails to recognize the 
consequences of the analogies he uses to represent his own view, hence I am 
inclined to think it is Vlastos, not Socrates, who has erred in this case. He 
attributes the analogy between shape/color and virtue to Socrates when he
^For just a few examples see Charm. 165e, 167a; Gorg. 495d; Prot. 331a, 333b.
Someone might be tempted to claim that Socrates has changed his mind in the 
interim between the Protagoras and the Meno. But this m ove is not open to Vlastos as he is 
using the text of the latter as support for his interpretation of the former; he must be 
committed to the consistency of the two texts. Since I am only interested in showing the 
inconsistency in Vlastos' interpretation in this chapter, I w ill not lavish further attention on 
this possibility here. However, I do address a similar problem in Chapter Five below.
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should not. But even if Socrates were committed to the analogies in the 
Meno. this would not support Vlastos' argument for the PVD since they are 
inconsistent with the position Socrates defends in the Protagoras.
There is a final reason why I am dubious of appealing to the Meno as 
support for the PVD: I take it to be a transitional dialogue. In this dialogue, I 
think we see the emergence of a distinct set of Platonic doctrines wholly 
lacking from the early or "Socratic" dialogues. For example, in the Meno. we 
find for the first time the epistemological theory of di/dp.vriaLs (and its 
attendant ontological doctrine of the immortality /  reincarnation of the soul^) 
(81b), in ethics the sufficiency of true belief for virtuous behavior (97b), and a 
shift away from the elenctic method toward the method of hypothesis.'*^
Thus, even if Socrates were unequivocally committed to virtue's composite 
nature in the Meno. we should not take that as standard Socratic doctrine 
unless it were confirmed in the non-transitional dialogues. But as I have 
already pointed out, there is no such confirmation. Therefore, we should be
might be argued that the 'Socrates' of the early dialogues already holds the 
doctrine of the immortal soul, but I am sceptical for two reasons. First, Socrates' argument at 
Ap. 40c-41c makes it clear that he is, at best, agnostic toward the doctrine, which is 
significantly different from his whole-hearted endorsement of it at Meno 81b (for analysis of 
the argument at Ap. 40c see Thomas Brickhouse and Nicholas Smith, 1989 "A Matter of Life 
and Death in Socratic Philosophy," Ancient Philosophy 9; 155-165; Scott Calef, 1992 "Why 
is Annihilation a Great Gain for Socrates?" Ancient Philosophy 12: 285-297; David L. 
Roochnik, 1985 "Apology 40c4-41e7: Is Death Really a Gain?" The Classical Tournai 80: 
212-220; Rudebusch, George, 1991 "Death is One of Two Things," Ancient Philosophy 11: 35- 
45). Second, Socrates specifically denies he has any firm beliefs about the afterlife at 
Apology 29a-b: ". . .  if I were to claim to be wiser than my neighbor in any respect, it would be 
in this—that not possessing any real knowledge of what comes after death, 1 am also 
conscious that I do not possess it."
'*®For an excellent analysis of the distinct methodology of the Meno. see Vlastos,
1988 "Elenchus and Mathematics: A Turning-Point in Plato's Philosophical Development," 
American Tournai of Philologv 109:362-396, reprinted in Benson, Essays on the Philosophy of 
Socrates. New York: Oxford University Press, 1992. All page references w ill be to the 
reprinted edition.
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keenly sceptical of whatever evidence in favor of the PVD we might find in 
the Meno.
But suppose one were to argue that the first third of the Meno. like the 
first book of the Republic, was actually an earlier work left unfinished until 
Plato's middle or early middle period. That is, why not suppose the text, up to 
the introduction of Meno's Paradox at 80d, reflects the character of an early 
dialogue and could therefore be taken as evidence of a Socratic commitment 
to the PVD7 After all, is it not the case that the irmovations that demonstrate 
the shift from early to middle Plato all occur after the diropia of Meno's 
Paradox? The answer is "No." Prior to the diropia, we find Socrates offering 
an example definition at 76a which reflects a firm grasp of theoretical 
geometry unparalleled in other early dialogues.'*^ This sort of technical, 
mathematical definition stands in sharp contrast to the example definitions 
Socrates offers elsewhere.^^ This is good evidence against the thesis that the 
first third of the text was written prior to Plato's philosophical emergence. It 
is far more likely that Plato intentionally used the style of the early period, 
including the emphasis on the elenctic method, to dramatize the departure 
from his earlier philosophical positions.
In summary, I find little reason to think the Meno supports Vlastos' 
contention that the PVD is one of Socrates' basic philosophical tenets. On one 
hand, I have argued that even if we take the Meno as representative of 
Socratic philosophy, there are good reasons to doubt Socrates actually held the
^^This is pointed out by Vlastos himself! See "Elenchus and Mathematics," 144,145.
'^ ^For example, see La., 192a, 198b; Prot. 358d, 360c and 360d; and Rep.. 352e. Santas 
takes the definition at 76a to be genuinely Socratic and not markedly distinct from the 
example definitions offered elsewhere. Santas, Socrates: Philosophy is Plato's Early 
Dialogues. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1979,97-135.
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belief that virtue is composed of distinct parts. But even if that argument 
fails, I have argued on the other hand that we really ought not think of the 
Meno as representing Socratic philosophy since it is a transitional dialogue. 
Taken together, I think we have legitimate reasons to doubt the Meno 
supports the PVD as Vlastos claims.
C onclusion
Vlastos' interpretation of the Unity of Virtue Doctrine—that Socrates is 
committed at most to the belief that a biconditional relationship holds 
between the virtues—is the strongest he can muster given his interpretation 
of the Protagoras. Laches and Meno. Specifically, since he believes Socrates is 
committed to the Parts of Virtue Doctrine, he carmot see how Socrates could 
accept the Identity Thesis that all the virtue terms refer to one thing. 1 have 
argued that Vlastos is unjustified in claiming the PVD is standard Socratic 
doctrine because his analysis of the text is inaccurate. And, if the PVD is not 
Socrates' considered opinion in the early dialogues, Vlastos' justification for 
rejecting the IT is undermined.
1 argued first that the text of the Protagoras considered by itself does not 
indicate Socrates' preference of PI) over P2) as an  appropriate expression of 
the UVD. Second, I argued that in the Laches Socrates' claim that virtue is 
composed of parts is an hypothetical proposition put forward to highlight its 
controversial nature to his interlocutors who uncritically assume its truth.
But the text gives us good reason to believe it is not Socrates' considered 
opinion. Further, Vlastos' analysis of the Meno is flawed for similar reasons. 
First, as in the Laches, there is nothing in the text that necessarily commits 
Socrates to the belief that virtue is composed of parts. The evidence to which
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he points is at best neutral toward Socrates' views. Second, if he were 
committed to the PVD, Socrates would seem to hold inconsistent views on 
the relationship between the parts of virtue. Finally, as a transitional 
dialogue, the Meno is tainted as a source of 'Socratic' doctrine. Since neither 
the text of the Laches nor the M eno supports Vlastos' claim that the PVD is 
fundamentally Socratic, and without the PVD we get a simpler reading of the 
Protagoras, we have good reason to deny Socrates accepted it. Further, if I am 
right, we should be able to attribute a more robust version of the UVD than 
Vlastos can allow.
Chapter III 
F en n er o n  the U nity of V irtue
Terry Fenner has offered one of the most interesting solutions to the 
puzzle of the Unity of Virtue Doctrine in recent Socratic scholarship. Fenner's 
view is attractive in large part because of its simplicity. In the paper "The Unity 
of Virtues/'^ he argues that whan Socrates suggests that "virtue is one thing" 
(Frot. 329d, La. 199e, Charm. 174c, M. 88d^), we should take him to mean exactly 
what he says: there is only one thing to which the term 'virtue', along with its 
derivatives, applies. On this interpretation of the UVD, Socrates is expressing a 
straight forward equivalence between the cardinal virtues: "bravery = wisdom = 
temperance = justice = piety. Fermer's view has thus become known as the 
Identity Thesis (or '/T').^ He believes this interpretation offers a more natural
^This paper was first published in Philosophical Review 82 (1973): 35-68. It has been 
subsequently reprinted in Benson, Essavs on the Philosophy of Socrates (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1992), 162-184. All references in this paper are to the latter. His view of the 
UVD is further ^borated in "What Laches and Nidas Miss—And Whether Socrates Thinks 
Courage Merely a Part of Virtue," Andent Philosophy 12 (1992): 1-27; and "Socrates and the 
Early Dialogues," 121-169 in Richard Kraut, ed.. The Cambridge Companion to Plato (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 1992).
^It should be noted in all fifimess that in none of these passages does Socrates 
unequivocally assert the identity of the cardinal virtues. This silence of course is the reason 
there is so much disagreement on just what Socrates' view actually is.
Penner indudes this passage from the Meno in his later elaboration of the UT 
contrasting it with discussion of the PVD at 71e-76e. He claims it is the later passage that 
represents Socrates' view not the earlier analogies which seem to supjjort the PVD. Penner 
attributes this contrast to Irwin. "What Laches and Nidas Miss," 13,14, n. 24. I have already 
argued in Chapter Two above that Socrates does not support the PVD in the Meno. and hence 
there is no inconsistency between it and the Protagoras.
^Permer, 162.
^This is essentially the same as what Vlastos designates the 'Unity Thesis'. However 
since IT captures the heart of Parmer's view with less ambiguity, and because it is Parmer's 
preferred designation for the doctrine, I w ill use this designation rather than Vlastos' UT.
Other notable commentators have weighed in on Permer's side of the UVD debate. See 
C.C.W. Taylor, Plato: 'Protagoras'. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991), 103-108, and Terence
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reading of the text as well as a better philosophical solution to the enigma of the 
UVD. I will argue that while Fenner's main proposal—that Socrates believes the 
cardinal virtues are in some sense identical—is essentially correct, his argument 
for the rr  leads to some rather odd conclusions, and therefore it must be 
significantly modified. In order to demonstrate the problems with his analysis of 
the rr, it first must be spelled out in more detail. Hence, I wiU follow the same 
pattern as the previous chapter: first 1 outhne Fenner's view, then I criticize it.
A. The Penner Interpretation
Fermer's interpretation of the UVD is primarily a response to Vlastos' 
Biconditiomlity Thesis and must therefore be understood in that context.^ It is 
essential therefore to sketch the BT in order to fully grasp the alternative that 
Fermer advocates. However, since I have already devoted a good deal of 
attention to Vlastos' view in Chapter Two above, I will here offer only a broad 
overview of the BT.
A.l An Overview of the Biconditionality Thesis:
It will be recalled from Chapter Two that Vlastos argues the best way to 
resolve the paradox of Socrates' theory of virtue in the Protagoras is to interpret 
the unity in the UVD as a logical biconditionality holding between the cardinal 
virtues. According to his view Socrates holds that virtue is a composite whole of 
distinct proper parts, but that anyone who possesses one of the virtues must
Irwin, Plato's Moral Theory. (Oxford: Qarendon Press, 1977) 86-90; Plato's Ethics. (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1995), 41-44,80-81,84-85. Michael Ferejohn is also in fundamental 
agreement with the FT althou^  he too rejects some of the consequences of Permer's view. 1 
have more to say about Ferejohn's position in § B below.
 ^Penner himself makes this clear. See Penner, "Socrates and the Early Dialogues," 147
n. 1.
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necessarily have all the others.^ Vlastos' view is thus referred to as the 
Biconditiomlity Thesis. According to the BT persons P are courageous ^ th e y  are 
temperate, iff they are pious, iff they are just, iff they are w ise / On this view, in 
order to predicate any one of the virtues of an individual, we must predicate all 
of them of the same individual. Thus, according to Vlastos, it is the person of 
whom the virtues are predicated that is central to Socrates' theory, not the nature 
of the virtues themselves.®
Vlastos defends the BT of the U W  for two fundamental reasons: first, he 
believes Socrates is committed to virtue's composite nature (the PVD) 
throughout the early dialogues,^ and second, if Socrates had opted for a stronger 
relationship between the "parts" of virtue in the Protagoras, he would be 
committed to the seemingly absurd position that the individual virtue terms are 
synonymous. Because he believes virtue's composite nature is "standard 
Socratic doctrine," and since no rational person could maintain the synonymy of 
the cardinal virtue terms, Vlastos argues the BT is the strongest formulation of 
the UVD that can be legitimately attributed to Socrates.
I^f we take the first letter of each cardinal virtue to represent its term the BT can be 
expressed logically as: V(x) 3  (Cx h Jx s  Tx s  Px = Wx).
^Gregory Vlastos, "The Unity of the Virtues in the Protagoras" in Platonic Studies 2nd 
ed., (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981), 232.
® This conclusion seems to be the consequence of Vlastos' "Pauline Predication," which 
forces us to ignore the prima facie meaning of the text. See Chapter Two § A.2 above.
^Vlastos refers to this commitment as "standard Socratic doctrine" and, although 
initially asserted without argument (225), he later defends this position against objections by 
Penner et. al. See "Socrates on 'The Parts of Virtue " in Platonic Studies 2nd ed., (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1981), 418-423.
lOviastos, "UVP," 227.
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A.2 Fenner's Critique of the Biconditionality Thesis
Penner rejects Vlastos' BT as an altogether too weak formulation of the 
UVD. While Penner rejects the composite nature of virtue as "standard Socratic 
doctrine/'^l his main objection to Vlastos' position is what he believes to be its 
dependence upon a "meaning view" of Socrates' "What is F-ness?" question.
That is, Penner wants to deny that Socrates is asking for definitions, essences, or 
universals when he asks a "What is F-ness?" question.^ But if Socrates is not 
looking for the meaning of 'courage' in the Laches, or 'piety' in the Euthyphro. or 
'temperance' in the Charmides. what is he looking for? Penner believes Socrates 
is not asking for a "conceptual analysis" of the virtues but rather is asking "the 
general's question: 'What is it that makes brave men brave?'"^^ He is inquiring 
about the psychological state, or state of the soul that, as a motivational force, 
explains the behavior of brave, temperate, or pious men. Since this view 
conceives the 'F' in Socrates' question as a causative agent it has been labeled the 
"causal" rather than "meaning" interpretation of the "What is F-ness?" 
question.
If it is true that Permer's interpretation of the UVD rests on the distinction 
indicated above, two important questions immediately present themselves: first, 
what is it about the "meaning view" of Socrates' "What is F-ness?" question 
which causes Fermer to reject it. Second, how does the distinction between
While Penner does not directly attack or reject this premise of Vlastos' argument in 
"The Unity of Virtues," it is clear from Vlastos' response in "Socrates on 'The Parts of Virtue'" 
that he does in fact reject the PVD as a Socratic doctrine.
^^Penner, 163,164.
l^ibid., 164.
^^For another brief, but excellent summary of Permer's argument, see Michael T. 
Ferejohn, "The Unity of Virtue and the Objects of Socratic Inquiry," Tournai of the History of 
Philosophy (January 1982): 7-10 So far as I can tell, it is Ferejohn who first refers to Permer's 
view of the "What is f-ness?" question as the "causal view."
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meaning and causal agency make a significant difference in the UVD debate? 
Thus, to fully understand Permer's view, we must understand why he believes a 
proper understanding of Socrates' UVD rests upon the causal view of his 
standard interrogative.
The main reason Fermer believes reinterpreting the "What is F-ness?" 
question as an investigation into the psychological state of persons rather than 
into the meaning of terms is that he believes it will allow him to read the text of 
the Protagoras. Laches, and C h a r m i d e s . ^ 5  with less interpolation than do other 
views. Further, he believes this causal view allows Socrates to be consistently 
committed to the FT throughout the early dialogues without entangling him in 
the problem of synonymy at the same time.
A.3 Permer's Rejection of the Meaning View of Socrates' "What is F-ness?" 
Question
Permer's argument against Vlastos' BT begins with an examination of the 
so-called "meaning view" of the "What is F-ness?" question, which he takes to be 
the wrongheaded, albeit received, interpretation. Fermer argues that the BT rests 
upon the "meaning view" since it interprets Socrates' question
1) What is F-ness? 
or the more specific version derived from the Euthyphro
One of the weaknesses in Fenner's view is that he gives little attention to the 
Euthyphro. which some commentators maintain shows a strong Socratic commitment to the 
PVD. While he makes occasional reference to this dialogue, he does not give it the same 
amount of analysis as other dialogues. The Euthyphro remains one of the difficult issues for 
anyone interested in defending the FT. It certainly appears that Socrates defends the PVD in 
the context of his argument with Euthyphro. I will have more to say about this issue in 
Chapter Four, below.
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1') What is that one thing because of which all F actions are 
as a request for the meaning of, or a definition of, some particular "F-ness". If 
this is accurate, he argues, any proponent of this view should also be committed 
to
2) There must be, in addition to F persons, a thing which is F-
ness—the meaning of 'F-ness'—because of which all F 
persons are F.
Further, he argues, it is clear to any competent user of Greek (or any language 
with comparable terms, for that matter), that the virtue terms are not 
synonymous. Thus,
3) The meaning of 'courage' is # the meaning of 'piety'.^^
If Socrates believes all the virtue terms are names for one thing, the principle of 
identity should enable us to substitute one virtue term for another, resulting in,
4) The meaning of 'courage' = the meaning of 'piety'.
Therefore, unless we are willing to commit Socrates to 4), it cannot be that he 
believes all the virtue terms mean the same thing. Therefore, if the meaning view 
is correct, the FT is too strong a view for Socrates to have reasonably maintained.
However, Penner argues, we can avoid the problem raised by the 
substitution of one virtue term for another if we reject the semantic interpretation 
of 2) and replace it with
2') There must be, in addition to F persons, a thing which is F- 
ness—a psychological state or motivational force— because 
of which ail F persons are F.
The text from which 1') is derived comes from two passages: "...tell me what is the 
essential form of holiness which makes all holy actions holy" (Eu. 6d), and "...show me what, 
precisely, this ideal is, so that, with my eye on it, and using it as a standard, I can say that any 
action done by you or anybody else is holy if it resembles this ideal, or if it does not, can deny 
that it is holy" (Eu. 6e).
The same holds for the other cardinal virtue terms: the meaning of 'temperance' is ^ 
the meaning of 'justice', the meaning of wisdom' is the meaning of courage', etc.
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There is no reason to think that semantically distinct terms may not, as a matter 
of fact, refer to one and the same entity: in this case a property of the soul which 
will turn out to be a kind of knowledge. So if the definitions of the meaning 
view are replaced with the references of the causal view, Socrates would have no 
reason to worry about the synonymy of the virtue terms. Thus, according to 
Penner, Socrates is not asking what 'piety' (or 'justice', 'temperance', 'courage', 
'wisdom') means, he is asking what it refers to; he is asking what piety is. To put it 
simply, Socrates' "What is F-ness?" question seems to be asking for real not 
nominal definitions.
Fermer believes his interpretation of Socrates' "What is f-ness?" question 
sustains a more natural reading of the text. This can clearly be seen firom a 
comparison of the contrary positions of Socrates and Protagoras found at Prot. 
329b-330b. Protagoras maintains the position that.
Virtue is a composite whole of proper parts which are distinct 
like the parts of a face, each having a particular 6wup.ig, and the 
parts of virtue may be possessed independent from one another.
Contrary to this, Socrates holds,
'Courage', 'piety', 'temperance', 'justice', and 'wisdom' are all 
different names for one and the same thing, they all have the 
same 6uuap.iç, and none can be possessed independently from 
the others.
It seems fairly obvious that 'courage', 'piety', 'temperance', 'justice', and 
'wisdom' do not mean the same thing. Thus, if Socrates asserts that virtue is
^®The standard example, a la Frege, is that the terms 'Hesperus' and 'Phosphorus' are 
semantically divergent, while both refer to one and the same ontological entity: Venus. This is 
an empirical claim and cannot be derived from an evaluation of the meanings of the two terms. 
In like marmer, piety' and courage' may pick out the same thing in the world, some 
psychological state or other, even though they mean different things. Penner, "What Laches 
and Nidas Miss," Andent Philosophy (1992): 6.
^^enner, "The Unity of Virtue," 163.
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one thing with different names (Prot. 329d.jf, 349b) it would seem odd for him to 
also believe that an acceptable answer to his ''What is F-ness?" question could be 
the meaning of 'courage', 'piety', 'temperance', 'justice', or 'wisdom'. Thus, 
Penner concludes, it is a mistake to interpret Socrates' inquiries about virtue as 
an investigation into the meaning of virtue.^ And, since the BT depends on the 
'meaning view' of the "What is F-ness?" question, it must be an incorrect 
interpretation of Socrates' UVD.
A.4 Permer's Argumeits for the Identity Thesis
Thus far Penner has argued against Vlastos' BT as the appropriate 
interpretation of Socrates' UVD. However, simply showing the weaknesses of 
Vlastos' view is insufficient evidence to support his own interpretation. The 
second part of Permer's argument for the FT is affirmative; it attempts to 
demonstrate that the 'state of the soul'^^ interpretation of the "What is F-ness?" 
question makes better sense of the arguments Socrates puts to Protagoras in the 
rest of the dialogue. The benefits of this view are not limited to the Protagoras. 
however. Penner believes his interpretation of Socrates' "What is F-ness?" 
question also clarifies the assertions about the nature of virtue in some of the 
other early dialogues. The following sections demonstrate how Permer's view 
applies to the Protagoras as well as to other early dialogues where the nature of 
virtue is discussed.
20penner offers a parallel argument for those who prefer universals or essences to 
meanings. He takes all of these positions to be rooted in similar accounts of the property of 
identity, which he rejects. See pp. 163,164 and note 6. I find the application of the argument 
against universals far less compelling. See § B below.
^^Penner drops the "motive-force" and "state of the soul" language in "What Laches 
and N idas Miss," which shows that it is not central to his thesis. H e dearly prefers to think of 
the referent of the virtue terms as "the sdence (or knowledge) of good and evil," which is the 
cause of a person's virtuous behavior.
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A.4.a The Protagoras
There are four main arguments in the Protagoras, three of which, Penner 
argues, directly support his interpretation of the UVD.^ The first he calls "the 
argument from opposites (332a-333b)," where Socrates attempts to show the 
equivalence of wisdom and temperance. Since Protagoras accepts the dictum "to 
one thing there is one, and only one, opposite" (332b) and since it appears that 
folly is the opposite of both wisdom and temperance, it must be the case that 
'wisdom' and 'temperance' are the same thing (i.e., refer to the same thing, 333b). 
However, Penner argues, it cannot be the case that Socrates thinks what 
'wisdom' and 'temperance' refer to is the meaning of these terms since that 
would be "grossly absurd" and require an equivocation on the term 'foUy'.^ If, 
on the other hand, Socrates is not referring to the definitions of the virtue terms 
but to some causal state in moral agents, he can soundly conclude:
^Penner ignores the elenchus at 330c-33Ib (which he calls the argum ent 
from resemblance) because it “will prove to be relevant only to the least 
plausible part of Protagoras’ interpretation of ‘virtue is one,’ and will do noth in g  
toward establishing Socrates’ interpretation of the dictum. ” “The Unity o f 
Virtue. ” 169. I, however, think this is a mistake. In order to fully understand  
Socrates’ position we need to examine each argument. When considered in  
conjunction with the other arguments Socrates poses against Protagoras’ 
position, this argument is useful for teasing out the Socratic position. Further, 
Socrates indicates that this argument is connected to the position he is trying to  
pose against Protagoras’ position by comparing the conclusion of the argum ent 
from opposites to the earlier conclusion of the argument from resem blance 
(333b). So Socrates sees him self as moving toward the same position through  
different arguments. (Whether or not these arguments are logically sound is a 
separate issue altogether, and one that does not concern me here.) If Penner is 
correct that Socrates means to defend the IT, and I think he basically is, then a n 
analysis of this argument will be useful after all.
^Permer, 170.
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. . .  in ethics there are two opposites only. One is the single thing 
referred to by both 'wisdom' and 'temperance' (that is, virtue), 
and the other the single thing referred to by 'intemperance' and 
'folly' (that is, vice). Under the influence of virtue one will act 
temperately (and bravely), under the influence of vice one will 
act foolishly (and i m p i o u s l y ) . ^ ^
Thus, Penner concludes the argument from opposites, when read from his
perspective, supports an identity of the referent of the virtue terms 'wisdom' and
'temperance' without committing Socrates to the synonymy of the terms as
would the meaning view. This reading also frees Socrates from a charge of
sophistry: he need not be seen as equivocating on the term 'folly' since he is not
after meanings at all.25
The "argument from confidence (349d-351b)" which follows the argument
from opposites, attempts to establish the identity of wisdom and courage by
showing "that the explanation of a man's brave actions is wisdom: that what it is
that makes a brave man brave is identical with what it is that makes him wise."^^
However, the character of this exchange is explanatory, not analytic. That is,
Socrates' conclusion that courage is knowledge does not strictly follow from the
premises:^
1) Those who are courageous are confident (349e);
2) Those with the relevant knowledge of a task are more
confident than those without the relevant knowledge (350b);
and
24lbid.. 170-171.
^  Taylor disagrees, holding instead that there is an equivocation on both folly' and 
'opposite' in this argument. See C.C.W. Taylor, Plato: Protagoras (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1995), 122-131.
26ibid., 171.
^  It should be noted that these premises are paraphrased from the indicated texts; 
they are not intended to represent exact quotations. However, the sense of each passage is 
preserved in these simpler linguistic forms.
83
3) Those with the relevant knowledge of a task are more
confident after they have the relevant knowledge than they 
were before they had the relevant knowledge (350b).
However, if we understand Socrates' claim that "it is their knowledge that must
be courage" (350c) as an explanation of the behavior of the courageous, then it
can be shown that courage is not confidence, but that 'confidence' is predicated
of two distinct classes: those with the relevant knowledge of a task at hand, and
those who are witless ((iaLv6p.ei/oi). The confidence of the ignorant is rooted in
madness while the confidence of the courageous is rooted in knowledge. Thus,
all those who are brave are those who have knowledge, and no one without
knowledge is brave. This explanatory view (as opposed to an analysis of
definitions), Penner argues, is supported by the context of this section of the text:
"Socrates is operating with, and is understood by Protagoras to be operating
with, the motive-force or state-of-soul view, and attempting to establish
identities. "28
The third argument from the Protagoras (the end of the axpaaia argument 
at 360c) that Penner claims as support for his thesis, turns specifically on the 
locution "that by virtue of which," which renders the Greek '8id'. Socrates has 
Protagoras' consent to the premises:
4) Cowardice is that by virtue of which the cowardly are
cowards (and likewise, courage is that by virtue of which the 
courageous are courageous);
28lbid., 172. I think Penner is correct that Socrates is trying to establish the identity of 
courage and wisdom in this argument, but it is not altogether clear to me why this argument 
tells against the view that Socrates is concerned with the analysis o f moral definitions. First, if 
this passage is exclusively explanatory why take it to be an argument at all? Philosophers 
commorüy distinguish between explanations and arguments, so which does Penner think 
applies here? Second, if Socrates is p>osing an argument for the identity of courage and wisdom  
in this passage, it seems to foil. If, on the other hand, Socrates is giving a psychological analysis 
of those who are brave, how does this advance the argument for the FT and why is it 
inconsistent with a more traditional view of Socrates' "What is F-ness?" question?
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5) Ignorance of what to fear is that by virtue of which the
cowardly are cowards;
6) Cowardice is igjiorance of what to fear.
So, Socrates can conclude that cowardice just is ignorance. From here he can 
argue that since
7) Courage is the opposite of cowardice;
and, since
8) Knowledge of what to fear is the opposite of ignorance of
what to fear,
Socrates can conclude that "knowledge of what is and is not to be feared is 
courage," or courage is wisdom (360d).^9 The sense of this argument, Penner 
claims, is that knowledge is the cause of courage, just as ignorance is the cause of 
cowardice. But the argument makes little or no sense on the traditional meaning 
view. For example, what sense could it make to say that the meaning of 
^knowledge' is 'courage', and the meaning of 'ignorance' is 'cowardice'? The 
identity Socrates demonstrates to Protagoras is not an "epistemological or 
semantic" identity, but rather an identity of reference. Thus, the terms 'wisdom' 
and 'courage' refer to the same thing: the cause of courageous behavior in those 
persons we call courageous.
Penner argues that each of the arguments from the Protagoras fairs better 
when understood from the causal view than from the meaning view of the 
"What is F-ness?" question. Accordingly, Socrates is not attempting to 
demonstrate that there is one definition that covers each of the cardinal virtue
^%ecause Socrates uses élTlOTtjgq  and its cognates interchangeably with oo(j)(a and 
its cognates, we can derive the identity courage = wisdom from courage = knowledge. I will 
argue below that this type of substitution is not limited to wisdom and knowledge. In fact, I 
take this to be partial evidence for the synonymy of the virtues in Socrates' mind. See § B.2 
below.
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terms. Rather, Socrates is trying to get Protagoras to see that each virtue label 
points to the same reality regardless of its meaning. That single reality, as 
Socrates points out at the end of the dialogue, is some kind of knowledge 
(361bj^. Precisely what kind of knowledge it is tiiat causes the disposition called 
"virtue" is made clear in other dialogues.
A.4.b The Laches
Further evidence for the FT, according to Penner, is to be found in the last 
argument of the Laches (198-199e). Nidas has taken over the investigation of 
courage from Laches and suggested that courage is "the knowledge of that 
which inspires fear or confidence in war, or in anything" (my emphasis, 195a). 
Interestingly enough, N idas' definition is purportedly derived from the Socratic 
dictum: Wisdom is the cause of goodness.^ If Nidas' definition is properly 
derived from a Socratic prindple, this definition (or some variation thereof) 
should be acceptable to Socrates. Penner argues that in the examination of the 
final definition of the dialogue we should see that Socrates essentially approves 
of this view, while also maintaining that Nidas still does not fully understand his 
position.3i
The elenchus aimed at Nidas' definition of courage at 195a begins with a 
restatement of the earlier assumed premise:
9) Courage (like justice, temperance, etc.) is a part of virtue (198a).^^
^  The full quotation from which this maxim is derived is found at 194d: "Every man 
is good in that in wtüch he is wise, and bad in that in which he is unwise." It is also clear from 
the text that Socrates does indeed affirm dûs proposition.
This assertion is essentially the conclusion of Penner, "What Laches and Nidas 
Miss," 22-26.
This premise is initially asserted by Socrates at 190c. Penner believes that we are 
meant to see that this premise is die weakness of the argument, not the claim that courage is the
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From here Socrates offers the following premises, which are all accepted by 
Nidas:
10) That which is dreadful causes fear, that which is hopeful does 
not (198b);
11) Fear is an expectation of future b ad ^  things, not past or present 
bad things (198b);
but.
12) There is only one knowledge or sdence of that which causes 
fear and hope (198d).
Because Nidas agrees to 10), 11), and 12), it seems to follow that:
13) If courage is the knowledge of what to fear and what not to fear, 
then courage is knowledge of all good and bad things (199e).
Socrates then goes on to show that this condusion forces them to concede that
"courage...instead of being only a part of virtue, will be all [of] virtue" (199e).
Thus, 13) is inconsistent with 9). Both propositions cannot be logically asserted
together as they have just done, therefore, there must be a mistake somewhere in
the argument. However, Nicias does not see where the mistake lies: he does not
know which premise of the argument they should reject. Because Nidas does
not see which proposition to sacrifice, Socrates condudes that they have failed to
discover what courage really is (199e).
Fermer believes this argument gives us good supporting evidence for the 
rr. Even though Socrates condudes that they have failed to grasp the nature of 
courage. Fermer maintains that we are meant to see the correct answer. He 
argues that it is N idas and not Socrates who is confused. Nidas has rightly
whole of virtue. While I agree with Permer's conclusion, I offer a completely different, and I 
think more compelling, argument. My argument is spelled out in Chapter Five, below.
^  Kukov and its derivatives are often translated 'evil' but I find the generic 'bad' a 
preferable rendering. See Appendix HI, below.
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derived Socrates' view of courage from the dictum "wisdom is the cause of 
goodness," but he (and Laches) fails to see how to rescue the argument since 
their conclusion is inconsistent with the common sense opinion that virtue is 
composed of parts. However, Penner believes that Socrates does not accept 9) 
(i.e., the PVD), and thus can embrace the definition of courage as the knowledge 
of the good and bad.^4 If courage is the whole of virtue and not just one of its 
parts, then we can see that it is the knowledge of the good and bad that is the 
"motive force" or "state of the soul" that causes a person to be virtuous (and in 
this case, courageous).^ Thus, according to Penner the Laches and the 
Protagoras are consistent in committing Socrates to the IT, not just the BT as 
Vlastos argues. In both dialogues Socrates rejects the PVD in favor of a holistic 
view of virtue, which means that no ontological distinction can be drawn 
between what makes a person courageous and what makes her virtuous.
A.4.C The Charmides
The final argument Penner appeals to as support for the U  is found at 
Charmides 169d-175d. Through this rather long and convoluted argument, 
Socrates attacks the definition of temperance, put forth by Critias, who asserts 
that it m ust be knowledge that has as its subject matter, itself (166c).^ The
^  Penner, "What Laches and Nicias Miss," 22. This question, of course, leaves open 
the question of Socratic ignorance. If Penner is correct in thinking that the definition offered by 
Nicias is indeed a Socratic definition, and if it is that case that Socrates is aware that this 
represents his own position, how can he seriously maintain that he does not know the nature of 
courage (as he does, for example, at 200e-201b)? Is Socrates being ironic or dishonest when he 
denies having knowledge? Well, Penner believes that even if he does know certain 
propositions about courage, he still does not know everything about courage, and this is what 
Socrates has in mind when he talks about knowledge. That is, Penner does not think 
propositional knowledge adequately captures what Socrates means by knowledge. Ibid., 22-26.
^  Penner, "Unity of Virtue," 175,176.
^  This premise is derived from Socrates' hypothetical assertion at 165c that "if 
[temperance] is a species of knowledge, [it] must be a science, and a science of something." I
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"knowledge of knowledge" (éiriCTTniiTiç é7TiaTnp.Ti) definition of temperance is 
further amended at 166e to cover all instances of knowledge: "[temperance] is 
the only science which is the science of itself as well as other sciences." Critias 
argues that such knowledge should enable us to distinguish what we know from 
what we do not. Thus, anyone having this kind of knowledge should have true 
self-knowledge and never mistakenly believe that he knows something that in 
fact he does not know (167a).
Socrates raises several objections to the "knowledge of knowledge" 
definition of temperance, but Penner focuses specifically on two. The first I call 
the "utility objection." Even if temperance is knowing what we do and do not 
know, as Critias proposes, "then wisdom or being wise appears to be not the 
knowledge o/the things which we do or do not know, but only the knowledge 
that we know or do not know" (170d). In other words, we only know that we 
know something; it is not clear zuhat it is that we know. This distinction seems 
problematic enough, but Socrates pushes forward to focus on a corollary. If 
Critias is correct, the temperate person could not know whether anyone else 
knows what she claim to know.37 The temperate person only knows that she
think it is important to emphasize the hypothetical nature of this assertion and to read the 
passage cautiously. Socrates himself reminds us of the hypothetical nature of this and other 
assertions at 175a-d, which, in my opinion, makes his position even more difficult to interpret.
The capacity to distinguish the specialist with knowledge firom the charlatan who 
merely pretends to know is initially suggested by Socrates as an important function of 
temperemce at 167a. At 169b Socrates avers that "temperance is a benefit and a good" though 
he does not specify that this benefit is the ability to unmask those who pretend to know when 
they do not. However, when they return to the question of temperance's benefit at 169e and 
173b-e, it becomes clear that this ability is, in part, what Socrates has in mind when he refers to 
the benefit we receive from temper«mce. Hence, any definition of temperance that does not 
entail the ability to discriminate genuine firom false claims of knowledge is, according to 
Socrates, inadequate. That is not to say that this is the only benefit to be derived from 
temperance, as is made clear below, but it is a necessary benefit.
89
knows certain things, and that she does not know other things.^ But how could 
such a person know that some other person—a physician, or cobbler, or pilot, or 
anyone else—know what they claimed to know unless temperance was the 
knowledge 0/ what one knows, not just the knowledge that one knows? In order 
to be a guide for testing other people's knowledge (as Critias and Socrates agree 
it should -167a, 170d-e, 171c-d,172b), it seems that temperance must include 
knowledge of other things, if not knowledge of all other things.^^
Socrates' second objection to Critias' definition can be appropriately 
labeled the 'eudaimonia objection'. Suppose we set aside the first objection and 
assume that temperance should be defined as knowledge of what one knows and 
does not know (not just that one knows that he does and does not know), and 
suppose we further assume that such knowledge is actually possible. Granting 
these assumptions, Socrates wonders, would such knowledge make us happy 
(173d)? It would certainly be the case that if one had the kind of complete 
knowledge necessary to make sense of Critias' definition, a person would be able 
to expose those who pretend to have knowledge when they do not (171d). 
Further, such a person is unlikely to undertake a task for which she lacks the
^  Another problem presents itself here although neither Socrates nor Critias 
acknowledges it; how could a person know what he does not know unless they already have 
some knowledge of the subject? It is not at all paradoxical to assert that "I know X" because if 
queried I can provide some account of X. Either I give a correct account or not. But suppose I 
say, "I know that I do not know Y." In order for this to make sense it would seem that I must 
already know something about Y. This epistemological paradox, usually referred to as 'Meno's 
Paradox', is taken up by Plato at M. 80d, but does not seem to significantly affect the argument 
here.
It strikes me as odd that Critias, or anyone else, would agree to this claim. Why 
would temperance, as traditionally conceived, enable one to test others for their knowledge? 
The common definition holds that temperance is the ability to control one's self, but what does 
this ability have to do with what someone else knows? The thesis that temperance wül enable 
one to test others' knowledge makes sense only if temperance is wisdom or complete 
knowledge. I think this is an important clue to understanding Socrates' position. If Socrates 
believes fiie ability to scrutinize the knowledge claims of others is a necessary feature of 
temperance, it must be essentially the same as wisdom.
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requisite skill (171e). But is this knowledge all that is required to achieve a great 
benefit ( p c y a  t l  dyaGov)? Socrates says:
I quite agree that mankind, thus provided, would live and act 
according to knowledge, for wisdom would watch and prevent 
ignorance from intruding on us in our work. But whether by 
acting according to knowledge we shall act well and be happy, 
my dear Critias—this is a point which we have not yet been able 
to determine (173d).
The great good or benefit we desire from knowledge, according to Socrates, is
happiness (evSaip.ovia). But why should we suppose that there is a necessary
connection between a well ordered society and happiness? Socrates is pointing
out that even if temperance is the knowledge of knowledge and ignorance (and
this is supposed to include the actual content of our knowledge), there is no
reason to suppose that we would be happier with temperance than without it.
Society would certainly be well ordered if persons acted only according to what
they knew, but Socrates and Critias agree that a good society ought to promote
happiness as well as good order (173e).^
If temperance—defined as knowing what we know, and knowing what
we do not know—is unable to secure the great benefit of happiness, there must
be some other kind of knowledge that has as its goal our happiness. The
knowledge that makes us happy, according to Critias, is "the knowledge with
which [we] discern good and evil" (174b). But if it is the knowledge of the good
and the bad ( t o  àyaBôv k o I  t o  k o k o i / )  that secures the great benefit of happiness
for us, then temperance must not be very beneficial. Socrates and Critias have
thus reached a conundrum: on one hand, they have asserted that temperance
should be a great benefit (i.e., produce happiness), but on the other hand, they
^  If Socrates is expressing his view of a good society, then he thinks good order is a 
necessary, but not sufficient, condition for human happiness.
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believe it is the knowledge of good and bad, not the knowledge of knowledge 
and ignorance, that yields the great benefit of happiness. Socrates concludes, 
therefore, that they have been "utterly defeated, and have Wled to discover what 
that is to which the lawgiver gave this name of temperance or wisdom" (175b).
Although he does not articulate the argument in this way, Penner would 
claim that Critias fails to see where the argument has gone astray, although 
Socrates is less confounded.^! To the end of the argument, Critias holds that 
"temperance is only the knowledge of knowledge and of ignorance, and nothing 
else" (174e), in which case, as they have seen, it would be insufficient for 
happiness. What he should see is that temperance is properly defined, not as the 
knowledge of knowledge and ignorance, but rather as the knowledge of the good 
and the bad .^  Socrates admits defeat at the end because his interlocutors do not 
see how to overcome the difficulties of the argument as they have pursued it. 
However, their oversight does not nrtean that we should conclude that Socrates' 
view has not emerged through the dialogue.
Thus, if Socrates identifies 'temperance' as knowledge of the good and the 
bad in the Charmides, then like 'courage' in the Laches, we can see that there is 
only one thing that the virtue terms identify: knowledge of the good and the 
bad. Or, to put it in simpler terms, 'temperance' in the Charmides is the same as
Penner appeals to the Charmides as support for the FT in "The Unity of Virtue," but 
does not articulate his hermeneutical principle (i.e., that we should "always assume Socrates 
has some particular thing in mind that he wants us to see, even though his interlocutors do not 
see it") until nineteen years later in "What Laches and Nidas Miss." However, it seems clear 
that he is thinking along these lines when he interprets this argument even if he had not yet 
fully articulated the prindple.
^  Thomas Schmid rejects the condusion that Socrates accepts the "knowledge of the 
good and the bad" as an appropriate definition. Instead, he argues that the definition given at 
167a (i.e., ".. .  this is wisdom and temperance and self-knowledge—for a man to know what he 
knows, and what he does not know.") more correctly represents the Socratic view. Ultimately, 
I find his argument for this thesis unconvincing. See Schmid, Plato's Charmides and the 
Socratic Ideal of Rationality (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1998), 40-60.
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'courage' in the Laches, neither of which is merely a part of virtue, but each of 
which is identical to virtue (and hence, to each other). So Penner concludes in 
the Charmides. the Laches, and the Protagoras we find that Socrates holds the 
same view. Socrates consistently upholds the IT rather than the BT: the cardinal 
virtue terms all point to one reality. For Socrates 'courage', 'temperance',
'justice', 'piety', and 'wisdom' all refer to the self-same thing—knowledge of the 
good and the bad. Because it is knowing the difference between what is good 
and what is bad that makes us virtuous, Socrates can say that the five virtue 
terms, while not synonymous, are all names for the same thing—virtue.
B. Problems with the Fenner Interpretation
I indicated earlier that I essentially agree with much of Penner's analysis 
of Socrates' doctrine of virtue. For example, I agree that we find a coherent view 
of the UVD expressed in the Protagoras. Laches, and Charmides. 1 also agree 
with Penner that the best interpretation of the UVD is the FT, not the BT. But as 
we have just seen, Penner argues that the IT can only make sense if we reject the 
"meaning view" of Socrates' "What is F-ness?" question in favor of his "causal 
view." This move is necessary, he thinks, because the received interpretation of 
Socrates' famous question would commit him to a seemingly absurd position.
As Vlastos originally argued, and as Penner concurs, if Socrates seeks definitions 
as appropriate solutions to his questions, then the FT would commit him to the 
claim that the virtue terms are synonymous. And what could be more absurd 
than to suggest that the definition of 'courage' is the same as 'temperance'?
'Piety' does not mean the same thing as 'justice', and 'wisdom' certainly has a 
different cormotation than 'virtue'. It would seem, then, that we have no choice 
but to reject the FT in favor of the BT as Vlastos suggests, or offer an alternative
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account of Socrates' intent when asking his femous "What is F-ness?" questions 
as Penner suggests.
I am unconvinced that the disjunction between Vlastos' meaning view of 
the "What is F-ness?" question and Penner's identity of the virtues is absolute. I 
think Penner is generally correct about Socrates' position in the Protagoras. 
However, I think Penner is incorrect about the consequences of the FT. I wish to 
argue in the final section of this chapter for a revision of Penner's thesis that 
embraces both the traditional epistemological emphasis implied by Socrates' 
search for definitions, along with the ontological implications of his identity of 
the virtues. Thus, I will argue that Socrates can consistently maintain a strong 
sense of identity among the virtue terms while at the same time being committed 
to something like the meaning view of his "What is F-ness?" question.
Michael Ferejohn also argues for a revision of Penner's thesis, but his 
argument differs significantly from my ow n.^ Though I find his argument 
interesting, I do not think it goes far enough. Also, my revision of Penner's thesis 
requires somewhat less hermeneutical effort, and to the degree it is simpler, I 
think it is preferable. However, it will be useful to summarize Ferejohn's 
argument as an indication of the not uncommon dissatisfaction with Permer's 
idiosyncratic interpretation of Socrates' philosophical activity. Thus, before 
demonstrating how I would revise Penner's interpretation of the UVD, I will 
outline the objections raised by Ferejohn.
^  Ferejohn's argument can be found in "The Unity of Virtue and the Objects of 
Socratic Inquiry," Tournai of the History of Philosophy 20 (1982): 1-21. He criticizes Irwin's 
interpretation of the UVD in "Socratic Thought-Experiments and the Unity of Virtue Paradox," 
Phronesis 29 (1984): 105-122. He reflects further on his interpretation of the UVD in "Socratic 
Virtue as the Parts o f Itself," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 44 (1984): 377-388.
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B.l The Ferejohn Objections
Ferejohn's concern with Penner's FT rests squarely on the latter's rejection 
of the traditional reading of Socrates' fundamental quest for moral knowledge. 
Socrates, it will be recalled, is on a quest for a moral theory^ motivated by his 
deeply held belief in a divine commission as well as his own desire to live a good 
life. The Delphic Oracle, when asked, proclaimed that no one was wiser than 
Socrates (Ap. 21a). This "riddle," as he calls it, coupled with the recognition that 
he was not very wise himself (Ap. 21b), motivated a search for a moral expert 
who could shed some light on the Oracle's enigma (Ap. 21c). In order to find an 
expert moralist, Socrates asks whomever he can to give an account of the good 
life (Ap. 21e, 22a, c). Unfortunately, what he discovers is that no one seems able 
to provide an account of morality that would insure the good life. Even more 
distressing is the fact that he is unable to find anyone who can give a 
rudimentary analysis of the basic elements of morality that is consistent.
Socrates ultimately concludes that Apollo's riddle is meant to demonstrate the 
absence of moral w isdom ^ among humanity (Ap. 23a-b), and hopefully thereby 
to promote our interest in securing it. The seemingly absurd declaration that
^  It might be objected that Socrates is not attempting to develop a moral theory but 
simply asking some basic moral questions. I think, however, that it is fedr to characterize his 
search as a search for a moral theory. Socrates desires to know what moral terms refer to, and 
he also desires to know how virtue is acquired. The first question sounds very much like a 
metaethical question, the second sounds like a normative one. His methodology may not be 
systematic, but that should not disqualify his efforts as an attempt to discover a moral theory.
^  Socrates does not have a term equivalent to 'moral wisdom' in his vocabulary, but it 
seems fair to infer from his distinction between wisdom that is p.éya and that which is 
CTp-LKpoy that he wishes to distinguish the divine wisdom (Ap. 23a) that he seeks, from the 
human wisdom that comes firom knowing how to do certain things. Vlastos eurgues this in "The 
Protagoras and the Laches." in Socratic Studies (New York; Cambridge University Press, 1994), 
109-116.
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Socrates is the wisest of humans is thus his commission to pursue 
philosophy—the quest for moral knowledge (Ap. 23b, 28e, 29c-e, 30e-31a).
If this is an accurate view of Socrates' mission, however truncated, the 
question at issue is how does he go about searching for a moral expert? That is, 
what criteria does he employ to test whether an individual has any significant 
moral knowledge? What touchstone does Socrates employ to distinguish one 
who might be a moral expert, from someone who definitely is not a moral 
expert? The traditional answer given by scholars is that Socrates looks for 
definitions of moral terms. This view goes all the way back to Aristotle:
Socrates . . .  was busying himself about ethical matters and 
neglecting the world of nature as a whole but seeking the 
universal in these ethical matters, and fixed thought for the first 
time on definitions (Met. 1:6).^
When asked to give an account of what they know, Socrates expects a so-called
moral expert to be capable of providing definitions of moral terms, at the very
least. After all, is it not necessary to first clarify the terms of an argument before
advancing to more substantive issues like the teachability of virtue?'^ As an
^  Among contemporary commentators it is almost universally agreed that Socrates' 
"What is F-ness?" question was designed to elicit definitions from his interlocutors. In fret. 
Fermer is the only scholar to my knowledge who denies that this is Socrates' goal in asking 
such questions. It would be firuitless to try to list all those who differ with Fermer on this point, 
but the following references should make it clear that this is the considered opinion of the vast 
majority of commentators: Marc Cohen, "Socrates on the Definition of Fiety: Euthyphro 10b- 
11b," in Vlastos, The Fhilosophy of Socrates: A Collection of Critical Essays (Notre Dame: 
Notre Dame University Press, 1980), 158-176; George Nakhnikian, "Elenctic Definitions," ibid., 
125-157; Richard Robinson, "Socratic Definitions," ibid., 110-124; Gerasimos Santas, "Socrates at 
work on Virtue and Knowledge in Plato's Laches." ibid., 177-208; W.K.C. Guthrie, Plato: The 
Man and His Dialogues. Earlier Period (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1974);
Terence Irwin, Plato's Ethics (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 22-27; Charles Kahn, 
Plato and the Socratic Dialogue: The Philosophical Use of a Literary Form (New York: 
Cambridge Urüversity Press, 1996), 148-182; Richard Kraut, Socrates and the State (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1984), 245-293; A. E. Taylor, Plato: The Man and His Work (New 
York: Meridian Books, 1956), 46-74.
^  Socrates makes precisely this point at Laches 190b when he says to the general, "For 
how can we advise anyone about the best mode of attaining something of whose nature we are 
wholly ignorant?"
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example, take someone like Euthyphro: surely anyone who claimed to be an 
expert in piety (Eu. 4e-5a), and who was willing to prosecute his own fother on 
the basis of this knowledge, should at least be able to define the subject of his 
alleged expertise.
The interpretation of Socrates' mission that asserts that he went about 
searching for someone who could provide definitions of moral terms, since such 
an individual might just be a moral expert, is precisely what Penner rejects. If 
Socrates intends a definitional answer to questions like "What is courage?", then 
he is asking for the meaning of the term 'courage'. But if he is interested in the 
meaning of moral terms, and if Penner's interpretation of Socrates' position in 
the Protagoras is correct, then it seems he will be committed to the synonymy of 
the virtues. Since it is "absurd" to think the virtue terms are synonymous, 
Socrates must not really be asking for definitions and meanings when he asks 
questions like "What is courage?" Thus, Penner concludes that the only thing 
Socrates could be asking when he poses an expert testing question is that thing 
which actually causes a virtue to exist in an individual. But as Ferejohn rightly 
notes, this supposes a false dilemma between the cause of virtue and a 
definitional inquiry:
Penner gives no reason whatever for supposing that this very 
psychological state (which is, after all, capable of being shared 
by many individuals, and so is a universal) cannot itself he the 
universal courage, the very thing that functions as the meaning of 
the term "courage" (his italics).^
So perhaps Penner is incorrect in thinking that Socrates is either looking for
definitions of virtue or the causes of virtue. Perhaps he is looking for both since
it is not implausible that they be the same.
^  Ferejohn, "The Unity of Virtue and the Objects of Socratic Inquiry," 11.
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A second and more dramatic weakness of Penner's position, according to 
Ferejohn, lies with his reading of Socrates' "What is F-ness?" question.^^ Fermer 
maintains (and Ferejohn agrees) that there are two forms of the "What is F-ness?" 
question, and we should always prefer the more explicit of the two. Socrates' 
question is most often expressed simply as:
14) What is F-ness?
Sometimes, however, the question is given the more explicit form:
14') What is that thing by which all F things are F?^0 
The problem with Penner's analysis, according to Ferejohn, is the way the causal 
idiom of 14') is interpreted. As indicated in § A.4.a above, Penner holds that we 
should interpret idioms like '5id' causally rather than semantically so that we get 
"that which causes" or "the cause of which" rather than the more ambiguous 
"because of which." If he is correct, Ferejohn argues, Socrates' question becomes
14") What is that thing which causes all F things to act F-ly?5l 
However, what Socrates really wants to know are the characteristics that we can 
use to discriminate between those who are F and those who are not, or those
49 Ibid., 11-13
50 There are three occasions where this longer form of the question occurs, according 
to Ferejohn: Eu. 6d, M- 72c, and H. Ma. 287c, 288a. Interestingly, there are reasons to worry 
whether or not these are intended to mean the same as the simpler 14). The Meno is a 
transitional dialogue and its content is, therefore, suspect of more Platonic than Socratic 
substance. Some commentators interpret this Euthyphro passage as an early expression of 
Plato's doctrine of Forms and therefore, though the dialogue is part of the early period, it 
shows signs of Plato's soon to emerge metaphysics. Thus, it is suspect to some degree. Finally, 
there are some commentators who are unsure of the authenticity and appropriate place of the 
Hippias Major in the Platonic canon. Unfortunately, w e do not find this longer version of the 
"What is f-ness?" question in any of the undisputed early dialogues. Hence, caution is 
warranted in asserting that this is Socrates' preferred form of the question.
51 Ferejohn, 12. See also Vlastos, "What Did Socrates Understand by his 'What is X?' 
Question," in Platonic Studies 2"^  ed (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981), 410-417.
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actions that are F and those that are noL^ Thus, reading Socrates' questions as a 
request for the cause of behavior rather than a request for the criteria that 
distinguishes those with a certain property, is to fundamentally misunderstand 
what he is up to. After all, Socrates is a philosopher not a general, and as such it 
makes more sense to suppose he is curious about the formal rather than the 
efficient cause of courage.^ To inquire about the efficient cause of courage "very 
likely is a general's question, but the texts indicate that it is surely not 
Socrates'."54
B.2 Other Objections to Penner
I think Ferqohn rightly divines Penner's misreading of Socrates' line of 
inquiry. It makes very little sense for Socrates to be interested in what interests 
generals like Laches and Nidas, at least until it is clear what courage is. Penner's 
reading of the Laches forces Socrates to put the cart before the horse. He is 
pursuing a psychological, rather than philosophical, question. He is 
investigating how to motivate people to act courageously (or virtuously in 
general) without first knowing what courage is. This all seems rather strange for 
any philosopher, let alone Socrates.
The possibility remains, of course, that Penner's interpretation of Socrates' 
"What is F-ness?" questions is correct. Indeed, one might argue that the only
52 This reading certainly seems to capture the sense of the Euthyphro passage where 
Socrates explains why he wants to know what piety is: "Tell me then what this aspect is, that I 
may keep my eye fixed upon it and employ it as a model and, if anything you or anyone else 
does agrees wiüi it, may say that the act is holy, and if not, that it is unholy" (Eu. 6e). Plato, 
Euthyphro. Harold North Fowler, trans. (Caniridge: Harvard University Press, 1914), 23.
Here it seems clear that Socrates is asking for a criterion by which he can judge pious acts; he is 
not asking for the cause of pious acts.
53 Ferejohn, 12.
54 Ibid., 13.
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significant difference between Penner and Ferejohn is their reading of ambiguous 
Greek idioms. The question might remain intractable if there were not other 
evidence to which we could point. Fortunately, there are other reasons for 
rejecting Penner's causal view in favor of the traditional definitional view. To 
that evidence, I now turn.
B.2.a Socrates and Definitions
When Socrates poses one of his "What is F-ness?" questions to an 
interlocutor, is he, or is he not, looking for the definition of F-ness, which is the 
one thing common to many instances, or the universal F-ness? One strong piece 
of evidence in fevor of this view comes to us from Aristotle. Not only does he 
tell us that Socrates was the first philosopher to focus exclusively on moral 
philosophy (Met. 1:6), but that he was also "the first to raise the problem of 
universal definition," which is the foundation of any systematic moral 
philosophy (Met. 8:4). He goes on to emphasize Socrates' characterization of 
definitions to distinguish his thought from that of other philosophers since 
Socrates d i d  not give universals ontological i n d e p e n d e n c e . 5 5  Thus we see that 
Aristotle unequivocally takes Socrates' "What is F-ness?" questions to be a 
request for definitions that are themselves universals. Unfortunately, Aristotle's 
authority is insufficient by itself to settle the issue. After all, Penner might argue 
that Aristotle was just as dependent on secondary literature for his knowledge of 
Socrates, as we are. Is it not possible that Aristotle simply misinterpreted what 
he read about Socrates?
^  Aristotle is surely referring to Plato as well as the "Pythagoreans" when he says, 
"they, however, gave [universals] separate existence, and this was the kind of thing they called 
Ideas" (M. 8:4).
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Happily, evidence in Plato's texts tends to corroborate Aristotle's 
testimony about Socrates' search for definitions. When Socrates puts an 
interlocutor to the test for wisdom, he occasionally has to clarify precisely what 
he is looking for in the way of an appropriate response. These occasions give us 
a window into what he meant by the questions he posed. Thus, one method of 
testing Penner's interpretation of Socrates is to see if it matches the kind of 
responses Socrates himself uses to explain what he thinks is an acceptable 
answer to one of his own questions. Is Socrates looking for definitions as 
Aristotle suggests, or a causal analysis as Penner suggests, or, perhaps both?^ 
There are at least two dialogues where Socrates clarifies his "What is F- 
ness?" question by offering a model answer to help his interlocutor better 
understand what has been asked.57 The first occurrence is at Laches 192a-b. The 
inquiry begins with the question: "What is courage" (190d)? Laches responds 
saying, courage is to remain at one's post and fight the enemy (190e). Socrates 
dislikes this answer and after offering a few counter-examples proposes a model 
of an appropriate answer to the kind of question he is asking. First he gives a 
long and explicit form of the question:
I might ask what is that quality which is called quickness, and 
whidi is found in running, in playing the lyre, in speaking, in 
learning, and in many other similar actions, or rather which we 
possess in nearly every action that is worth mentioning of arms.
^  If, as I suspect, it turns out that he is looking for both (i.e., he wants a definition that 
will have certain causal powers), it will be necessary to readdress the problem of synonymy. I 
turn to this in § B.2.b below.
^  It is irrelevant for my purposes why Socrates singles these individuals out for 
special help. This issue has beat sufficiently explicated by other commentators. See Alexander 
Nehamas, "Confusing Universals and Particulars in Plato's Early Dialogues," Review of 
Metaphysics 29 (1975): 287-306; and Hugh Benson, "Misunderstanding the "What is F-ness?" 
Question/' in Benson, Essays on the Philosophy of Socrates (New York: Oxford U nivasity 
Press, 1992), 123-136.
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legs, mouth, voice, m ind  What is that common quality,
which in all these activities you call quickness (192a)?
Next Socrates offers what he takes to be an appropriate answer to this type of
question:
I should say, the quality (Suvajiii/) which accomplishes much in 
a little time (192b).
The proposition that Socrates asserts takes the form "F-ness is Y." In this case 
'quickness' is shown to be the ability (ôuvajuv)^ to "accomplish much" in a brief 
time, regardless of what kinds of things are being done. In this context, F-ness 
(i.e., 'quickness') is a universal—it is the one thing that stands over many 
instances. The predicate Y is a definition of F-ness; it is an explanation of what F- 
ness entails. So in this case, it appears that what Socrates seeks when asking his 
"What is F-ness?" question is the definition of a universal.
A similar case appears at Meno 7 5 b . M e n o  does not fully understand 
the question put to him by Socrates, and more to the point, he does not 
understand what form an adequate answer must take. To help him understand, 
Socrates offers a model question and answer, just as he did with Laches.
Suppose one were to ask, "What is shape?" Socrates suggests as a model answer: 
"the only thing which always accompanies color." Once again we find Socrates 
clarifying his "What is F-ness?" question with an "F-ness is Y" answer. We can
^  Socrates' use of 0l3vap.iv in this context suggests the possibility of a causal element 
in the definition. However, we should not confuse a causal element in the definition, with the 
definition itself. There is nothing here to suggest an intellectualist thesis, i.e., that knowing the 
definition of 'quickness' is necessary and/or sufficient for acting quickly. My cat Lucy often 
acts quickly, but I rather doubt she has the cognitive capacity to know the definition of this 
adveffi. I do not think this is a serious problem since this example is only meant to show 
Laches the form of a proper response to the "What is courage?" question, not the substance of 
such an answer.
Because the Meno is a transitional dialogue, we must be careful about any evidence 
we find there for what Socrates may have believed. However, since this case is virtually 
identical with the case in the Laches, which is an early dialogue, I think we are justified in 
appealing to it as evidence.
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define the universal 'shape' with the expression "that which always accompanies 
color." However, this definition would be inadequate for someone who was 
blind, or someone examining an object in a very dark room. Such failures may 
be the heart of Meno's objection that this account of shape is too simple (euqGes). 
Thus, Socrates provides a second definition which, he thinks, equally well serves 
as an explanation: shape "is the limit of a solid" (76a). Once again Socrates 
offers an "F-ness is Y" answer to the "What is f-ness?" question. So here, as in 
the Laches. Socrates uses a universal and a definition of that universal to explain 
to his interlocutor what he is looking for as an adequate response to his "What is 
f-ness?" question.
Penner might object that in neither of these cases does Socrates, in 
describing an adequate answer, use the word 'definition' (opog).^ This silence 
does not constitute a serious problem. Whether we call these expressions 
'definitions' or 'explanations' or 'accounts' is irrelevant. After all, a linguist 
might say a definition just is an account of how a term is properly used by a 
group of speakers. The point is that Socrates indicates that he is searching for 
universals and some account of how those universals are employed in 
philosophical discourse. Therefore, it would appear that Aristotle assessed 
Socrates' method correctly. The question that remains to be answered is whether 
Aristotle's being right about Socrates makes Penner's analysis wrong.
^  In fact, this term occurs very infrequently in the early dialogues. It can be found at 
Gorg. 470b, 488d, H.Ma. 283b, Ly. 209c, Men. 238d, and Rep. 1331d.
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B.2.b Synonymy Reconsidered
We should recall that Penner rejects the claim that Socrates seeks 
definitions of universals because, like Vlastos, he believes this account of the 
''What is F-ness?" question along with the FT would commit Socrates to a belief 
that the virtue terms are synonymous. The claim that the virtue terms are 
synonymous is taken, by nearly everyone, to be absurd since it would seem to 
entail that 'virtue' means the same thing as 'courage', or 'temperance', or 'piety', 
or 'justice', which obviously it does not. In this final section, I wish to argue that 
this view rests on an unnecessarily narrow conception of synonymy, and that an 
alternative account is possible that allows Socrates to rationally hold the FT while 
at the same time searching for definitions of universals.
At first glance it might seem uncontroversial to assert that two terms are, 
or are not, synonymous. Synonymy is commonly conceived as a relation that 
exists between two terms that have the same meaning.^^ Thus, two terms are 
said to be synonymous if and only if they mean the same thing. If two terms 
mean the same thing, it is further held that these two terms can be exchanged, 
one for the other, without disturbing the sense of the statement. Thus, if 
'gelding' and 'castrated horse' are synonymous (i.e., mean the same thing), we 
can exchange one term for the other without disturbing the sense of a linguistic 
expression. For example, the proposition
I take this to be the common notion among philosophers as demonstrated in 
philosophical dictionaries and encyclopedias. See Robert Audi, ed.. The Cambridge Dictionarv 
of Philosophy (New York: Cambri(%e University Press, 1995), s.v., 'meaning'; Antony Flew, A 
Dictionary of Philosophy, revised 2 ed. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1979), s.v., 
synonymy. Quine traces this notion of synonymy back to Leibniz who suggested that 
interchangeability salva veritate is the sufficient condition for synonymy; see W. V. O. Quine, 
"Two Dogmas of Empiricism," Philosophical Review (1951), reprinted in Quine, From a 
Logical Point of View. (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1994), 20-46. It might well be the 
case that ordinary people or specialists in other fields use the term differently. However, my 
purpose here is to focus on philosophy, not lexicography.
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15) Silver-Far was a beautiful gelding, 
can be altered to
16) Silver-Far was a beautiful castrated horse.
Any literate speaker of English (or any other ordinary language with a 
sufficiently similar grammar) would, it seems, understand 15) and 16) to express 
the same meaning (assuming they also understood that 'Silver-Far' rigidly 
designates a particular horse). With this type of example in mind, we can see 
that there are at least two important elements of synonymy: first, there is a 
semantic criterion that tells us that synonymous terms share a common meaning. 
Second, there is a usage criterion that indicates that synonymous expressions are 
acceptable substitutions for one another in a single context.
The common notion of synonymy seems prima facie uncontroversial, but is 
it really? Consider the semantic criterion. What does it mean to assert that two 
terms share the same meaning? This claim is less than clear until we answer the 
question, what is a meaning? Assuming we could provide an uncontroversial 
answer to that question, we would also have to tackle two larger questions: how 
do meanings get attached to terms? and how does the same meaning get 
attached to different terms? That is, what is the nature of the relationship 
between meanings and terms?^^ it would seem, therefore, that before we can 
offer an adequate account of the semantic criterion of synonymy that we must be 
able to give an adequate account of both the nature of meaning and how
This problem takes us beyond mere linguistic practice and into the realm of 
metaphysics. For example, we need to know the nature of the relationship between the 
meaning entity and the word which is associated with it. Is this relationship an independent 
ontological entity or does it oiüy exist in the mind of the speaker? Whether one comes down 
on the side of Realism or Nominalism makes little difference: we are here clearly in the realm 
of metaphysics. Also, we need to analyze how we come to know the meanings of terms, which 
raises sticky epistemological questions. Thus, an adequate philosophical investigation of 
synonymy will have to include significant groundwork in  both metaphysics and epistemology.
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meanings get attached to specific terms in a language. Since the meaning of 
'meaning' is less than clear, perhaps it would be more advantageous to begin an 
analysis of the semantic criterion of synonymy somewhere else. It might turn 
out that an account of reference would give us all we really need to account for 
synonymy and thus we need not bother with the problem of meaning at all.
It might be suggested that the synonymy of two expressions rests on the 
feet that two terms refer to, or name, the same thing. After all, the etymology of 
'synonymy' suggests this is the proper way to understand the problem since it is 
the transliteration of awcüi/up.La (which is a cognate of CTuvwvTjp.os’), meaning "of 
similar name."® And, if an explanation of synonymy could be given in terms of 
reference without having to appeal to meaning, so much the better. However, as 
Gottlob Frege has pointed out, two terms can refer to or name the same thing, 
while having distinct m eanings.^ Repeating his well-worn example, 'Hesperus' 
and 'Phosphorus' r^er to the same thing—the planet Venus—but they have 
different meanings. If reference were all we had to account for synonymous 
expressions, we would end up with numerous cases of equivocation. Thus, 
synonymy cannot be explained simply by the fact that different words refer to 
the same object: reference and meaning are distinct. It would seem then, that an 
account of reference cannot resolve the problem of synonymy. The semantic 
criterion of synonymy is necessarily associated with meaning after all, and 
therefore, we cannot escape the difficulties associated with an account of 
meaning if we focus on this criterion.
®  Liddell and Scott, An Intermediate Greek-English Lexicon, s.v. (TUVWVUHOÇ.
^  Gottlob Frege, "On Sense and Reference," in Robert Hamish, ed., Basic Topics in the 
Philosophy of Language (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1994), 142-1&I.
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Whether we begin an analysis of the semantic criterion of synonymy with 
the question of meaning or reference seems to make very little difference. We 
apparently need an account of both if we are to give an adequate analysis of the 
semantic criterion. However, as anyone remotely ^miliar with the 
contemporary fields of Philosophy of Language and Linguistics is aware, these 
questions are reasonably disputed by reasonable people.^ Thus, if we are forced 
to begin an analysis of synonymy with the semantic criterion, it may turn out 
that synonymy is for more difficult to explain than at first appeared. As Quine 
has noted.
Just what it means to affirm synonymy, just what the 
interconnections may be which are necessary and sufficient in 
order that two linguistic forms be properly describable as 
synonymous, is far from clear.^
The preceding discussion highlights two important points: first, a 
rudimentary philosophical understanding of synonymy, as defined by the 
semantic criterion, requires significant ontological and epistemological 
assumptions. Second, rational people disagree about the ontological and 
epistemological conditions that give rise to sjmonymy as it is commonly 
understood. Both points are important in relation to resolving the dispute over 
the UVD. If the problem of synonymy partially motivates both Vlastos and 
Fermer, what kinds of ontological and epistemological assumptions do they 
project onto the mind of Socrates? That is, if it would be irrational for Socrates to
^  One has only to compare the views of Russell, Frege, Quine, Wittgenstein, et. al. to 
recognize that there is no universally accepted view of meaning or synonymy. My point is 
simply that if there is disagreement on these issues, it may be that Socrates has his own views 
about synonymy that differ from those we are inclined toward today. Thus, we should not be 
too quick to dismiss the possibility that for Socrates the virtue terms are synonymous.
^  Quine, "Two Dogmas of Empiricism," 24,25. See also Pursuit of Truth (Cambridge: 
Cambridge Urüversity Press, 1990), 37-59.
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assert that 'justice' and 'temperance' are synonymous on the grounds that such a 
relation would violate the semantic criterion (i.e., they do not mean the same 
thing), would not Socrates have to have a sufficiently rich semantic theory to 
inform him of this feet? Would not such a claim assume that Socrates has some 
theory about meaning and reference that would make it implausible for him to 
claim the synonymy of the virtue terms? But what evidence is there that Socrates 
has any interest in semantic theory at all? It is not at all clear that Socrates was 
even cognizant of the ontological or epistemological notions necessary to form an 
astute semantic theory. In fact, the term 'crwoi/vp-oç' does not appear in the 
Greek philosophical vocabulary until Aristotle.^^ Thus, while it would be odd 
for Vlastos and Penner to assert the synonymy of the virtue terms, it is much less 
clear in the case of Socrates.
Thus far, I have argued that the notion of synonymy we take for granted 
ought not be taken for granted in the case of Socrates. 1 seriously doubt the 
philosophical tools necessary for conceptualizing the problem of synonymy, as 
we understand it, were available to him. It is unlikely, therefore, that Socrates 
has anything like the semantic criterion of synonymy in mind when he raises the 
question of the unity of virtue to Protagoras. However, just because Socrates is 
not likely to have had a sophisticated notion of synonymy, does not mean he had 
no notion of synonymy at all. Ordinary people with no philosophical 
background whatsoever execute synonymous expressions aU the time. So, how 
do we account for those who know how to practice synonymy even though they 
could not begin to give an adequate philosophical account of what they are
67 Aristotle refers to synonymous expressions in several locations: Cat. I.a6 Rhet 
1405a, 990b, 1065b, 1079a, E ^ . 1111b, 1.15,4.3,6,6.10,13,7.4.
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doing? The answer, it seems to me, lies in the usage criterion. Ordinary 
language users understand that words can sometimes be substituted for one 
another without weakening their ability to communicate. The usage criterion 
shifts our understanding of synonymy away from epistemology and ontology 
and toward linguistic practice and convention. By focusing on Socrates' 
linguistic practice, I think we gain a far better understanding of his theory of 
virtue than we ever could by forcing him to meet the contemporary standards of 
a semantic theory.
It should be clear by now that I am profoundly sceptical of using 
contemporary notions from semantic and linguistic theory to unravel Socrates' 
UVD. It falls to me, then, to suggest an alternative that make sense of the FT 
without reading too much into Plato's text. I think the key to understanding 
Socrates' view is to focus on the usage criterion. How does Socrates use 
language and how does he treat synonymous expressions? Are there clear 
passages where Socrates uses terms synonymously and, if so, what do they tell 
us about his understanding of synonymy? Further, how does his use of 
language illuminate the FT interpretation of the UVD7
B.2.C Socrates and the Synonymy of the Virtue Terms
There are some clear cases where Socrates engages in the linguistic 
practice of using terms synonymously. Perhaps the most famous, and commonly 
noticed by commentators,^ is Socrates' synonymous use of the Greek terms for 
'knowledge' and 'wisdom', especially èmu-rnixTi, 4>povoiaLÇ and (rc<j)La. There are
^  It seems many commentators recognize this practice on Socrates' part. For two very 
good examples see Guthrie, Plato: The Man and His Work. 265, and Taylor, Protagoras. 152ff-
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numerous instances throughout the early dialogues where Socrates treats 
^knowledge' and 'wisdom' interchangeably. In the Apology for example, 
Socrates claims that he is not wise (21b, 22e, 23b) or does not have significant 
knowledge (20e, 21d, 22c-d). There seems to be no significant difference in the 
usage of terms in these contexts. Also, at 19c, we find Socrates exchanging 
'wisdom' and 'knowledge' in the context of a single passage, which could easily 
be described as synonymous. An even clearer case is seen at Protagoras 349e- 
350c where Socrates substitutes 'wisdom' for 'knowledge' in the midst of an 
argument. In each of these cases, and there are others (e.g., Euth. 281a-b, La.
194e, Prot. 357-358), Socrates substitutes one word for the other without 
hesitation, and in each case his interlocutor(s) fully understand the locution. I 
think it is safe to conclude, therefore, that Socrates uses these terms 
synonymously.
The synonymy of 'knowledge' and 'wisdom' in the early dialogues is 
taken to be uncontroversial by many commentators because of the ambiguity of 
these terms in the Greek language. And indeed, these notions are closely related. 
Also, prior to Aristotle many thinkers may not have drawn sharp distinctions 
between them. However, this observation does not weaken my argument. If 
ordinary language users engage in a linguistic practice that violates the rules of a 
systematic theory of language they did not have, we should not be too troubled. 
Whether individuals succeed in communicating with one another is the central 
issue. Thus, as long as Socrates can successfully communicate with his 
interlocutors, it does not matter that he may, at times, violate the rules of our 
semantic theory. After all, we would draw a clear distinction between 
'knowledge' and 'wisdom' because these terms do not mean the same thing.
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However, it would be inappropriate to chastise Socrates for using these terms 
synonymously unless he recognizes the distinctions we draw between them.
There is further evidence about Socrates' notion of synonymy to be found 
in the early dialogues. At times Socrates distinguishes between important terms, 
and fortunately he tells us what criterion he uses in doing so. The passage in 
which he lays out what I take to be his criterion for synonymy long escaped my 
notice because it is buried in the Ion, an early dialogue that receives little 
attention among commentators. However, when I stumbled upon this passage, 
its importance was immediately clear. It is in this passage that Socrates indicates 
how he distinguishes between the terms for certain activities. Socrates is trying 
to help Ion see how to distinguish between various activities (rexvTj). He claims, 
and Ion agrees, that each rex^n "has been apportioned by God a power of 
knowing a particular business" Q. 537c) Further each art is properly 
distinguished by the knowledge (eTTtarnjjLT]) that is peculiar to it:
Do you argue this as I do, and call one art different from another 
when one is a knowledge of one kind of thing, and another a 
knowledge of another kind Q. 537d)?70
Thus, for Socrates, the terms for two activities are synonymous if the knowledge
on which they depend is the same.
With the criterion from the Ion in hand, we can see how Socrates can 
consistently and rationally hold that the terms 'justice', 'piety', 'wisdom', 
'courage', and 'temperance' are synonymous. Socrates holds the view that 
virtue—and each of the terms used to describe virtue—is a kind of TexvTi. 
Therefore it will be distinguished from other human activities by the special
Plato, Ion, trans., W.R.M. Lamb (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1925). 
70 Ibid.
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knowledge associated with it. Since the knowledge associated with virtue is 
knowledge of the good and bad (La. 199d), the term for any other skill that is 
based on knowledge of the good and the bad will be synonymous with it. Since, 
as we have already seen, Socrates argues that virtue, courage (La. 199c), and 
temperance (Charm. 174b) are properly identified with knowledge of the good 
and the bad, these terms are for him  synonymous with ^virtue' (and with each 
other). Further, from the arguments he gives in the Protagoras, we see that 
Socrates attempts to establish the same for justice and piety (Prot. 330c-331b). 
Though it is true that he never explicitly shows the connection between justice 
and piety and the knowledge of the good and bad as he does with temperance 
and courage, it is strongly suggested at Laches 199d. Thus, I think we are 
justified in claiming that the IT, which Socrates embraces in opposition to 
Protagoras, rests on his belief that the virtue terms aU point to the same thing— 
knowledge of the good and the bad. Since he explicitly tells us he discriminates 
between human activities based on the knowledge associated with each, we are 
justified in asserting that he does in fact believe that the virtue terms are 
synonymous. More simply put, Socrates' notion of synonymy is less narrowly 
focused than our own. His broad conception enables him to treat, as 
synonymous, terms that are for us, heteronomous.
Conclusion
I began this chapter with an  outline of Penner's view of the UVD, which 
asserted that Socrates intends to affirm a strong sense of identity among the 
virtue terms as opposed to Vlastos' BT. However, because Penner agrees with 
Vlastos that the virtue terms cannot be synonymous, he is forced to reinterpret 
Socrates' mission so that his "What is F-ness?" questions are not requests for
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definitions. Instead, he takes Socrates to be searching for some causal account of 
what makes a person act virtuously. 1 have argued that while Fermer is correct 
that the IT is the proper way to understand Socrates' view of the UVD, we are 
not forced to give the radical reinterpretation of his "What is F-ness?" questions 
that Penner suggests. 1 have argued that it is the case that Socrates searches for 
definitions that are universals, but, in the case of the virtues, the definition he 
keeps discovering is the knowledge of the good and the bad. Since Socrates 
distinguishes between specializations by the knowledge peculiar to each, and 
since he believes that each virtue term can best be defined as requiring the same 
kind of knowledge as do the other terms, it is the case that for Socrates the virtue 
terms are synonymous.
1 suspect that if we could put the question to Socrates, he would say that 
the various virtue terms contribute significantly to the confusion about virtue. 
When we come through philosophical scrutiny to see that each of the so-called 
virtues is an activity that rests on knowing the difference between that which is 
good and that which is harmful, we should also see that the apparent differences 
between the virtues disappear. That is, 1 think Socrates would be quite happy to 
do away with the cardinal virtue terms and simply talk about virtue—the 
knowledge of the good and the bad. As a linguistic convention Socrates is quite 
happy to talk about courage, or piety, or justice, etc., knowing that most folks fail 
to recognize that these terms all point to one and the same thing. However, as 
the Protagoras illuminates, Socrates believes there is nothing distinctive about 
them. There is no distinctive power associated with them, nor can they be found 
separated from one another, nor is there any distinct substance associated with 
them. They are for him, merely different words for the same thing.
Chapter IV
Brickhouse and Smith on the Unity of Virtue
In this chapter I turn attention to Thomas Brickhouse's and Nicholas 
Smith's interpretation of the UVDA They argue that Socrates' notion of the 
relation between the virtues is not sufficiently captured by either Vlastos' 
Biconditionality Thesis or Fenner's Identity Thesis. But, like Vlastos and 
Fenner, they argue that the claims of the Frotagoras are not hopelessly at odds 
with other accounts of virtue found in the early dialogues. Also like Vlastos, 
they are firmly in the intellectualist camp and argue that Socrates believes 
virtue is a special kind of skill or knowledge, a significant part of which 
consists in knowledge of definitions of moral terms. But when the skill of 
virtue is applied in varied circumstances, non-definitional knowledge is 
required to consistently achieve virtuous action. On their account, the 
cardinal virtues wül be distinct both in their definitions and in the attendant 
knowledge necessary to achieve virtuous behavior. The unity of virtue, on 
their account, depends upon the special role of wisdom among the cardinal 
virtues. Since virtue is a type of wisdom/knowledge, all the particular 
virtues will be an application of wisdom in different circumstances. On their 
account of the UVD, the wise person will be the one who knows all the
^The account I offer here is derived primarily from their Plato's Socrates (N ew  York: 
Oxford University Press, 1994), 60-72,103-136; Socrates On Trial (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1989); and "Socrates and the Unity of the Virtues," The Tournai o f Ethics 1 
(1997): 311-324. The latter work offers no new  insights into their position. It is, however, a 
concise presentation of their view.
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definitions of the virtues as well as how to actualize virtue in each unique 
moral situation. Thus, the wise man is, for Socrates, a virtue craftsman.
I will follow the same pattern here as in previous chapters: in the first 
section, 1 will outline Brickhouse and Smith's analysis of the Socratic doctrine 
of virtue. In the second section of this chapter, I will offer objections to their 
position.
A. The Brickhouse and Smith Interpretation of the UVD
Like other commentators, Brickhouse and Smith (hereafter B&S) are 
concerned with the apparent inconsistency in the account of virtue found in 
the Protagoras and those found in the Laches. Euthyphro. and the M eno.^  As 
we have seen previously, the Socratic position on virtue in the former 
dialogue seems to indicate that it is a single thing. B&S hold that there is at 
least prima facie evidence in the others that indicates 'virtue' is the name for 
a set of related but discrete entities. Like Vlastos and Fenner, B&S believe a 
consistent account of these texts can be provided.^ Thus, we need not think 
Socrates is committed to a sophomoric inconsistency, nor need we claim that 
at least one of the views fails to be genuinely Socratic.^
2 It is interesting that B&S do not give attention to the Charmides and the evidence 
of the UVD we find there. I think this highlights a serious gap in their analysis.
 ^It should be noted that Fenner excludes the Euthyphro from his discussion of the 
UVD. See Fermer, "The Unity of Virtue," in Benson, Essays on the Fhilosophy of Socrates 
(New York: Oxford University Fress, 1992), 165,166.
 ^Daniel Devereux maintains that the Frotagoras expresses a genuine Socratic UVD 
while the doctrine expressed in the Laches and Vteno is likely a Flatonic revision of the 
earlier, and less systematic, Socratic doctrine. For a full treatment of Devereux's position, see 
Chapter Five below.
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B&S argue that the coherence of Socrates' UVD depends upon 
recognizing that an acceptable answer to his "What is f-ness?" question, 
where 'virtue' is the F-ness under discussion requires no less than two 
distinct elements. First, they hold that Socrates searches for an  acceptable 
definition of virtue (or one of the cardinal virtues) which servers as an 
identifying universal. This definition will help Socrates recognize legitimate 
instantiations of virtue. Second, in order for Socrates' "What is F-ness?" 
question to be adequately answered a specification of what is produced by 
virtue is required. That is, not only do we need a universal to use as a 
standard for evaluating purported cases of virtue, we also need to know what 
kinds of effects to expect from a virtuous person.
Along with Vlastos, and in opposition to Fenner, B&S accept the 
traditional interpretation of Socrates' activity which holds that he searches for 
definitions of moral t e r m s . 5  For example, in the Charmides he pursues a 
definition of (temperance), in the Laches of dvSpeia (courage), in
the Lysis of <j)iXia (friendship), in the Euthyphro of oaiov (piety), and in the 
Protagoras and the first part of the Meno dpeTii (virtue) itself. However, B&S 
beheve that a satisfactory definition of virtue must include more than a 
specification of the necessary and sufficient conditions for virtue. They also 
believe that an adequate definition of virtue must include an account of its 
ipyov (or epya, as the case may be) or what is accomplished by the possession
 ^For the sake of clarity I w ill henceforth refer to this as the lex ica l element' of a 
Socratic definition of virtue. "ITus is the part of a Socratic definition that sets out the 
necessary and sufficient conditions for virtue.
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of the virtue.^ The importance of this second element arises because they 
believe Socrates conceives of virtue as a species of knowledge or wisdom, but 
he also believes that all the particular virtues as essentially distinct, albeit 
related parts of w isdom / Because Socrates thinks of wisdom as a kind of 
rexvn or 'craft', an adequate answer to his "What is F-ness?" question must 
specify both the productive and lexical elements of the definition. That is, 
Socrates not only seeks knowledge of the definition of F-ness, but also what is 
produced by the person who possesses it, the person who, in this case, is a 
virtue-craftsman.
B&S also maintain that Socrates is committed to the belief that some 
of the particular virtues may be proper parts of other particular virtues: in the 
Euthyphro. for example, it appears that Socrates believes piety is a proper part 
of justice. They will account for this by arguing that a craft may have more 
than one eçtyov and that since Socrates believes the particular virtues are 
crafts, it is possible some have multiple and distinct epya. Thus, justice might 
have two epya, one corresponding to the craft we call 'justice' the other to the 
craft we call 'piety'. In the same way wisdom/virtue may have multiple epya 
which correspond to that which is labeled 'courage', 'temperance', 'justice', or 
'piety' respectively.
I will raise two fundamental objection to B&S's interpretation of the 
UVD. First, I think the texts they use to construct their position are
 ^ I w ill refer to this as the 'productive element' of the Socratic definition of virtue.
 ^One consequence of this view  w ill be that wisdom is both necessary and sufficient for 
the possession of the other cardinal virtues. I will argue below that this raises a 
fundamental problem for their view  of the UVD.
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inconsistent. On the one hand, if the Socrates of the Protagoras believes 
wisdom is both necessary and sufficient for all the particular virtues, then 
having any one of the virtues will necessarily entail having them all. This 
seems to mean, at the very least, that a biconditional relation holds between 
the virtues. There are places, which I point out below, where they seem to 
accept this. On the other hand, if the virtues are proper parts of each other as 
construed in the Euthyphro. there cannot be a biconditional relationship 
between them. The text that is central to their interpretation of the Protagoras 
is incompatible with the text they appeal to in the Euthyphro. Unless Socrates 
is to be committed to an inconsistent position on the nature of virtue, they 
must yield one or the other of these two positions.
My second objection is even more fundamental. I do not think the 
texts they use to support their thesis are actually endorsed by Socrates. As 1 
have suggested in previous chapters, there is scant evidence for a Socratic 
commitment to the PVD in the early dialogues. This goes to the heart of 
B&S's contention that Socrates thinks of the virtues as proper parts of each 
other. Further, I do not think the parts of gold analogy of the Protagoras 
which, as we shall see, is central to B&S's interpretation of the UVD 
represents Socrates' position at all. It may turn out not to be incompatible 
with the position Socrates does hold in the Protagoras, but as I will argue 
below, it is not—and I think it unlikely that it would be—endorsed by him. It 
is a mistake, therefore, to place the interpretive weight on this passage which 
B&S do.
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A.1 Definitional Knowledge and Virtue
To fully grasp B&S's position on the UVD, we must first be aware of 
their analysis of the role of definitions in Socratic epistemology. 
Understanding the role of definitions in answering Socrates' "What is F- 
ness?" questions, they maintain, will help clarify his seemingly inconsistent 
views on the nature of virtue. This is because Socrates holds virtue to be a 
kind of knowledge and because definitions are a necessary part of the 
knowledge he calls "fine and good" (kuXoi/ KdyaGoi^  Ap. 21d). Therefore, 
Socrates' treatment of definitional knowledge will be vital in understanding 
the UVD.
To clarify Socrates' position on the role of definitions in  knowledge, 
B&S start with an epistemological puzzle found in the Apology. Part of their 
philosophical project is to provide an account of Socrates' epistemology 
wherein he can consistently maintain:
1) that he has no significant wisdom /  knowledge (21b);
2) that he knows certain significant moral truths (29b);
and,
3) one of the things he knows is that he is a good man (41c/).
These claims seem clearly contradictory. Taken together, how could anyone 
attribute these assertions to the same person, in the same context, with a 
straight face?
B&S point out that we must first understand what Socrates 
understands by 'wisdom' in order to solve this paradox. Perhaps being
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virtuous consists in more than just doing the right thing. Thus, Socrates 
could believe that he consistently does the right thing, and hence believes 
himself a good man, without knowing what virtue is.® That is, right action, 
even a lifetime of consistent right action, might be insufficient for being a 
virtue-craftsman. So what does Socrates lack which, when added to his right 
action, would make him an expert on virtue? The obvious answer, they 
maintain, is that wisdom /  knowledge is what he lacks. But what is wisdom?
Unfortunately, Socrates never gives a precise conceptual analysis of 
wisdom, nor does he ever make a definitive pronouncement on w hat he 
takes wisdom to be, but B&S believe there are significant clues scattered 
throughout the early dialogues which offer a partial answer to this question. 
One clue is Socrates' relentless pursuit of definitions. But there are two 
important questions to be answered about the way definitions function for 
Socrates:
4) Are definitions merely a constitutive parts of wisdom, but
by themselves do not give a complete account of 
wisdom?
If so, we may ask:
5) What role do definitions play in his account of wisdom?
That is, are definitions necessary or sufficient, or both necessary and 
sufficient, for wisdom according to Socrates?
® Brickhouse and Smith have a dual approach to this claim. They believe Socrates 
is justified in this claim not only by his daLjiOVLOV, which prevents him from doing evil, but 
also from several elenctically secured moral propositions. See Brickhouse and Smith, 1984, 
"The Paradox of Socratic Ignorance in Plato's Apology." History of Philosophy Quarterly: 
and ScKjates on Trial-
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B&S conclude that Socrates does indeed think moral definitions are a 
necessary part of wisdom from the evidence of the Apology and the 
Euthyphro. At the trial Socrates claims that his pursuit of wisdom at the 
oracle's behest took the form of elenctic examinations of those who were 
reputed wise (21a-23b). And the examples of these investigations related in 
other early dialogues^ make clear that Socrates believes definitions of moral 
terms are a necessary element of the wisdom he seeks. If Socrates is searching 
for wisdom, and if he rejects others' claims to wisdom on the grounds of their 
inability to provide definitions consistent with their other beliefs, then 
Socrates must think definitions are a necessary part of wisdom. Since no one, 
including himself, is able to provide definitions which are consistent with 
their other beliefs, no one Socrates has met can be called wise. Thus, B&S 
argue there can be no wisdom without definitional knowledge, or 
definitional knowledge is at least necessary for Socratic wisdom.
Given that Socrates thinks definitions are necessary for wisdom, we 
should ask why he thinks so. According to B&S, the reason he thinks 
definitions are fundamental to wisdom is that wisdom is a kind of craft- 
knowledge (i.e., The person who is wise will be able to serve as a kind
of specialist—a craftsman of wisdom. Being a specialist in a field, they 
maintain, entails being able to define the area of one's expertise. Thus, the
 ^After a perusal of the early dialogues, one could almost say that Socrates is more 
interested in definitions than anything else. For example, in the Euthyphro. Socrates pursues 
"What is piety?"; in the Laches. "What is courage?"; in the Charmides. "What is 
temperance?"; in the LysiS, "What is friendship?"; in the Hippias Major. "What is 
beauty?"; in Republic I, "What is justice?", etc. With the pursuit of definitions taking up so 
much of Socrates' quest for wisdom, it seems incontrovertible that he thought definitional 
knowledge at least necessary for wisdom.
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expert should be able to offer a definition of her expertise. But Socrates 
believes definitions serve a more important function in the life of the expert 
as tools of criticism. He makes this clear when he asks 
Euthyphro for a definition of piety:
. .  . that, with my eye on it, and using it as a standard 
(irapaSeiyM-aTL), 1 can say that any action done by you or 
anybody else is pious if it resembles this ideal (oucnov eivai), 
or, if it does not, can deny that it is pious (Eu. 6e).
Unfortunately, Socrates has been unable to find a wisdom-specialist since
none of the people he has met could produce a definition consistent with
their other beliefe.
But what does Socrates ask his interlocutors to define? Primarily he 
asks for definitions of virtue (or the virtues). If knowing the definition of 
virtue is necessary for being a virtue-craftsman, virtue must be knowledge in 
some sense. Since Socrates uses 'knowledge' and 'wisdom' interchangeably, it 
would appear that virtue in some sense just is wisdom.^^ So anyone who is 
wise will be virtuous and anyone who is virtuous will also be wise. Since 
neither he nor anyone else he knows can define virtue, neither he nor 
anyone else he knows qualifies as a moral expert. Since neither he nor 
anyone else he knows is a moral expert, neither he nor anyone else he knows 
is wise. Thus B&S conclude that for Socrates knowledge of moral definitions 
is necessary for an adequate account of the nature of virtue.
So Socrates believes knowledge of moral definitions is necessary for 
wisdom, and anyone who is wise will, like the skilled craftsman, be able to
Brickhouse and Smith, Plato's Socrates. 70.
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provide paradigmatic definitions to guide the unskilled. It would be 
tempting to stop here and say that Socrates believes virtue simply is the 
knowledge of moral definitions. But B&S point out that knowledge of 
definitions, while necessary, could not possibly be sufficient for being wise.^^ 
"Even if one were to know that wisdom is defined as the knowledge of good 
and evil, one would not by that knowledge alone be able to steer one's way 
through vexing [moral] i s s u e s . " ^ ^  addition to a definition of virtue, the 
moral expert needs other information relevant to particular cases in order to 
apply her definitional knowledge. Suppose, for example, one knew the 
definition of 'courage' was "standing firm in battle." Unless one also knew 
the relevant rules of military engagement, this definition by itself would be 
impotent in the production of courage. Thus B&S argue that knowledge of 
definitions, while necessary, is insufficient for wisdom according to Socrates.
A.2 The Role of epya in Socratic Virtue Theory
The first clue in understanding Socrates' conception of virtue is his 
insistence that an expert is someone who is able to supply appropriate 
definitions to be used as guides to moral action and moral criticism. But
Brickhouse and Smith are following Richard Kraut's lead in this observation. In 
Socrates and the State (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), he argues that 
definitions can play only a partial role in Socrates' conception of wisdom. What Socrates 
wants. Kraut argues, is not just definitions of moral terms, but rather a "substantive theory, 
organized around a small number of core statements, that tells us how to decide all practical 
questions" (282). But Brickhouse and Smith take issue with Kraut. They do not see any 
reason to think Socrates believed a moral paradigm, based upon a definition of virtue, must be 
capable of solving eoery moral dilemma. Therefore, they argue Socrates need not be seeking 
the kind of comprehensive moral theory Kraut has in mind. Brickhouse and Smith, 1994, 
61-63.
12 Ibid.
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these definitions by themselves are not enough to make us act rightly; the 
moral expert needs to know why, how, and when to apply definitional 
knowledge in different circumstances. This is what B&S take to be the second 
major clue for understanding Socrates' conception of w isdom /v i r t u e . ^ ^
It was noted above that, according to B&S, Socrates takes wisdom to be 
analogous to craft-knowledge, and because of this he thinks of anyone with 
wisdom as a moral expert, or craftsman of morality. The significance of the 
analogy between tcxv'ti and wisdom/virtue is rather obvious. A craftsman 
will not only be able to give a definition of his art, but will also be able to tell 
why the art is employed and know when and how to employ it. So if we 
asked a cobbler, for instance, for an account of cobblery, he could reply not 
only that it is the "art of shoe-making," but also point out the relevant 
benefits of his art for society at large. Most important of all, he could tell us 
how to make shoes. Any technical expert worth his salt should be able to 
demonstrate the relevant purpose (i.e., epyou) for which the art is practiced as 
well as define what he does. If moral expertise is analogous to craft expertise, 
as Socrates seems to think it is,l'^ the moral expert should be able to specify 
three distinct things: 1) the definition of her art, 2) what her art aims to 
produce, and 3) how to produced it. For Socrates, therefore, complete
13 Ibid., 63-65.
1^  The relevant passage toward which Brickhouse and Smith point as evidence for 
this claim is Gorg. 448e where Socrates begins the examination of Gorgias. There are two 
points which make this passage significant for Brickhouse and Smith: first, Socrates 
consistently refers to Gorgias' activity as rexv'T) in this passage which indicates his belief 
that the moral expert is a kind of craftsman. Second, if moral expertise is a kind of craft, 
they hold "the crédt in question can be defined in terms of knowledge of how to produce some 
characteristic product, or ergon." Ibid., 64.
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knowledge of virtue includes knowing the definition of virtue (or knowledge 
of the definitions of the virtues if there are more than one), knowing what 
the ipyov of virtue is, and knowing how to achieve the ipyov of v i r t u e . 5^
With the distinction between knowledge of the definition, knowledge 
of the ipyov, and knowledge of how to produce the ipyov, B&S are in a 
position to solve the epistemological puzzle of the Apology. First, they take 
Socrates' view of w isdom /virtue to be composed in part of definitional 
knowledge. Moral definitions will be a necessary element of any account of 
wisdom that Socrates can accept. Second, the knowledge of definitions is, by 
itself, insufficient to make one a wise and virtuous person. Third, since 
wisdom is akin to craft-knowledge, the moral expert or moral craftsman 
should be able to specify the goal or product (epyoi/) of the defined skill along 
with the knowledge of how to produce the goal in particular circumstances. 
Hence, virtue requires knowledge of the definition of virtue, knowledge of 
the ipyov, and knowledge of how to produce the ipyov. Now, it is quite 
possible for a person to be good (i.e., to do the right thing) without having the 
relevant definitional and product knowledge necessary for moral expertise. 
Such a person might be described as accidentally good. It also seems possible 
that a person might know some morally relevant propositions and yet fail to
Ibid. What Brickhouse and Smith fail to clarify is whether ipyov  knowledge 
and the knowledge necessary to produce the ipyov are to be counted as part of a complete 
definition of moral terms or distinct elements of moral knowledge. If they are to be counted as 
part of the definition, then a definition of virtue should be sufficient for making one a virtue- 
craftsman which they want to deny. On the other hand, if these are distinct elements of 
moral knowledge, it may turn out that Socrates knows more than he lets on, and his denials of 
definitional knowledge may have to be taken as ironic, which they also wish to deny. See § 
B.l below.
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have the definitional and product knowledge which is sufficient for moral 
expertise. Thus, on B&S's account, Socrates can consistently claim that he is a 
good man, that he knows some morally relevant propositions, but that he 
also fails to have knowledge sufficient for his being a moral expert.
A.3 The Unity of Virtue
The puzzle from the Apology highlighted the role of definitions in 
Socratic epistemology and led B&S to emphasize the importance of the 
virtue/craft analogy in understanding the nature of virtue. In turn this 
analogy highlighted the importance of non-definitional knowledge in 
Socrates' account of virtue. Having explored these constitutive elements 
(knowledge of the definition of virtue, knowledge of the epyoi/ of virtue, and 
knowledge of how to produce the virtue), B&S turn to the problem of the 
unity of these diverse elements. How is it that together they form the unity 
of virtue? Here they must answer the following kinds of questions: if there 
is more than one virtue, what property do they all share which legitimizes 
their common appellation? And what does the craft analogy reveal that will 
help unify the seemingly inconsistent accounts of virtue found among the 
early dialogues?
A.3.a The Euthyphro
B&S have already argued that because Socrates thinks moral 
knowledge is analogous to craft knowledge, being a moral expert entails being 
able to provide a definitional account of one's craft, an account of the 
purposes or benefits of that craft, as well as being able to actualize the product
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of the craft. On this account, it follows that definitional knowledge is 
insufficient for virtue if not accompanied by the appropriate product 
knowledge. A perfect example of this, they claim, can be found in the 
Euthyphro where Socrates and Euthyphro agree to the following propositions 
on the nature of piety
6) Piety is a part of justice (12d);
7) Piety is the part of justice concerning service (Gepa-rreia)
toward the gods (12e);
8) The remainder of justice concerns service (Gepaireia)
towards humans (12e);
9) The definition of piety is incomplete without specifying its
epyou (13e).
But there is something missing from their analysis of piety which is necessary 
for its completion. All they need, B&S argue, is to identify the product of 
piety: "Socrates specifically says that Euthyphro will complete the definition 
of piety by specifying the benefit produced by the craft of p i e t y . O f  course, 
Euthyphro is unable to elucidate the proper product of piety (14b-c), and so 
they are unable to arrive at knowledge of piety. It is because Euthyphro is 
unable to satisfy Socrates' curiosity about the product of twv Gewi/ GepaireLav 
that he chides Euthyphro. But what is important for B&S is Socrates' claim
It is importeint for their account that Socrates not merely entertain these 
propositions, but actually be committed to them. But as 1 pointed out in the previous note, if 
these propositions do express genuine Socratic doctrine, we raise other problems for Socratic 
epistem ology.
17 Ibid., 66.
18 "Surely, Euthyphro, if you had wished, you could have summed up what 1 asked 
for much more briefly. But that fact is you are not eager to instruct me. That is clear. But a
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that he and Euthyphro were on the verge of arriving at knowledge of piety. 
Here we have a case where it seems a satisfactory definition of a moral term is 
reached, but knowledge of piety is still lacking since Socrates and Euthyphro 
are unable to discover the product accompanying the definition of piety.
There are several important points that should be emphasized about 
this reading of the Euthyphro. First, If B&S are correct, it would seem to 
follow that Socrates has discovered two morally relevant, though incomplete, 
definitions:
Dl) Justice is service (SepaireLa) toward humans;
D2) Piety is service (BepaTreta) toward the gods.
This would be no small matter since he seems to deny any hint of 
definitional knowledge in other definitional d ia lo g u e s .A w a re  of this fact, 
B&S deny this is a consequence of their position. Instead, they assert the 
much weaker claim that Socrates finds the conception of piety partially stated 
towards the end of the Euthyphro to be "more plausible" than any he has 
heard from Euthyphro and others who profess to know what piety is.^ O They 
emphasize, however, that what is important for their view is that knowledge
moment since, you were on the very point of telling me—and you slipped away. Had you 
given the answer, I would now have learned from you what piety is, and w ould be content" 
(m . 14b).
For example, see Charm. 165b; La. 186e; Ly- 216c, 223b.
20 Brickhouse and Smith, 67. While it is clear why, it is not at all clear how they 
can deny that Socrates has discovered the definitional aspects of piety and justice. If they 
take the constructivist position and they take Socrates' assertion at 13e to mean that the 
definition of piety will be completed when accompanied by the appropriate product 
knowledge, it should follow that he knows the definitional aspects of piety and justice. And, 
if 'know' is too strong a word, we should at leéist be able to say that he has a strongly justified 
belief that the definitional aspects of piety and justice put forward are correct.
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of the definition of piety (or justice) is insufficient by itself to make one 
pious.21
A second consequence of their reading of the Euthyphro is that it 
commits Socrates to a position that divides virtue into proper parts.22 Not 
only is virtue divisible into proper parts (e.g., justice, piety, courage, 
temperance, etc.), but at least some of the parts of virtue are divisible (i.e., they 
have different scopes) as well.23 Piety, on this view, turns out to be a proper 
part of justice (Eu. 12d) as well as a proper part of virtue. It also appears that 
Socrates is not merely claiming to believe that piety has a smaller scope than 
justice. If he is committed to 6), 7), and 8) above, he must surely know that 
virtue has a different scope than justice which has a different scope than 
piety.
Finally, if Socrates accepts Dl) and 02) and he knows that piety is a 
proper part of justice, then it would seem plausible that the virtues are
There is an even more puzzling problem that follows. Even if this is a correct 
reading of the text of the Euthyphro Socrates w ill still not have complete knowledge of piety 
because the second element of product knowledge (knowledge of how to produce the epyou of 
piety) has not been specified. Articulating the product of piety is different hrom specifying 
how to achieve that product All Socrates has requested of Euthyphro is a specification of 
the product, and this along with the definition of piety is insufficient for knowledge of piety 
on Brickhouse and Smith's account. It is possible that Socrates has conflated knowing the 
product of piety and knowing how to produce the product of piety. But if this is the case, we 
must wonder why he would conflate a distinction central to his own analysis of moral 
knowledge. This, along with problems I raise in § B below, should cause us to reject this 
reading of the text
^  I am using the term proper parts' to designate the species and sub-species of virtue 
in basically the same way it would be used in set theory; any set X can be a subset of itself and 
hence a part of itself, but any sub-set Y which has at least one distinct property from X is a 
proper subset of X. On B&S's account of the cardinal virtues, justice, piety, temperance, 
courage, etc. are proper parts of virtue since each has a peculiar element (its ep yov) not 
found in the others. In the same way, piety is a proper part of justice because each pious act is 
considered a just act, but justice has a wider scope than piety.
23 Ibid., 70.
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definitionally distinct as well. If virtues such as piety and justice are 
definitionally distinct, the question becomes, are they different in their 
intension, their extension, or both? B&S claim the text supports the latter 
alternative. When Socrates explains his question about the scope of piety and 
justice, he uses the examples of fear and reverence and odd numbers and 
numbers (Eu. 12c). "Not only do the paired terms have different intensions, 
but they obviously have different extensions as well."24 Therefore, if piety is 
to justice as odd numbers are to numbers, piety and justice must be distinct in 
both intention and extension. Piety is definitionally distinct from justice, and 
both are (presumably) definitionally distinct from virtue.
So according to B&S's interpretation of the Euthyphro. Socrates is 
committed to the PVD, a position in which virtue is a composite whole of 
proper parts that are distinct in their definitions and scope. If we add to this 
their conclusions about Socratic definitions, it must be the case that each 
definitionally distinct virtue is also distinguished by the epyov at which it 
aims.
A.2.b The Protagoras
If this is the correct interpretation of Socrates' position in the 
Euthyphro. the natural question to ask is whether this account of virtue is 
consistent with the accounts found elsewhere? Prima facie it seems 
consistent with the accounts of virtue in the Laches and M eno where Socrates
24 Ibid., 68.
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apparently holds the PVDP^ But what about the central dialogue on the 
nature of virtue—the Protagoras? In this dialogue it would appear that 
Socrates does not believe that virtue is a composite whole of proper parts.
But B&S argue that Socrates' position here is consistent with his position in 
the Euthyphro. So, how is it that the cardinal virtues, each with a distinct 
definition and product, can be thought of as one thing?
B&S argue the unity of virtue becomes clear when we compare the two 
analogies of virtue Socrates offers Protagoras at 329e. After Protagoras has 
asserted that virtue is a composite thing (329d), Socrates asks for a clarification 
of the relation of the parts to the whole:
Do you mean, said I, as the parts of a face are parts—mouth, 
nose, eyes, and ears—or like the parts of a piece of gold, 
which do not differ from one another or from the whole 
except in size.
Protagoras accepts the first alternative and goes on to assert that each part 
must have a distinct function or power (6uuajus). So for Protagoras no two 
virtues are alike in appearance or capacity (330b); virtue is thus a composite 
whole of functionally distinct parts. If this is his view, Socrates should accept 
the alternate analogy—the parts of virtue are like parts of gold; they differ in 
no way other than size. The problem for B&S is to show how the 
definitionally distinct, proper parts of virtue of the Laches. Meno. and 
Euthyphro are more like pieces removed from a chunk of gold than the parts 
of a face.
25 La. I90d, 198a, 199e; M- 72c, 73e, 78e, 79b. I have already argued in Chapters 2 
above that I do not think these texts commit Socrates to the PVD. I w ill say more about this 
in § B below, as w ell as Chapter Five.
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The key, they argue, is to remember "that wisdom occupies a special 
place among the particular virtues in that all the other particular virtues are 
in some sense wisdom."26 What they mean is w isdom /virtue is a single 
xéxi'Tl but it may be applied in different circumstances to achieve distinct 
epya. Each proper part of virtue is distinguishable by its peculiar product as 
well as its peculiar definition. But they are also the same in a significant way 
just as the parts removed from a gold bar are significantly the same. The skill 
of wisdom/virtue, they argue, is like the mathematical skill of 
triangulation.27 While triangulation is a single skill, it has many different 
applications, and since each application of triangulation is designed to 
achieve a distinct purpose, each application of the skill is distinct. For 
example, even though a navigator and a surveyor both use the same 
skill—triangulation— their purposes are sufficiently distinct, thus we do not 
confuse the two. There is only one skill applied in both professions, but the 
effects of that skill are unique.
But B&S take this analogy further. Not only may we divide 
triangulation into separate applications, there may be distinct applications 
within applications.28 For example, navigation may be sub-divided into 
coastal and harbor navigation each having its own distinct application of the
26 Brickhouse and Smith, 70.
27 Ibid.
26 Ibid., 71. It should also be noted that Brickhouse and Smith's position is different 
from Kraut's subdiscipline thesis. Kraut is reticent to push the gold analogy too far, and 
Brickhouse and Smith take this to be a fundamental flaw in his position. They argue further 
that the subdiscipline thesis is unable to account for the "special status" of wisdom among the 
virtues, since none of the subdisciplines of an academic field like economics are fundamental 
to all the others. Ibid., 70, n. 54.
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triangulation skill. This is why the gold analogy of the Protagoras is central to 
their interpretation: it allows them to make sense of the passage at 
Euthyphrol2d. If the parts of virtue are related to each other in the same way 
that pieces of gold removed from a gold bar are related, then Socrates can hold 
that justice is a proper part of virtue, and piety is a proper part of justice. 
W isdom/virtue is a skill like triangulation, and justice is the application of 
that skill in the service toward humans just as navigation is the application 
of triangulation in moving ships through the water. Likewise, piety, as a 
subdivision of justice, is the application of justice in service toward the gods, 
just as harbor navigation is the subdivision of navigation that is the 
application of triangulation in bringing ships safely to dock. The scope of 
navigation is clearly more broad than harbor navigation, and by analogy the 
scope of justice is more broad than piety. So, like pieces of a chunk of gold or 
the skill of triangulation, the parts of virtue differ in their scope, but they are 
all still applications of wisdom in different circumstances. The virtues are 
thus unified in being the skill wisdom, but are distinct in their particular 
applications.
Thus, the UVD for B&S falls out of Socrates' position that virtue is a 
technical skill. And the skill of virtue is like a piece of gold; it is one thing 
with multiple applications. Just as we may take different parts of a piece of 
gold and use them in diverse ways, we may use the skill of virtue in diverse 
circumstances. When applied to fearful situations, virtue is called 'courage', 
when applied to human relations 'justice', when applied to the gods 'piety', 
etc. Thus even though there is only one 'skill /  knowledge /  wisdom', each part 
(or application) of virtue is distinct in its aim to produce a specific goal. So
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while there is a unity to virtue, it is also appropriate to speak of its proper 
parts. In the Laches. Euthyphro. and Charmides. for example, Socrates and 
his interlocutors are focused on one or other of the applications of 
virtue—courage, piety, and temperance respectively—while in the Protagoras 
and (the first part of) the Meno. they are after virtue itself. Thus, in these 
latter works, it is natural for Socrates to emphasize the unity of virtue rather 
than its distinctiveness. However, the differences in emphasis should not 
lead us to conclude the notions of virtue in these dialogues are inconsistent.
B. Problems with the Brickhouse and Smith Interpretation
B&S have offered some useful insights into the problem of Socrates' 
UVD. For example, they correctly see that the UVD is motivated by Socrates' 
epistemology, and must therefore be understood within an epistemological 
context. Because Socrates generally treats wisdom and knowledge as the same 
thing, and since he thinks virtue is a kind of knowledge, it is impossible to 
understand the UVD without some conception of his epistemological 
intuitions. They are also correct to emphasize the importance of definitions 
in Socrates' account of virtue. But, however helpful these insights may be, I 
believe their interpretation of the UVD is fundamentally flawed at its core. 
First, as I have already argued in Chapter Two above, it is very unlikely that 
Socrates is committed to the PVD in the early dialogues. Second, I do not 
think a careful analysis of the Protagoras shows a Socratic commitment to the 
parts of gold analogy that is central to B&S's interpretation. Third, even if 
Socrates were committed to the parts of gold analogy in the Protagoras. 
Socrates' position would still be inconsistent with their reading of the
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Euthyphro. On one hand, they hold that having wisdom necessarily entails 
having all the other "parts" of virtue, but on the other hand their 
interpretation of the Euthyphro seems to deny such a strong logical relation. 
In the following sections, I spell out these criticisms in more detail.
B.l Socrates and the Parts of V irtue^
I am very sceptical that there is evidence from the early dialogues 
which commits Socrates to the PVD. Those commentators who argue for it 
usually look to three dialogues: the Laches. Meno. and Euthyphro. There are 
three passages in the Laches that seem to indicate that Socrates thinks of 
virtue as a composite of proper parts. First, at 190d Socrates introduces the 
notion of the parts of virtue, suggesting to Laches that it will be easier to 
understand the whole of virtue if they first understand the nature of the 
parts. Later at 198a, when Nicias takes Laches' place as the main interlocutor, 
Socrates reminds him that they originally assumed courage was only a part of 
virtue. Finally at 199e, Socrates points out that the definition of courage they 
have come to is inconsistent with the premise that courage is only a part of 
virtue. B&S argue that because it is Socrates who introduces and reiterates 
the parts of virtue premise throughout the dialogue, it must represent his 
considered opinion. But I have already argued this cannot be the correct 
reading of the text for two fundamental reasons: first, that virtue is composed 
of parts is from the beginning an assumed premise which is shown at the end
To prevent repetition, I w ill only outline the arguments against a Socratic 
commitment to the PVD from the Laches and Meno here. For a full discussion, see Chapter 
Two above, and Five below.
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of the dialogue to be inconsistent with a Socratic definition of courage.
Second, the premise that virtue is composed of parts is introduced in a 
context which makes it clear that Socrates could not affirm it.^ O
The second text used by commentators to support a Socratic 
commitment to the PVD is Meno 71d - 79e. The bee analogy (72b), the shape 
analogy (74b), and the color analogy (74c) each seem to indicate that Socrates 
believes virtue is divisible into distinct parts. But as in the case of the Laches. 
it is not clear whether he poses these analogies to accurately represent his 
view, or to cause Meno to think more critically about his own views. But 
even if the analogies of the Meno did represent Socrates' view, we should be 
very wary of taking them as paradigms of Socratic doctrine because the Meno 
is a transitional dialogue. As such, it represents the emergence of Platonic 
doctrine and thus the 'Socrates' we find there is more Platonic than Socratic.^^ 
The final text used to argue for a Socratic commitment to the PVD, and 
on which B&S heavily depend, is Euthyphro 12c. Here Socrates introduces 
the num bers/odd numbers, fear/reverence analogies to argue that the scope 
of justice is more broad than piety:
So it is not right to say that 'where fear is, there too is 
reverence.' No, you may say that where reverence is, there 
too is fear—not, however, that where fear is, there always 
you have reverence. Fear, I think, is wider in extent than
^  Just moments before the PVD is introduced Socrates gets Laches to agree that he 
and Socrates already "know the nature of virtue" and therefore they w ill easily be able to 
spell out the nature of courage since it is only a part of what they already know. What is 
being made clear is that Socrates knows that Laches thinks he knows what virtue and 
courage are, when in fact, as the dialogue quickly bears out, he does not. I discuss this in 
detail in Chapter Two above, and Chapter Five below.
This is discussed in more detail in Chapter Two above.
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reverence. Reverence is a part of fear, as the uneven is a part 
of number; thus you do not have the odd wherever you have 
number, but where you have the odd you must have 
number.
These analogies are peculiar and therefore require close analysis. Socrates is 
evidently trying to get Euthyphro to see that piety is a proper part of justice.
He begins by suggesting that justice is to piety as fear is to reverence. Every 
case of reverence is a case where fear will be present because the set of 
reverential things is part of the larger set of fearful things. That is, there is a 
set of things called 'fearful' which will be composed of the sub-set 'reverential' 
and the sub-set 'non-reverential fearful'. Now, we cannot infer the presence 
of members of the set of non-reverential fearful things from the set of 
reverential things, but as a sub-set of the fearful, we know that every case of 
reverence will be a case of fear.
The numbers/odd numbers analogy makes this point clearer. There is 
a set of things called 'numbers' that is composed of the sub-set odd numbers' 
and the sub-set 'even numbers'. We cannot infer the presence of members of 
the even set from the odd set, but as a sub-set of numbers, we know that every 
instance of an odd number will be a number. In the same way, there is a set 
called 'justice' which is composed of the sub-sets 'pious' and the 'non-pious 
just' or the just.32 Each pious act will be just in the sense that the pious is part 
of the larger set justice. However piety and justice will be distinct in the same
The fact that 'justice' gets used twice in this example causes a good deal of 
confusion. It would have been clearer if Socrates had said, "Piety and justice are parts of 
virtue." However, since he did not, it would seem that the position Socrates is advocating 
here (supposing he is advocating any position at all) is that justice is com posed of two related 
but distinct things: the pious and the non-pious just. To put it another way, Socrates is 
distinguishing between the just proper, the part of justice that has to do with the gods, and 
the part of justice that has to do with men.
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way that the odd and the even are distinct. So Socrates seems to be pointing 
out to Euthyphro the seemingly analytic truth that acts of reverence are acts of 
fear, that odds are instances of numbers, and evidently that pious actions are 
just.
If these analogies accurately represent Socrates' view in the Euthyphro. 
then this 'Socrates' seems to hold views different from the 'Socrates' of the 
Protagoras and Laches.33 This would not be too surprising if the Euthyphro 
was placed toward the end of the early period as a transitional dialogue along 
with the Meno. There are a couple of reasons why commentators might be 
tempted to adopt this interpretation. First, since there is broad agreement that 
the Protagoras and Laches are representative of early dialogues and therefore 
Socratic doctrine, and since the Euthyphro is apparently inconsistent with 
them, we have some reason to think the latter represents the emergence of 
Platonic doctrine.^^ Now, by itself this seems purely ad hoc and 
unconvincing, but there is internal evidence that might suggest the 
Euthyphro demonstrates a transitional character. For example, at 6d Socrates 
asks Euthyphro for the eîSoç of piety against which any particular act might be 
compared. Many commentators take this to represent the earliest expression
In the Protagoras Socrates explicitly argues that justice and piety are identical 
IProt. 331b) and at the conclusion of the Laches he suggests that courage is no different from 
any of the other so-called virtues <T.a. 199e), and by implication that all the virtues are 
identical.
^  One significant exception to the commentators who accept this dating is Charles 
Kahn, who places the Gorgias among the earliest of the Socratic dialogues and places the 
Protagoras next to the Euthydemus. and Meno as one of the very last. See Kahn, "Did Plato 
Write Socratic Dialogues," in Benson.
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of the theory of Forms that Plato brings to maturity in the middle d i a l o g u e s . 3 5  
If this were correct, the Euthyphro. like the Meno. might represent the 
emergence of Plato's thought and could therefore be considered late among 
the early d i a l o g u e s . 3 6  Therefore, the Socratic assertion of the PVD found in 
the Euthyphro should not be taken as counter evidence to the doctrine of the 
unity of virtue found in the Protagoras, Laches.
While I am sympathetic to the suspicion that Plato is beginning to 
emerge in the Euthyphro. I reject B&S's interpretation of this text on other 
grounds. I do not think we should take the numbers/odd numbers, 
fear/reverence analogies to be positive assertions of Socratic doctrine. It is 
true that Socrates makes assertions such as "I do not think that 'where fear is, 
there too is reverence'" (12b), and "Fear, I think, is wider in extent than 
reverence" (12c), and piety is that part of justice that "has to do with the 
service of the gods" (12d). But he also asserts, with equal or greater 
enthusiasm, propositions such as, "A person ought not prosecute a relative 
for murder unless the victim was also a relative" (4b), which, while 
consistent with popular Athenian morality of the time, seems completely out
See R. E. Allen, Plato's Euthyphro and the Earlier Theory of Forms. (New York: 
Humanities Press, 1970), William Prior, The Unity and Development in Plato's Metaphysics 
(La Salle: Open Court Publishing Co., 1985), 9-50; Nicholas White, Plato on Knowledge and 
R eality (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co., 1976), 5-10.
36 Penner makes a similar argument in "The Unity of Virtue" saying that the 
Euthyphro. Euthydemus. and Meno are more interested in what he calls the "demotic" 
virtues. Penner, "Unity of Virtue," 165-166. However, he later rejects the existence of 
demotic virtue as part of Socratic doctrine. See Penner, "What Nicias and Laches Miss—And 
Whether Socrates Thinks Courage Merely a Part of Virtue" Ancient Philosophy 12 (1992):
13 n. 4.
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of character for Socrates.^^ He also asserts throughout the dialogue that 
Euthyphro can teach him the nature of piety when it is clear that Euthyphro 
does not in fact know what it is!^  The point is that this dialogue is so 
saturated with irony that it is difficult to tease out what Socrates does and 
does not actually believe. Given this fact alone, we should be particularly 
careful about attributing positive doctrines from this dialogue to Socrates. 
But if there are things Socrates asserts here that do represent his considered 
opinion, we should find them corroborated in other dialogues. The 
interpretive principle we should employ in such circumstances is, "is this 
doctrine consistent with what Socrates asserts in other early dialogues?" If 
not, we should be sceptical about attributing it to him. In the section which 
follows I demonstrate that the connection B&S attempt to draw between 
justice and piety in the Euthyphro. and the parts of gold analogy of the 
Protagoras will not hold, since Socrates does not endorse that analogy. Thus 
the Euthyphro need not undermine the consistent Socratic position we find 
in the Protagoras. Laches, and Charmides since it is unlikely that what we 
find there represents genuine Socratic doctrine.
Of all people, it seems w e should expect Socrates to agree with Euthyphro that it 
makes no "difference whether the victim was a member of the family, or not related, when 
the only thing to watch is whether it was right or not for the man who did the deed to kill 
him. If he was justified, then let him go; if not, you have to prosecute him, no matter if the 
man who killed him shares your hearth, and sits at table with you" Æu. 4b).
^  For example see B i. 5a, 5c, 9a, 11b, l ie , 14c, 15d-e.
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B.2 The Protagoras and the Parts of Gold Analogy
B&S's interpretation of the UVD depends in large part on their reading 
of the Protagoras which commits Socrates to the pieces of gold analogy at 
329d. But is Socrates really trying to spell out this own view of the UVD with 
this analogy? B&S offer no positive argument for attributing this to Socrates; 
they simply assert that "the gold/pieces of gold analogy [is] endorsed by 
Socrates."^^ I think he is not employing the analogy to express his own view, 
and I think there are good reasons to believe he could not be using this 
analogy to express his own view. For one thing, as I indicated in the section 
above, I do not think Socrates believes the terms 'justice', 'w isdom ', 'piety', 
'temperance', and 'courage' refer to proper parts of virtue in the Laches. And I 
think the context of the discussion in the Protagoras makes this clear as well.
It will be recalled that Socrates puts three related disjunctions to 
Protagoras at 329d-330b which are designed to clarify the latter's view of the 
nature of virtue. Each disjunction is exclusive and Protagoras chooses one 
term from each as an adequate articulation of his view. The three 
disjunctions are:
First,
PI) Virtue is a composite whole and justice, piety, 
temperance (courage and wisdom) are parts of it;
or
P2) Justice, piety, temperance (courage and wisdom) name the 
same thing.
Second,
Brickhouse and Smith, 70.
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or
Pl.a) The parts of virtue are like the parts of a face each with a 
distinct 5t5va[iiç;
Pl.b) The parts of virtue are like the parts of a piece of gold, 
which do not differ from one another, or from the whole, 
except in size.
And finally,
Pl.a.i) A person may possess one part of virtue without 
having all the rest;
or
Pl.a.ii) A person possessing one part of virtue must have all 
the rest.
Protagoras chooses PI), Pl.a), and Pl.a.i), expressing the view that virtue is 
composed of proper parts which have distinct functions and which may be 
possessed independently from one another. The context in which the 
disjunctions progress shows that the second disjunction is an attempt to 
clarify PI), and the third is intended to clarify Pl.a). So if the pieces of gold 
analogy of Pl.b) were to express Socrates' view, it seems that he would have to 
agree with Protagoras on Pi)—that virtue is composed of proper parts. 
However, nowhere in this discussion does Socrates suggest he accepts PI). 
Taken by itself, the presentation of the three disjunctions gives us no reason 
to think Socrates takes any position at all! In fact, it is not until he begins 
elenctic scrutiny of Protagoras' position at 330c that we begin to see what 
Socrates' position might be.
So w hat does Socrates' scrutiny of the Protagorean position reveal 
about his own view of the nature of virtue? We find many clues throughout 
the dialogue, but especially from the conclusions of the elenchoi he brings
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against Protagoras.^ At 331b Socrates concludes: "justice is either the same 
thing as piety or very like it." Similarly at 333b he concludes: "temperance 
and wisdom [must] be the same." At 350c and again at 360d he concludes that 
knowledge (or wisdom) is the same as courage. Finally, in summarizing the 
view he has defended against Protagoras, he claims to have tried to 
demonstrate "that everything is knowledge—justice, temperance, and 
courage alike" (361b), which is tantamount to saying that virtue is "a single 
whole." The first three conclusions are aimed squarely at Pl.a), which leaves 
open the possibility that Socrates is expressing his own view in the pieces of 
gold analogy of Pl.b). But the summation of the dialogue leaves little doubt 
that Socrates takes himself to have been arguing against PI) throughout. At 
361b, he articulates the dilemma that has grown out of his and Protagoras' 
opposing views:
One of you [Socrates], having said at the beginning that virtue 
is not teachable, now is bent upon contradicting himself by 
trying to demonstrate that everything is knowledge—justice, 
temperance, and courage alike . . . .  If it [virtue] turns out to 
be, as a single whole, knowledge—which is what you are 
urging, Socrates—then it will be most surprising if it cannot 
be taught.
So if Socrates thinks he has been attacking PI), and since a commitment to the 
pieces of gold analogy requires a commitment to PI), either Socrates is very 
confused, or he never intended the pieces of gold analogy to represent his 
own view.
It should be pointed out that many commentators believe that the arguments 
Socrates uses to dislodge Protagoras from his position are either intentionally or 
unintentionally fallacious. For my purposes, this issue is irrelevant since 1 am only suggesting 
what Socrates' position might be, not whether he is justified in holding it.
143
By analyzing the conclusions he draws from the cross-examination of 
Protagoras it seems fairly clear that Socrates wishes to endorse P2) in 
opposition to PI). However, the clearest evidence that Socrates is committed 
to P2), and therefore cannot be committed to the pieces of gold analogy, comes 
not at the end of the dialogue, but at 349b. After the long interlude in which 
Simonides' poetry is discussed, Socrates refocuses the discussion on the UVD 
by rearticulating the two opposing positions. Protagoras has defended the 
position expressed in PI)—that virtue is a composite of distinct parts—and 
clarified this view with Pl.a), and Pl.a.i). Though he does not directly say it, it 
is clear that since they disagree, Socrates opposes the Protagorian view and, 
therefore, prefers P2)—that the different virtue names all refer to one and the 
same thing. The way Socrates sets up the disjunction shows that PI) and P2) 
are incompatible. But P2) is also incompatible with Pl.b) (i.e., the pieces of 
gold analogy) as well as Pl.a). This is the case because both the pieces of gold 
analogy and the parts of a face analogy are designed to explicate PI), which 
Socrates rejects. Both analogies are logically bound to the PVD expressed in 
PI); they are both offered to Protagoras as possible consequences of the 
ambiguous PVD expressed in PI). Thus, if Socrates rejects PI) in favor of P2), 
he cannot also intend Pl.b) as a clarification of his own view.
B.3 The Incompatibility of the Protagoras and the Euthyphro
If my analysis of the Protagoras is correct, Socrates is not trying to spell 
out his view of the UVD with the pieces of gold analogy. But for the sake of 
argument, let us suppose that it does represent his view. Even if that were 
the case, B&S's interpretation is still fundamentally flawed. The logical
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consequences of the pieces of gold analogy are incompatible with the logical 
implications of the num bers/fear analogies of the Euthyphro. The analogy 
from the Protagoras entails that from any one of the "parts" of virtue, we may 
infer any and all of the others, while the numbers/fear analogies from the 
Euthyphro explicitly denies inferring an instance of piety from an instance of 
justice. That is, in the Euthyphro we find a material implication between 
piety and justice, but in tlie Protagoras we find a biconditional relation 
between all the parts of virtue. So it would appear that B&S must alter their 
reading of either the Euthyphro or the Protagoras.
It will be recalled from Chapter Two above that a biconditional 
relationship holds between the "parts" of virtue just in case having any one 
of the virtues necessarily entails having them all.^l If a biconditional 
entailment holds between the cardinal virtues, we may infer that any person 
who is virtuous will be wise, temperate, just, courageous, and pious. But not 
only may we infer this; if biconditionality holds, it is necessary that anyone 
who lacks any part of virtue will lack all of virtue. Biconditionality thus 
ensures an all or nothing relationship between the parts of virtues.^
The BT is derived from the exchange between Socrates and Protagoras 
when the latter asserts that virtue is a unity of distinct parts with distinct
41 Gregory Vlastos, "WP," 1981, 232.
42 I should here draw a distinction between biconditionality as a logical relation and 
the Biconditionality Thesis. The latter is the claim, initially put forward by Vlastos, that 
possessing any one of the virtues necessitates having them all, but that each is a discrete 
thing. Because of its emphasis upon the PVD, the BT precludes a stronger logical relation 
between the virtue terms. However, if one holds the stronger Identity Thesis put foreword by 
Penner, one w ill also accept biconditionality, for the IT entails biconditionality, but not vice 
versa. See Permer, "The Unity of Virtue," in Benson, 163.
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names (329d). Socrates proposes the pieces of gold and parts of a face 
analogies to clarify Protagoras' assertion that virtue is composed of parts. 
Protagoras favors Pl.a), asserting that the virtues are like
the parts of a face are parts—mouth, nose, eyes, and ears . . .
[which] differ both in themselves and in their function 
(ôuvajiiç) (330a, 330b).
As Socrates points out, this analogy entails that a person may posses some of
the parts without possessing them all (329e). In affirming the face analogy,
Protagoras rejects the alternative description which B&S think represents
Socrates' view. They believe Socrates affirms the pieces of gold analogy which
means that the parts of virtue do not differ from one another or from the
whole except in size (329d). The fundamental question is, what distinction is
Socrates highlighting with these cases? What point is he trying to make
about the parts of virtue which Protagoras affirmed in PI)? B&S take the size
distinction of Pl.b) to be the point Socrates is making. However I think the
text makes it clear that the function of the parts is what distinguishes the two
cases.
In order for biconditionality to hold among the virtues, the pieces of 
gold analogy must entail that anyone who possesses one of the parts of virtue, 
must possess them all (329e).43 However, Socrates suggests that the 
significant difference between the parts of a face and pieces of gold is that in 
the first case each can accomplish a distinct task, while in the second case we 
can accomplish the same task with each. That is, what Socrates highlights
Vlastos claims that this is not only the implication of the text but that this "is a 
transparently clear expression of a well-known Socratic tenet" Ibid., 233.
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with the two cases is the Sui/ap-ig  ^or ability to accomplish a task, of each part, 
not the relative size of the parts. But B&S think the size of the various parts 
is the point Socrates is trying to m ake.^ However, this simply makes no 
sense. Suppose the relative size of the parts is what Socrates is trying to 
highlight with the two analogies: there would be no significant difference 
between the two cases. Both parts of a face and pieces taken from a bar of gold 
will have different sizes. This is trivially true in the first case though less so 
in the second. However if the size distinction is what is supposed to 
distinguish the two cases, Socrates has failed to make any significant 
distinction at all. So if he is trying to draw a distinction with the two 
analogies, which obviously he is, the size criteria of P2.b) caimot be the 
important element of the distinction. Thus, what Socrates emphasizes as the 
difference between Pl.a) and Pl.b) is the ôuvajuç of each. If the parts have the 
same power, we can accomplish the same kinds of tasks with the different 
pieces. The parts of a face each have distinct powers, but the pieces of gold 
will all have the same essential powers so long as quantity is not an essential 
consideration.
There is another reasons to think the pieces of gold analogy implies a 
biconditional relationship between the parts of virtue: Protagoras thinks this 
is the consequence of the analogy. The elenctic exchanges that follow 330b all 
involve Protagoras defending the notion that a person may have one of the 
virtues without having them all. This is a consequence of biconditionality.
^  This is essential to their interpretation because if true, it would allow them to 
claim that Socrates is expressing his own view in the Euthyphro where it is argued that 
piety is a part of justice.
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not size. Socrates is committed to opposing Protagoras on this point; with 
each elenchus he concludes that it is implausible to think someone could 
have one of the virtues and not all the others. Protagoras is taken along with 
great reluctance, but it is clear that he understands that the pieces of gold 
analogy implies a biconditional relationship between the virtues, which he 
wants to deny (especially in the case of courage at 349d).
Thus, it seems that if the pieces of gold analogy represents Socrates' 
view, he is committed to the BT. B&S seem to recognize some of the 
implications of the parts of gold analogy as it affects their understanding of 
the UVD. For example, they interpret the sameness of the virtues expressed 
in the pieces of gold analogy to mean that each virtue name (i.e., justice, piety, 
temperance, courage, etc.) refers to an application of one and the same skill 
(i.e., wisdom, or "the knowledge of good and evil"^) in different 
circumstances.
Wisdom, then, is what is common to all of the virtues. One 
who possesses this virtue will possess them all, for anyone 
who is wise will recognize what he or she should do in all 
morally relevant circumstances and contexts. Moreover, one 
must possess wisdom in order to possess any one of the other 
virtues . . . .  So it is that no one can have any one of the 
virtues without having all of the others. For no one can be 
virtuous in any way without being wise, and if one is wise, 
one can use one's wisdom to produce all of the different 
moral erga.^
^  Brickhouse and Smith, 69. 
46 Ibid., 71.
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Thus, in order to be just, one must possess knowledge of good and bad and be 
able to apply it in the circumstances of human relations. In order to be pious, 
one must possess knowledge of good and bad and be able to aid in the 
circumstances of service to the gods. In order to be courageous, one must 
possess knowledge of good and bad and be able to apply it in fearful 
circumstances, and so on. So B&S are committed to biconditionality between 
the "parts" of virtue in some sense: if a person is virtuous, she must have 
wisdom, and if she has wisdom, she has courage, justice, and piety.
The question which remains is whether their use of the Euthyphro to 
support the claim that knowledge of definitions is insufficient for knowledge 
of virtue is consistent with the biconditionality of the pieces of gold analogy. 
Their analysis of the Euthyphro revealed that Socrates must be committed to 
the parts of virtue having distinct and varying scopes. At 12a-e, he seemed to 
be committed to the claim that justice and piety are related in the same way as 
numbers and odd numbers, fear and reverence. The set of numbers is 
composed of both odds and evens while the set of odd numbers is smaller 
because it leaves out the even. So whenever we take the set of all numbers, 
we will also have the subset of odd numbers. But it is clearly not the case that 
when we take the set of odd numbers, we have all numbers since the odd 
excludes the even. The scope of the odd set is smaller than the scope of the 
set of numbers. Thus, we could not infer the even from the odd. In the same 
way, fear has a scope more broad than reverence because everywhere there is 
reverence, there is fear, but there are cases of fear which do not include 
reverence. Thus, we cannot infer reverence from non-reverential fearful 
situations. The important point is that in neither case do we have the
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biconditionality suggested by the pieces of gold analogy. But, if B&S are right, 
Socrates believes these analogies accurately represent the relation between 
justice and piety. Like numbers and fear, justice has a larger scope than piety; 
every case of piety will therefore be a case of justice, but not every case of 
justice will be a case of piety.
B&S want to maintain that the analogies of the Euthyphro are 
consistent with the pieces of gold analogy of the Protagoras. Virtue, like a 
piece of gold, is one thing (i.e., a single "psychic c o n d i t i o n " 4 7 ) ^  and if we take 
off different pieces of the gold, they will share all the same essential properties 
of the whole except their size. In like manner, the parts of virtue are all still 
essentially the same, like the pieces of gold, but they are different in their 
various extensions. And this seems prima facie consistent with the 
numbers/fear analogies of the Euthyphro since the set of numbers is bigger 
than the set of odd numbers and since the set of fearful things is larger than 
the set of reverential things. Unfortunately, it is impossible for Socrates to be 
committed to both analogies without being inconsistent. If the pieces of gold 
analogy entails a biconditional relationship between the parts of virtue as 
indicated above, we know that from any instance of virtue (not just wisdom), 
we can infer the presence of all the others. So if anyone has piety he m ust 
also have justice, temperance, courage, etc. But according to the analogies of 
the Euthyphro. Socrates cannot believe that possession of justice necessitates 
the possession of piety. The set 'justice' will include the set of all pious things 
but will also include the set of all non-pious just things. It would be true that
4 7  I b i d . ,  6 9 .
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having the whole set of just things necessitates the set of pious things because 
the latter is a proper part of the whole set 'justice'. But the numbers/fear 
analogies explicitly preclude inferring the whole from the part. Thus, if B&S 
are correct and Socrates is committed to these analogies in the Euthyphro. he 
should not endorse the pieces of gold analogy of the Protagoras. The logical 
implications of the analogies from these two dialogues are simply 
inconsistent. An alternative interpretation can offer a much simpler 
resolution to this dilemma; if neither the numbers/fear nor pieces of gold 
analogy are intended to articulate Socrates' position, there is no prima facie 
inconsistency for B&S to resolve.
Conclusion
I have argued in this Chapter that Brickhouse and Smith offer some 
interesting insights into the epistemological foundations of Socrates' UVD, 
but that their interpretation of that doctrine, dependent as it is on the PVD, is 
inadequate. Specifically, I think their attempt to synthesize the accounts of 
virtue in the Protagoras and Euthyphro is problematic. The Euthyphro. like 
the Meno. shows signs of an emerging Platonic epistemology and metaphysic 
which is moving toward distinct forms corresponding to each virtue term.
The Protagoras, on the other hand, gives us good reason to believe Socrates 
thought the various virtue terms refer to only one thing. Another problem 
with Brickhouse and Smith's interpretation of the UVD is that it looks rather 
more like the position defended by Protagoras than the one defended by 
Socrates. If their analysis were correct, each virtue would be distinct from 
every other in its definition as well as what it aims to produce (i.e., its ipyov).
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This is strikingly similar to Protagoras' claim that the parts of virtue are 
distinct in themselves—like the parts of a face—and in their power (or 
Suvajiis) to accomplish distinct things. Finally, the text does not support, and 
therefore there is no reason we should afford, wisdom priority over any of 
the other virtues. Socrates treats wisdom no differently than the other so- 
called "parts" of virtue. In the texts where the UVD is discussed, wisdom is 
just one instance of virtue, no different from courage, piety, justice, or 
temperance. For these reasons, I think the interpretation of the UVD offered 
by Brickhouse and Smith ultimately fails to capture Socrates' doctrine of the 
UVD. Besides, as I have already argued in the chapter above, we can attribute 
a much stronger sense of unity to virtue than Brickhouse and Smith can 
allow. The only question left to investigate is whether or not there really is a 
coherent doctrine of the UVD in the early dialogues. Daniel Devereux denies 
there is a coherent doctrine in the early dialogues, and to this challenge 1 now 
turn.
Chapter V 
Devereux on the Unity of Virtue
One way to resolve the apparent textual inconsistencies that shape the 
enigma of Socrates' doctrine of virtue is to argue that there is no single 
Socratic doctrine of virtue, and, therefore, there is no problem to solve. If 
different early dialogues demonstrate Socrates' commitment to different 
views on the nature of virtue, at different times, w ith different interlocutors, 
the simplest solution might be to argue that Socrates simply does not have a 
single coherent theory of virtue. Perhaps he expresses genuinely distinct, and 
inconsistent, views on the nature of virtue in different dialogues. Perhaps he 
had not thought the problem through, or perhaps he changed his mind over 
time. Alternately, one might argue that in some texts we find the doctrine of 
the historical Socrates and in others Plato's revision of his mentor's 
unsystematic views. Something like this second possibility has been 
suggested by Daniel Devereux.^
Devereux has argued that there is no coherent, systematic, Socratic 
UVD to be found throughout the early dialogues of Plato. He maintains that 
the doctrine we find Socrates expressing in the Protagoras is hopelessly at
^Devereux makes the strongest case for the 'Socrates' of the Laches not being the 
historical Socrates in his 1977 paper. However, I w ill not focus on this article since his later 
work represents the same basic position with a primary focus on the problem of the UVD 
which is the focus of this study. There is an important shift, however, in how he interprets 
the Parts of Virtue Doctrine in the Laches, as I point out in § B .l below. See Daniel 
Devereux, 1977, "Courage and Wisdom in Plato's Laches." Tournai of the History of 
Philosophy. 129-141; and Devereux, 1992, "The Unity of the Virtues in Plato's ■
Laches" Philosophical Review. 765-789.
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odds with the views he expresses in other early dialogues. Thus, the whole 
enterprise of trying to fit the disparate views of Socrates together into a single 
coherent doctrine is doomed from the start Because I believe there is a 
systematic UVD found not only in the Protagoras but also in other early 
dialogues, and because my interpretation of the UVD depends upon this 
view, I must respond to Devereux's objections and demonstrate why I think 
his interpretation of the early Platonic corpus is mistaken.
A. The Devereux Interpretation of the UVD
While there are disputes over exactly how we should understand the 
UVD, the belief that there is a coherent UVD to be found throughout the 
early dialogues is held by most commentators on Socratic philosophy. The 
general consensus is that Socrates was committed to a view in which the 
virtues courage, temperance, piety, justice, and wisdom are related in some 
necessary way which makes it impossible for anyone to have one, but not 
others, and that virtue is some kind of knowledge.^ But Devereux parts from 
the majority and denies there is a systematic UVD in the early dialogues. He 
claims that what we find in the Protagoras is a genuine Socratic theory of 
virtue, but the views expressed in the Laches and Meno are inconsistent with
Zpor Example, c.f. Thomas Brickhouse and Nicholas Smith, Plato's Socrates (New  
York: Oxford Press, 1994); Michael Ferejohn, 1982, "The Unity of Virtue and the Objects of 
Socratic Inquiry," Tournai of the History of Philosophy 20: 1-21; Terence Irwin, Plato's Ethics 
(New York: Oxford Press, 1995); Richéird Kraut, Socrates and the State (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1984; Terry Permer, 1973, "The Unity of Virtues," Philosophical Review 82: 
35-68; Gerasimos Santas, "Socrates at Work on Virtue and Knowledge in Plato's Laches." 
Review of Metaphysics 22: 433-460; C.C.W. Taylor, Plato: Protagoras (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1991); Gregory Vlastos, "The Unity of the Virtues in the Protagoras." in 
Platonic Studies (Princeton, Princeton University Press); Paul Woodruff, "Socrates on the 
Parts of Virtue," Canadian Tournai of Philosophy Supplementary Volume II (1976): 101-116.
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it and, therefore, most likely represent a Platonic revision of Socrates' 
doctrine.3
Devereux's argument centers on an analysis of the Laches that 
highlights what he believes are several apparent inconsistencies with the 
texts of the Protagoras. He justifies this narrow focus by pointing out that 
"those who have discussed the unity of the virtues in the early dialogues 
have focused most of their attention on the Protagoras, and have not 
appreciated the complexity of the view suggested in the L a c h e s . In the 
latter, he believes we find a view of the UVD which is not only different from 
the position outlined in the Protagoras, but which is also inconsistent with 
the competing interpretations of the UVD offered by other scholars (e.g., 
Vlastos' Biconditionality Thesis and Penner's Identity Thesis).
Devereux's argument against a coherent UVD is twofold: first, he 
argues that in the Laches Socrates is committed to virtue's composite nature 
(as he is in the MenoL and in the Protagoras he is committed to its non­
composite nature; therefore, these dialogues are inconsistent. The second 
part of the argument is itself twofold: first, he argues that wisdom plays a 
central unifying role among the virtues not found in the Protagoras. Second, 
Socrates' position in the Laches indicates the parts of virtue will each be 
distinguished by some non-intellectual element such as endurance which is
^Devereux, 1992, 788.
 ^Ibid., 767. Devereux does not offer an analysis of the texts of the Meno which, he 
believes, are also inconsistent with the Protagoras. He sidesteps the Meno for two reasons: 
first, Vlastos has already provided a thorou^ investigation of these texts and he thinks it 
is uimecessary to repeat that work; second, he believes the theory of virtue laid out in the 
Meno is significantly different from that related in the Laches (771). The precise difference 
between these two accounts is spelled out below. However, despite the differences between 
these two dialogues, Devereux believes they both show Socrates' commitment to the Parts of 
Virtue doctrine which, he maintains, is wholly lacking from the Protagoras.
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also incompatible with the theory of virtue articulated in the Protagoras. 
Given the combined force of these two arguments, Devereux believes any 
attempt to tease out a single UVD in the early dialogues is ultimately futile. I 
believe Devereux's analysis of the Laches is fundamentally flawed, and 
therefore the radical conclusion he offers is unwarranted. Before I offer a 
detailed criticism of his position, however, his argument must be laid out in 
detail.
A .l Why the Laches and Protagoras are Inconsistent
Devereux first argues that there cannot be a consistent, Socratic UVD 
because the Laches and Protagoras, both early dialogues, contain inconsistent 
views on the nature of virtue. This argument rests on a prima facie reading 
of three particular passages in the Laches where it appears Socrates commits 
himself to the position that virtue has a composite nature. I refer to this as 
the Parts of Virtue Doctrine (hereafter, PVD).^ In the Laches, according to 
Devereux, Socrates is committed to the PVD since he asserts to both Laches 
and Nicias that virtue is composed of definitionally distinct parts, of which 
courage is but one.
The first passage which Devereux believes commits Socrates to the 
PVD is found at 190d:
^There are a number of ways to conceptualize the relationship between virtue and its 
parts. One way is to think that 'virtue' names a set of distinct things (e.g., definitionally 
distinct universals). An alternative is to think of the universal virtue as a genus of 
knowledge with distinct species falling under it. Devereux opts for something like the first 
alternative and ultimately claims that, in the Laches at least, the universal 'wisdom' (or, 
knowledge of the good and the bad) is identical with virtue, and the universals courage, 
temperance, piety, and justice are necessarily present whenever it is. Devereux, "The Unity 
of the Virtues," 778.
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I would not have us begin, my friend, with inquiring about 
the whole of virtue, for that may be more than we can 
accomplish. Let us first consider whether we have a 
sufficient knowledge of a part; the inquiry will thus probably 
be made easier to us.
From this passage, Devereux derives:
1) Socrates himself introduces the PVD and is therefore 
committed to it.
The second passage is found at 198a where Nicias takes over as interlocutor 
for Laches and Socrates reminds him of their agreement on the PVD:
Do you [Nicias] agree with me about the parts [of virtue]? For 
I say that justice, temperance, and the like, are all of them 
parts of virtue as well as courage (my emphasis).
This passage leads Devereux to assert:
2) Socrates unequivocally affirms his commitment to the 
PVD.
The third and final passage to which Devereux points as support for Socrates' 
commitment to the PVD is found toward the end of the dialogue at 199e:
. . . Nicias, courage according to this new definition of yours, 
instead of being only a part of virtue, will be all virtue . . . .
But we were saying that courage is one of the parts of virtue?
We can summarize Devereux's interpretation of this passage as
3) Socrates reminds Nicias of their commitment to the PVD 
and is therefore committed to it.
Taken by themselves, any one of these passages certainly seems strong prima
facie evidence for Socrates' commitment to the PVD, and of the three 2) is
clearly the strongest. But when we consider 1), 2), and 3) together, it seems
almost impossible to doubt Socrates' commitment to the PVD in the Laches.
Given these assertions on Socrates' part, how could we possibly come to any
other conclusion?
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If the prima facie reading of the texts highlighted by Devereux 
accurately represent Socrates' position in the Laches, what is the position he 
defends in the Protagoras and how is it different? Devereux agrees with the 
majority of commentators that in the Protagoras there are only two 
descriptions of virtue available for Socrates to adopt. At 329d, Socrates asks 
Protagoras:
Is virtue a single whole, and are justice and self-control and 
holiness parts of it, or are these latter all names for one and 
the same thing?
The disjunction Socrates articulates can be divided into
4) Virtue is a composite whole and justice, piety, and 
temperance are parts of it;
and
5) Justice, piety, and temperance name one and the same
thing.
Either Socrates agrees with Protagoras that virtue has a composite nature by 
asserting 4), or he is committed to 5) and believes that all the particular virtue 
names refer to "one and the same thing" (329d).
Gregory Vlastos has defended the first alternative and argued that 
Socrates must take the first disjunct because this is the same position found in 
the Laches and M eno.^  Socrates goes on, Vlastos believes, to disagree with 
Protagoras on just what is entailed by the PVD, but he is consistent in his 
commitment to virtue's composite nature throughout the early dialogues.
But Devereux rejects this interpretation because he believes it is internally 
inconsistent with the position Socrates takes in the rest of the Protagoras.
^Vlastos calls the PVD "standard Socratic doctrine," "UVP," 225; see also "Socrates 
on The Parts o f Virtue,'" 418-423. I deal with Vlastos in detail in Chapter Two above.
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Specifically, when Socrates and Protagoras return to their debate on the 
nature of virtue at 349b, Devereux argues that Socrates clearly shows he has 
been committed to P2) all a lo n g / Socrates reiterates the initial disjunction of 
329d:
Wisdom, temperance, courage, justice and holiness are five 
terms. Do they stand for a single reality, or has each term a 
particular entity underlying it, a reality with its own separate 
function, each different from the other?
From this, Devereux argues, we can derive:
4') 'Wisdom', 'temperance', 'courage', 'justice' and 'piety' are 
names of distinct things with distinct functions;
and
5') 'Wisdom', 'temperance', 'courage', 'justice', and 'piety" are 
names of one and the same thing.
The context makes clear that Socrates thinks 4') and 5') affirm the same
positions as 4) and 5), and since Socrates rejects 4'), he must also reject 4).
Thus, in the Protagoras Socrates rejects the claim that virtue is composed of
parts (the PVD) in favor of the much stronger claim that all the particular
virtues are really one and the same thing (the IT).
Given the analyses of the Protagoras and Laches favored by Devereux,
it is easy to see his argument emerge. In the Laches Socrates is committed to
virtue's composite nature while in the Protagoras he favors an identity of the
so-called "parts" of virtue. These are inconsistent views, so either Socrates
held what are clearly incompatible views at the same time, or the two
different views represent distinct phases of Socrates' thought. It would clearly
violate the principle of charity to suppose Socrates failed to see the obvious
^Devereux, 769.
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inconsistency between the PVD and FT. Therefore, it must be that Socrates 
does not mean to hold the same view in both the Protagoras and the Laches. 
For whatever reason, Plato is not putting a single, consistent doctrine of 
virtue in the mouth of Socrates, but is presenting different doctrines in these 
two dialogues. Devereux ultimately speculates that the Laches may represent 
Plato's attempt to resolve some of the problems found in the doctrine 
represented in the Protagoras.  ^and therefore it probably represents a later 
work. But whatever the case may be, Devereux holds that it is futile to search 
for a consistent UVD in the early dialogues if we include the Laches in our 
investigation.
A.2 The Peculiar Role of Wisdom in the Laches
The second part of Devereux's argument that the Laches represents a 
unique doctrine of virtue focuses on what he takes to be the peculiar role of 
wisdom among the various parts of virtue. In the Protagoras we find wisdom 
listed as one of the parts of virtue (329e, 349b), whereas in the Laches we do 
not (198b). Further, in the Protagoras Socrates offers arguments designed to 
convince Protagoras that wisdom and temperance (332a-333b) and wisdom 
and courage (349e-350c, 353b-360d) are the same thing. Devereux thinks this 
should not be surprising since he believes Socrates is committed to the IT of 
the UVD in the Protagoras. But in the Laches. Devereux argues, Socrates 
rejects the claim that courage and wisdom are the same and is instead 
committed to the view that "the other virtues are united through wisdom.
®Ibid., 788; see also Devereux, 1977.
160
and [thus] wisdom is regarded not as a part but as the whole of virtue."^ So, 
in the Laches wisdom is conceived differently than in the Protagoras, and this 
is further evidence for Devereux's claim that there is no coherent UVD in 
both dialogues.
The argument for the distinctive role of wisdom in the Laches begins 
with the final elenchus between Socrates and Nicias. The general has argued 
that courage, which all agree is good, is a kind of knowledge which inspires 
fear or confidence depending on the situation (195a). And the knowledge that 
causes fear or confidence is knowledge of what will happen in the future 
(198b). But Nicias also believes that for any subject there is, properly speaking, 
only one eTriCTTTjuT] (or science) covering past, present, and future events 
(198d-e). So if there is an eTnaTijp.Ti of courage, it must be knowledge of not 
only the future, but also the past and present which would make it equivalent 
to the knowledge of goods and bads generally (199d). Now, if it is true that 
courage is not just knowledge of the future (i.e., what is fearful and hopeful) 
but also knowledge of the past and present (i.e., knowledge of the good and 
the bad), then "instead of being only a part of virtue, [courage] will be all 
virtue" (199e). But Socrates immediately points out that Nicias earlier agreed 
(198a) that courage was only a part of virtue, which is a contradiction of the 
conclusion they just reached. It must therefore be, claims Socrates, that "we 
have not discovered what courage is" (199e).
We should now recall Devereux's previous argument that Socrates is 
committed to virtue's composite nature. He says.
d evereux, "The Unity of the Virtues," 767.
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in treating courage as a part of virtue, [the Laches] demands a 
distinctive definition of this virtue, a definition that indicates 
how it differs from wisdom and the other virtues.l^
Thus when Socrates tells Nicias that they have not yet discovered the nature
of courage at the end of the dialogue, it would appear he is rejecting the claim
that knowledge of goods and bads (i.e., wisdom) is sufficient for courage.^
After all, there must be something that distinguishes courage from, say,
temperance, justice, or piety. 12 However, as Devereux admits, the text clearly
commits Socrates to the sufficiency of wisdom for virtue.l^ So on the one
hand, Socrates thinks there is some property that distinguishes courage from
the other virtues, while on the other hand, this property does not undermine
wisdom's sufficiency for virtue overall. So, what is that property which when
added to wisdom yields courage as opposed to some other part of virtue, and
how is it related to wisdom?
The answer, according to Devereux, was introduced in an earlier part of 
the dialogue (192b) where Laches suggested that courage is a kind of 
endurance (Kaprepia).!'! Even though the elenchus leaves Laches in utter
lOlbid., 774.
l^The argument would go something like this: Socrates' main objection to Nicias' 
definition is that it is inconsistent with the conjunction of 1), 2), and 3). Because they all 
agree that courage is only part of virtue, and because the new definition would make courage 
equivalent to wisdom (and therefore all of virtue), it must be the case that wisdom, while 
necessary, is insufficient for courage.
12 Devereux's claim rests entirely on Socrates' acceptance of the PVD. However, as I 
argue below, it is not at all clear that the text forces us to conclude that Socrates is committed 
to the PVD and there is therefore no need to think of the virtues as definitionally distinct in 
the way that Devereux suggests.
13"! have argued that both endurance and knowledge of good and evil are essential 
for courage. . . .  It would seem  to follow that the knowledge by itself is not a sufficient 
condition for courage. However, in the final argument Socrates clearly asserts that 
knowledge of good and evil is sufficient for all the virtues." Devereux, "Unity of Virtues," 
778.
l^Literally, "an endurance of the soul" (Kaprepta T ig e iv a i  r fjs  tjJDX^s)-
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confusion and Nicias takes the conversation in a different direction, "Socrates 
does nothing to disabuse Laches of his belief that endurance is essential to 
c o u r a g e . " l 5  go if Socrates is committed to the PVD and it is therefore 
necessary that there be some property that distinguishes courage from the 
other virtues, why not take Kaprepia to be that property? Thus, despite 
Laches' confusion, courage will turn out to be wise endurance (192c) after 
all.l6
If Devereux's analysis is thus far correct, there remains one nagging 
question: If wisdom is sufficient for courage, how can it be that Kapxepia is 
necessary for courage? After all, wisdom, a cognitive property, and 
endurance, a noncognitive property, are clearly not the same thing. But 
Devereux suggests we might conceive of Kaprepta as a "necessary 
concomitant" of wisdom without doing injustice to Socrates' intellectualism. 
That is, "one might think of endurance as a quality one could not fail to 
possess if one had knowledge of good and evil."^^ If this is correct, then we 
can see why Socrates rejects Nicias' definition of courage at the end of the 
Laches. While it is true that wisdom is sufficient for courage, Nicias' 
definition leaves us no way of distinguishing courage from any other part of 
virtue because it fails to highlight an essential feature of courage not found in 
any other part of virtue. And although not argued in the Laches, it will be a
l^Devereux, "Unity of Virtues," 777.
^^For Devereux's account of why Laches is tripped up by Socrates' elenchus, see 
"Courage and Wisdom in Plato's Laches."
l?Devereux, "Unity of Virtues," 779.
163
corollary of this view that each 'part' of virtue will have some peculiar 
property, necessitated by wisdom, which distinguishes it from any other.l®
So, according to Devereux's analysis of the Laches, wisdom, which is 
equivalent to knowledge of the good and the bad—or virtue, is not one of the 
parts of virtue but is sufficient for the presence of each in an individual.
Thus, each of the parts of virtue will be connected through wisdom. That is, 
wisdom is what guarantees the 'unity' of the virtues since having it will 
insure having each of the others. Further, it cannot fail to be exemplified in 
any courageous, temperate, just or pious action.l^ Thus, anyone who is wise 
will also, in virtue of that wisdom, be courageous, temperate, and pious. So 
the role Plato assigns wisdom in the UVD of the Laches is, according to 
Devereux, much stronger than that of the Protagoras. So if we put this 
conclusion together with that of the previous argument (that Socrates is 
committed to the PVD  in the Laches but not the Protagoras). Devereux 
believes we can come to only one conclusion: The Laches and the Protagoras 
do not represent a single, coherent, Socratic UVD, bu t rather two divergent 
theories of how virtue is one thing.
This makes very little sense to me. If 'endurance' is supposed to be a property of 
courage, and courage is supposed to be distinct from wisdom, how can it reasonably be asserted 
that wisdom is sufficient for courage? If this property is so closely associated with wisdom  
that you cannot have wisdom  and fail to have it, it would seem  better to think of endurance 
as a property of wisdom, not a property of courage. Of course, Devereux could not accept this 
without abandoning the thesis that S<xzates is committed to the PVD. This objection is 
spelled out in more detail in § B.l below.
19ibid., 778.
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B. Problem s w ith  the Devereux In terp reta tion
Devereux has argued that the project of discovering a Socratic doctrine 
of the Unity of Virtue in the early dialogues is fundamentally flawed because 
the Laches and Protagoras attribute distinct and incompatible views to 
Socrates. In the latter, Socrates seems content with the view that each of the 
names of virtue actually refers to one and same thing, while in the former he 
seems committed to a view where the names of virtue point to distinct 
things. The argument for this position rests upon two claims: first, in the 
Laches Socrates is committed to virtue's composite nature, and second, in the 
Laches Socrates gives one of the parts of virtue (i.e., wisdom) logical 
precedence over the others. It should be pointed out that Devereux's second 
argument is logically dependent upon the first. Because he takes the 
commitment to the PVD in the Laches as genuinely Socratic, Devereux is 
forced to read the rejection of Nicias' definition of courage at 199e as he does.
I wish to suggest that we have good reasons for doubting that Socrates is 
committed to the PVD in the Laches, and therefore we get a completely 
different (and, in my opinion, more natural) reading of the end of the text. 
More importantly for my purposes, if I am correct, then there is no reason to 
think the Laches and Protagoras are inconsistent so far as the UVD is 
concerned. But before I offer my response to Devereux, I will note some 
significant objections to his position raised by Terry Penner.
B.l The Permer Objections
Devereux's reading of the Laches has not escaped criticism by other 
commentators. Terry Permer has suggested two problems raised by 
Devereux's reading of the Laches: 1) if he is correct, Socrates must reject what
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appears to be a dearly Socratic argument given by Nidas and, 2) the Socrates 
of the Laches would seem to reject the Socratic maxim that virtue is 
knowledge.20 Unfortunately, Penner does not flesh out these objections in 
much detail. But because they are worthy of note, I will undertake to do so 
briefly before moving on to my own objections to Devereux's position.
Fenner's first objection is that on Devereux's reading of the Laches 
Socrates must reject the argument put forward by Nidas at 194d. That 
Socrates opposes an argument put forward by an interlocutor is not 
surprising, but in this case it is an argument built on Socrates' own premises:
Nidas: I have often heard you [Socrates] say that 'Every man 
is good in that in which he is wise, and bad in that in 
which he is unwise.'
Socrates: That is certainly true, Nidas.
Nidas: And therefore if the brave man is good, he is also 
wise.
If we were to schematize this argument it would go as follows:
6 ) X is good, if and only if X is wise.
7) If the courageous are good, then the courageous are wise.
8 ) The courageous are good, (assumed premise)
9) Therefore, the courageous are wise.
2^erry Penner, 1992, "What Laches and Nidas Miss—And Whether Socrates 
Thinks courage Merely a Part of Virtue," Andent Philosophy 12: 4. Penner goes on to object 
that "Devereux seems to find the only real Socrates in Xenophon and Aristotle!" However, 
this objection seems as much rhetorical as substantive and I w ill not comment on it further 
except to say that Devereux does in fact spend a good deal of time trying to show that 
Socrates' conception of virtue in the Laches is not too far removed from Aristotle's and 
Xenophon's conception of self-control (éyKpaTeta). See Devereux, "Unity of Virtues," 779- 
783.
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The first premise (one which Socrates admits to having asserted in the past, 
194d) holds that wisdom is both necessary and sufficient for goodness, and 
because it is assumed by Socrates, Nicias, and Laches that courageous men are 
good men, it must follow that all courageous men are wise. Socrates turns to 
Laches to see if he follows the argument (which he does not) and clarifies 
N idas' position by saying, "he appears to me to mean that courage is a sort of 
wisdom" (194d). This conclusion actually requires the further premise:
10) Courage is what makes the courageous man courageous 
(and similarly, wisdom is what makes the wise man wise).
which then enables Socrates to condude:
11) Therefore, courage is a kind of wisdom.
The interlocutors then go on to clarify what kind of wisdom (or knowledge) 
courage is which ultimately leads to the contradiction between N idas' 
definition (195a) and the premise that courage is only a part of virtue. We 
should recall that Devereux argues that Socrates is committed to the PVD, so 
he must reject Nidas' definition of courage; and since that definition is based 
upon the argument just outlined, Socrates must reject what seems to be a 
Socratic argument put forward by Nidas.
The question is, to which part of the argument does Devereux object? 
That is, which premise or inference in N idas' argument is Socrates supposed 
to find unpalatable? In an earlier paper,^l Devereux argues it is 6 ) (i.e., X is 
good, if and only i fX  is wise) which is unacceptable to Socrates. He thinks the 
most we can get out of the daim  'Every man is good in that in which he is 
wise' is that "wisdom is a suffident, but not necessary, condition of
Devereux, "Courage and Wisdom in Plato's Laches." 137-141.
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g o o d n e s s .  "22 Devereux's main reason for reading N idas' daim  at 194d as a 
suffident, but not necessary, condition for goodness is that if Socrates 
endorses this argument, he ought also to endorse the definition of courage at 
195a which would then force him to reject the premise that courage is only a 
part of virtue at the end of the dialogue. However, Socrates does not openly 
reject the PVD at the end of the dialogue but merely condudes "we have not 
discovered what courage is" (199e). Devereux takes this to be evidence for 
Socrates' continued commitment to the composite nature of virtue (along 
withl), 2), and 3) noted above). After all, if Socrates accepted the first premise 
as formulated above, why not go all the way and condude that we should 
reject the premise that courage is a part of virtue?
But this reading of the argument simply will not hold up. If we go back 
to N idas' original statement of the Socratic maxim: '. . . every man is good in 
that in which he is wise, and bad in that in which he is unwise/ we see that 
Devereux has neglected an important element of the maxim. The second half 
of the proposition demands a stronger reading than he wants to allow. The 
first half of the conjunction tells us that "every wise person is a good person," 
which Devereux accepts as an assertion of the suffidency of wisdom for 
goodness. And if wisdom is suffident, but not necessary for goodness, there 
should be cases of good people who are not wise. But the second half of the 
conjunction implies that where wisdom is absent so too is goodness.23 So the
22c)everetix, "Courage and Wisdom," 139, n. 33.
23As I read it, the maxim states (W => G) & (~W 3  ~G) from which the material 
equivalence of W s  G can be derived. Thus, if Devereux accepts the first disjunct to read 
"wisdom is necessary for goodness," it seems to me he must accept the implication of the 
second disjuncL That means the best reading of this maxim is that wisdom is both necessary 
and sufficient for goodness.
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question is, does Socrates believe a person can be good and at the same time 
fail to be wise? The second disjunct seems to tell against there being any good 
people lacking w i s d o m . 2 4  Thus, if Socrates accepts the maxim put forward by 
Nicias (which he clearly seems to), then it would appear that he is committed 
to wisdom being both necessary and sufficient for goodness.
In his more recent paper "The Unity of the Virtues in Plato's 
Protagoras and Laches." however, Devereux moderates his earlier view.
While accepting that there can be no courage without wisdom, he still wants 
to defend a Socratic commitment to the PVD. On this latter view, wisdom 
(i.e., the knowledge of the good and the bad) is sufficient for all the parts of 
virtue, but each part is distinguished by some non-intellectual property which 
cannot fail to accompany wisdom. So the non-intellectual property 
'endurance', which is a "necessary concomitant" of wisdom, distinguishes 
courage from piety, justice, and temperance.^ Likewise, each of the other 
parts of virtue will have some non-intellectual property that demarcates 
them from the other parts of wisdom. So while Socrates accepts the claim 
that wisdom is necessary and sufficient for courage, he also rejects the 
conclusion of Nicias' argument that courage and wisdom are the same thing 
(and therefore all of virtue).
my reading of the maxim is accurate, we immediately face an ancillary paradox 
in Socratic virtue theory which exceeds the scope of this work. The Apology seems to 
indicate that Socrates thought him self a good man who lacked wisdom (41c-d). If I am 
correct about the Laches passage, w e must eventueilly come to grips w ith this paradox. In 
fact, some commentators have already attempted to resolve this issue. See Brickhouse and 
Smith, 1990 "What Makes Socrates a Good Man?" Tournai of the History of Philosophy 160- 
179; and Vlastos, "The Paradox of Socrates," in The Philosophy of Socrates (Notre Dame: 
University of Notre Dame Press, 1971.
^  Devereux, "The Unity of the Virtues," 779.
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There are several objections that can be raised to Devereux's reading of 
the final elenchus of the Laches. One objection goes to the heart of my 
response to Devereux's reading of 1), 2), and 3) which I give below, so I will set 
it aside for now. A second objection, raised by Penner, is that N idas' 
argument is introduced as Socratic, and at no time does Socrates point out 
that Nidas heis misimderstood what was meant by the Socratic maxim 
"Wisdom is the cause of goodness." This stands in sharp contrast "with 
Critias in the Charmides who gets exceedingly rough treatment for his pains 
in trying to be Socratic—being shown really to understand nothing of what he 
may have picked up from Socrates. "26 Since Socrates does not disabuse 
N idas of the Socratic nature of the argument, Penner condudes he most 
likely endorses this position.27 jf j^ 0 accepts the argument as valid and does 
not question the truth of the premises, he should also accept the condusion 
(and therefore, reject the PVD).
The second objection Penner raises against Devereux's position is that 
if he is correct, the Socrates of the Laches must reject the traditional Socratic 
maxim that virtue is knowledge. Even if Kaprepia is a necessary concomitant 
of knowledge as Devereux speculates, there is a non-intellectual property 
which is necessary for the existence of courage, thus wisdom alone cannot be 
sufficient for courage. But Penner points out that there is no need to think 
the accounts of the Laches and Protagoras are inconsistent just because there 
is a discussion of Kuprepia in the former but not the latter. If knowledge is
26penner, "What Laches and Nidas Miss," 4, n. 6.
27This does not mean, as Penner rightly points out, that N idas fully understands
Socrates' views. Ibid.
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necessarily accompanied by a kind of power^S in the account of virtue in the 
Protagoras, the discussion of Kaprepia as a necessary condition for courage in 
the Laches need not represent a different doctrine. The 'endurance', to which 
Devereux appeals as a distinct addition to Socrates' earlier formulation of 
courage, may be nothing more than the 'power' (8uvap.ts) which is identical 
to, or necessarily accompanies, knowledge. That is, the 'endurance' of the 
Laches just is the 'power' of the Protagoras. Thus Penner objects that 
Devereux "does not consider the possibility that for the Socrates of the Laches 
as for the Socrates of the Protagoras, there is no more to (wise) endurance 
than just w i s d o m .  " 2 9  And, if we can account for the data of the Laches on 
the same interpretive model we use for the Protagoras, we have a more 
parsimonious explanation. Thus, we have sufficient justification for 
doubting Devereux's claim that the Laches and Protagoras are inconsistent 
simply because the former includes a discussion of wise endurance.
While I think Penner's objections to Devereux's reading of the Laches 
are damaging, there are more profound objections to be raised against his 
view. I think Devereux makes a fundamental error in attributing!), 2), and 3) 
to Socrates in the first place. I believe there is a natural way of reading the text 
which does not force Socrates to accept the PVD. In fact, as 1 will argue in the 
next section, I think the context in which!), 2), and 3) are introduced and 
reiterated makes it virtually impossible to take them as Socratic
2®It seems clear that Socrates does in fact attribute power to knowledge: Prot. 357c 
. .  we two agreed that there was nothing more powerful than knowledge, but that wherever 
it is found it always has the mastery over pleasure and everything else." An interesting 
question, which must be deferred until later, is whether this power is a distinct quality of 
knowledge or merely a consequence of possessing knowledge.
29penner, 4, n. 7.
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endorsements of the PVD. Since this is the foundation of Devereux's reading 
of the text, when this objection is coupled with those raised in this section, I 
think Devereux's interpretation of the Laches founders altogether.
B.2 Problems with the Text
It will be recalled that Devereux bases his argument that the Laches and 
Protagoras present inconsistent views of the UVD on Socrates' commitment 
to the PVD in the former. If the Socrates of the Laches believes that courage is 
but a part of virtue while the Socrates of the Protagoras rejects this claim, 
must it not be the case that these two dialogues represent two distinct 
doctrines of virtue? And is it not, as Devereux points out, Socrates himself 
who suggests to Laches at the beginning of the dialogue that in order to 
understand virtue, we must first understand its parts, specifically courage 
(190d)? And does not Socrates reemphasize this premise, and in fact commit 
himself to it, when he reminds Nicias of their agreement on it at the 
beginning of the final elenchus of the dialogue (198a)? And finally, is it not 
Socrates himself who points out that Nicias' definition of courage is 
inadequate just because it conflicts with the premise that courage is only a 
part of virtue (199e5)? Do not these passages (1), 2), and 3)) taken together 
clearly indicate that in the Laches Socrates is committed to virtue's composite 
nature?30
I do not think that any one of the passages mentioned above, taken 
individually or together, commit Socrates to the PVD. In order to
^ O n  this point Kraut emphatically agrees with Devereux: "There is simply no 
evidence in the Laches that Socrates really means to reject his own claim that courage is a 
part of virtue." Richard Kraut, Socrates and the State (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1984), 261. In what follows I show why this claim is false.
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demonstrate why I reject Devereux's reading of the text, we should review the 
premises in order. At the beginning of the first elenchus with Laches,
Socrates suggests they inquire after part of virtue because "the inquiry will 
thus probably be made easier" (190d). Laches agrees, and off they go chasing 
after courage, assuming it to be a proper part of virtue as a whole. However, 
this is clearly an assumed premise; it is a premise accepted on the grounds 
that it might make the inquiry simpler. It is equally plausible that it will 
make the inquiry more complicated. In fact, it is possible that Socrates does 
not believe virtue is compose of parts, but he at the same time knows that 
Laches, and very likely many others, do. Rather than rejecting the PVD  
outright, Socrates could very well believe it better to help Laches discover for 
himself that virtue is not composed of parts. My point is that we ought not 
read too much into an assumed premise. Taken by itself, we have no way of 
knowing what Socrates believes about this assumption.
If the statement of the PVD at 190d is an assumed premise, are there 
any clues elsewhere in the text to help indicate whether or not Socrates 
accepts, rejects, or is genuinely unsure about the truth of 1)? Are there any 
passages where Socrates emphatically asserts the truth of a proposition with 
which we can compare this one? In fact, as we noted in the section above, 
there is. Compare 190d with 194d to which Socrates admits he is committed:
Nicias: I have often heard you say that 'Every man is good in 
that in which he is wise, and bad in that in which he is 
unwise.'
Socrates: That is certainly true, Nicias. (194d)
Nicias here quotes Socrates to Socrates. Why? Because Nicias wants to argue 
from premises that he knows Socrates believes true. This premise is not
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assumed to be true by Nicias or Socrates for the success of the argument. 
Rather, Socrates is unequivocally committed to its truth. Thus, the 
qualification of the initial premise should give us serious pause; at best 
Socrates is neutral to its truth.
However, Devereux anticipates this objection.31 That is why he goes 
on to emphasize 2). When Nicias takes over for Laches and he and Socrates 
begin the final elenchus of the dialogue, Socrates is careful to remind Nicias 
of the assumed premise from the beginning of the dialogue:
I must beg of you, Nicias, to begin again. You remember that 
we originally considered courage to be a part of virtue (198a).
Socrates goes on to remind Nicias that he (Nicias) had accepted the claim that
courage was a part of virtue and that there were many other parts—the sum
of which is virtue (198a5). But more importantly for Devereux, Socrates gets
N idas' agreement on what the parts of virtue are, and this is a passage where
it looks as if Socrates commits himself to the PVD:
Do you agree with me about the parts? For I say that justice, 
temperance, and the like, are all of them parts of virtue as 
well as courage. Would you not say the same (198a9)
[emphasis mine].
Even if Socrates were neutral toward the initial passage, how could we doubt 
his commitment to the PVD here?
What we should keep in mind about this passage is that it clearly refers 
back the assumed premise from the beginning of the dialogue. And, as I have 
already argued, the qualification of that premise gives us cause to be dubious 
about ascribing it to Socrates. If this passage had occurred without reference to 
that earlier premise, I would think it more likely that Socrates was committed
SlOevereux, "Unity of Virtues," 772.
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to its truth. However, given the overall context in which it occurs, I take it 
Socrates is simply being rigorous about the initial assumption. It is as if 
Socrates is saying: "If virtue is composed of distinct parts, as we initially 
assumed, then those parts would be justice, temperance, etc." But the fact that 
Socrates begins by reminding Nicias of the initial assumption and then goes 
on to spell out the implications of the assumption only serves to underscore 
its provisional nature.
The final passage Devereux suggests as evidence that Socrates was 
committed, from the beginning, to the truth of the assumed premise is the 
conclusion of the final e l e n c h u s . 3 2  If Socrates had been neutral to the truth of 
the premise, the argument should have ended, he claims, with a disjunction 
between Nicias' last definition and the assumed premise that virtue is 
composed of parts. But because Socrates concludes they have failed to 
discover what courage is (199e9), Devereux takes it that he is committed to the 
initial premise, and therefore rejects Nicias' definition. But the implication 
of the conclusion is that we must either yield one or the other. And it is not 
at all unusual for an elenchus to end with this kind of conclusion without 
explicitly stating the d i s j u n c t i o n . 3 3  So the fact that the disjunction is not 
explicit is not evidence that Socrates was committed to the truth of the 
assumed premise and therefore the falsity of N idas' definition.
Thus far all 1 have argued is that the provisional nature of the premise 
that virtue is composed of distinct parts gives us good reason to be sceptical 
about Socrates' acceptance of it. There is, however, a further piece of evidence
Prot. 361a-c.
32ibid.
^For example, see the following early dialogues; Charm. 175b; Ly. 223b; E i 8a;
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from the text which I think makes it impossible for Socrates to have endorsed 
the PVD implied in 1), 2), and 3). Before he introduces the assumption that 
their inquiry after virtue will be made easier if they first pursue a part of 
virtue, Socrates says to Laches:
Socrates: Then must we not first know the nature of virtue?
For how can we advise anyone about the best mode of 
attaining something of whose nature we are wholly 
ignorant?
Laches: I do not think we can, Socrates.
Socrates: We say then. Laches, that we know the nature of 
virtue.
Laches: Yes.
Socrates: And that which we know we must surely be able to 
tell?
Laches: Certainly [190b-c; my emphasis].
As the dialogue makes clear. Laches knows the nature of neither courage nor 
virtue even though he thinks, at the beginning, that he knows both. Are we 
to assume then, that Socrates is claiming to know what courage and virtue 
are from the very beginning of the dialogue? I think that is very improbable. 
Rather, it seems he believes that Laches thinks he knows what courage is, and 
that a good part of his efforts thereafter are designed to show Laches that he 
does not know what he thought he knew. Given what we know of Socrates 
from other early dialogues, it is completely out of character for him to claim 
to know what virtue is. In fact, it would not only be out of character for 
Socrates to openly claim to know the nature of virtue (or its so-called parts) in
176
reference to other early d i a l o g u e s , 3 4  but he has already claimed in the Laches 
that 'lie  has no knowledge of the matter" (186e). So if we cannot take 
Socrates' assertion—that he and Laches know what virtue is—at 190b 
seriously, why should we take seriously the claim at 190d that virtue is 
composed of parts? A far more natural reading, as I have already suggested, is 
that Socrates has reason to believe that Laches (and probably Nicias too) 
believes that courage, justice, piety, etc., are distinct parts of virtue. This is, 
after all, a common sense view of the nature of virtue. Even the great sophist 
Protagoras defends a similar view. Thus, armed with the realization that 
Laches and Nicias believe courage to be only a part of virtue, he sets out to test 
the generals on the elenctic battlefield.
Conclusion
In this chapter, I have argued that Daniel Devereux's claim that the 
Laches and Protagoras represent distinct and incompatible views of Socrates' 
UVD is unwarranted. Devereux's thesis rests upon two related arguments, 
both of which, I have argued, fail. First, there are three passages in the Laches 
that look as if they might commit Socrates to the claim that virtue is 
composed of distinct parts. Upon closer examination, however, it appears 
they are assumed for the sake of argument, and we may consistently read the 
text without attributing them Socrates. In fact, the context in which he 
introduces these remarks makes it implausible to think Socrates could believe 
them to be true. Second, on Devereux's reading of the Laches wisdom plays a
^^One of the most consistent elements of the early dialogues is Socrates' denial of 
significant moral knowledge. See Ap. 21b, 21d; Charm. 165b, 166c; Laches: 186e; Ly. 216c; B i. 
15c; Gorg. 506a, and 509a.
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distinctive role among the virtues not found in the Protagoras. But the 
motivation for this argum ent rests directly upon Socrates' commitment to 
the PVD, and I have shown such a commitment to be altogether lacking.
This objection, combined with those of Terry Fenner, show that the 
uniqueness of wisdom—as conceived by Devereux—is unfounded. Thus, if 
my argument holds, there is sufficient reason to reject Devereux's claim that 
the 'Socrates' of the Laches maintains a more complex, non-Socratic, doctrine 
of the nature of virtue. This allows us to consider the arguments of the 
Laches as genuinely Socratic and therefore part of the overall theory of the 
Unity of Virtue Doctrine found in other early dialogues of Plato.
Chapter VI 
Conclusions
The enigma of Socrates' assertions on the nature of virtue has long caused 
commentators a good deal of frustration. As I noted at the beginning of this 
work, there are many questions that have resisted clear resolution, questions that 
have proved fruitful ground for debate and speculation about Socrates' theory of 
virtue. First, there is debate over what view Socrates actually holds in the 
Protagoras where he most clearly raises the question of the unity of virtue. 
Second, commentators have struggled with his assertions on the nature of virtue 
found in other early dialogues. Do different dialogues provide evidence that 
Socrates held a single theory of virtue or is there no single theory to be 
discovered? That is, does Socrates have any theory of virtue at all? If he does 
have a doctrine of virtue, is it rationally consistent? That is, can we come to 
understand what motivates Socrates to hold such a doctrine; does it make sense 
from his perspective? This question is closely related to the issue of overall 
coherence: is Socrates' doctrine of virtue generally consistent with the other 
doctrines he seems to hold? Ultimately, Socratic scholars might be interested in a 
final question: is his account of virtue a plausible theory from our perspective? 
That is, do we think Socrates is right about the nature of virtue?
The fact that insightful commentators have radically differed on these 
questions of Socratic interpretation only serves to highlight the immensity of the 
task facing anyone interested in Socratic philosophy. This diversity of 
interpretation highlights the fact that it is insufficient to look to a single text, or 
even a few texts, to resolve questions such as, "What did Socrates think about
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XT' But even taking the whole Socratic corpus (i.e., the early Platonic Dialogues) 
into account, along with the voluminous secondary literature, does not guarantee 
success. The History of Philosophy wiU likely always be plagued with gaps and 
puzzles. However, the uncertainty of the project, and the tentative conclusions 
we can reach, are in large part what keep us interested in the subject. Hopefully, 
the process not only sheds new light on old problems, but also forces us to 
reconsider ourselves in the light of the great thinkers of the past. This has 
certainly been my own experience.
My interest in Philosophy began with Socrates some sixteen years ago 
when I first read the Apology. From that time to the present, my life has been, to 
one degree or another, under the spell of the Athenian vdpicn. However, I hope 
my research has been something more than an exercise in self-indulgence. I 
think I have offered some important, or at least interesting, insights and have 
helped advance the cause of the scholars who have proceeded me. In this final 
chapter, I summarize what I take to be the highlights of my research and I 
conclude by raising some questions which remain for others to address.
A. Expectations and Discoveries
The first thing I should say about my research into the labyrinth of 
Socrates' theory of virtue is that I had very different expectations about what I 
would eventually conclude when I began the project. At first I was very much 
opposed to the Identity Thesis, which 1 took to be an implausible expression of 
Socratic doctrine. My initial preference was for something like the Brickhouse 
and Smith interpretation, which I conceived as a compromise between the weak 
Biconditionality Thesis of Vlastos and Farmer's much stronger thesis. However,
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the more I researched the problem, and the more seriously I threw myself into 
the text, the closer I moved toward Penner's position. But this was not an easy 
pill to swallow since I wanted Socrates' theory not only to make sense and be 
textually consistent, but also to be correct. That is, I wanted Socrates' theory to 
be the sort of theory that I could present and say, "This is worth believing 
today." However, this was not my ultimate conclusion. That is, while I do 
believe Socrates had a consistent theory of virtue, and while I think he advanced 
the field of moral Philosophy beyond his predecessors, I think his theory rests on 
a naive view of human psychology, and an incomplete epistemology and 
metaphysic as well. Thus, I think we would be hard pressed to take Socrates' 
moral theory seriously today.
This conclusion, however personally disappointing, is instructive in its 
own right. It is an easy trap for those like myself who are interested in the 
History of Philosophy to lose sight of their project. Legitimately, the task of the 
History of Philosophy is to try to make sense of past philosophers in their 
historical context. It is, however, all too easy for anyone engaged in this process 
to extend the principle of charity beyond the boundaries of legitimacy. The 
temptation to go beyond making good sense of the great thinkers of the past, the 
temptation to make them right about the subjects they address, is strong. This 
temptation, ever present to those in this field of Philosophy, ought to be resisted, 
however. Personally speaking, I think this is one of the greatest lessons I have 
learned in the process of my research. We must be vigilant when attempting to 
resolve the puzzles handed us from past philosophers to respect the context in 
which they arose. While it is unfair to dismiss the accomplishments of our 
predecessors because they do not meet our standards of philosophical rigor, it is
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equally unfair to attribute to those same philosophers more insight than they 
could possibly have had. We diminish the achievements of past thinkers such as 
Socrates by forcing them to cohere with our understanding of the world.
B. C on tribu tions to the Field of Socratic Studies
One important question to fece at the end of any research project such as 
this is what contributions to the field, if any, have been achieved. I believe my 
research has provided several important insights into the enigma of Socrates' 
Unity of Virtue Doctrine. The best way to articulate these points is to put them in 
the context of the view I have developed throughout the proceeding chapters. 
This will serve to tie together the strands of argument developed in opposition to 
previous scholarship and at the same time to give an overview of my position.
My investigation of Socrates' UVD has been primarily guided by two of 
the questions noted above: 1) What is Socrates' position in the Protagoras, and 2) 
Is Socrates' view in the Protagoras consistent with the views he espouses in other 
early dialogues? In order to answer the first question, I examined the work of 
Gregory Vlastos, Terry Penner, and Thomas Brickhouse and Nicholas Smith. 
Vlastos defends the Biconditionality Thesis, Penner the Identity Thesis, and 
Brickhouse and Smith offer a compromise view. The second question required 
an investigation into the work of Daniel Devereux, who argues that the early 
dialogues are inconsistent on the UVD. My struggles with these commentators 
have brought me to a unique, and probably controversial, interpretation of 
Socrates' doctrine of virtue's unity.
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B.l Socrates' View in the Protagoras
The enigma of the UVD begins with Socrates' conversation with 
Protagoras on the nature of the relationship between the cardinal 
virtues—courage, justice, piety, temperance, and wisdom. Protagoras defends 
the view that virtue is best understood as a composite whole while each of its 
"parts" is distinct in name (oi/opara), substance (ovaia), power (Süvapiç), and he 
believes each may be possessed independently from the others (329dj^. While 
he moderates his view slightly during their debate, until the end of the dialogue 
Protagoras maintains that there is some significant distinction between the 
cardinal virtues. He holds that a person may have some of the virtues 
(particularly courage) while failing to have them all (349d). * There is little debate 
among commentators that this is the view Protagoras holds. But what view, if 
any, does Socrates defend in opposition to Protagoras?
Vlastos argues that Socrates agrees with Protagoras that virtue is a 
composite whole, but disagrees with him on the nature of the relationship of the 
parts.2 According to Vlastos, Socrates prefers the pieces of gold analogy to the 
parts of a face analogy as a description of the relationship between the proper 
parts that compose virtue. This analogy, however, is problematic in itself and 
must be interpreted through the lens of Socrates' assertion that anyone having 
one of the virtues must have them all. Thus, Socrates' commitment to the pieces
 ^Even though Protagoras is forced in the end to conclude that courage is knowledge 
(360e), it is clear that he is not convinced that the argument has led them to the truth. He 
makes his doubts clear by saying, ". . .  to oblige you, I will say that by what we have admitted I 
consider it impossible [that anyone may lack wisdom and be courageous]." This assertion 
demonstrates that Protagoras is unwilling to embrace the unity of virtue Socrates has defended 
although he is not sure where the argument went astray.
2 See Chapter Two, § A.
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of gold analogy, coupled with the assertion that having one part of virtue entails 
having them all, means, according to Vlastos, that the strongest relationship that 
can exist between the parts of virtue is logical biconditionality. Therefore,
Vlastos labels Socrates' position in the Protagoras the Biconditionality Thesis.
Vlastos' argument for interpreting Socrates' UVD as the BT is motivated 
by two main concerns. First, Vlastos thinks it impossible that Socrates could 
embrace the view that the five virtue terms are simply different names for the 
same thing. This, he thinks, would commit Socrates to the belief that the virtue 
terms are synonymous. Since it is prima fade absurd to assert that the virtue 
terms mean the same thing, Socrates, like Protagoras, must think that the virtue 
terms refer to different dispositions of character. The second motivation for the 
BT is that, according to Vlastos, Socrates demonstrates a strong commitment to 
the Parts of Virtue Doctrine in other early dialogues. If Socrates did embrace an 
identity of the virtue terms in the Protagoras he would be defending a view 
which is inconsistent with the views he expresses in dialogues such as the Meno 
and the Laches. But why should we commit Socrates to an incoherent set of 
views about virtue if there is a coherent alternative account available to us?
According to Vlastos' interpretation, it is possible to provide an account of 
Socrates' theory of virtue in the Protagoras that is both rational and coherent 
with the views he holds in other dialogues. Brickhouse and Smith agree, in large 
part, with Vlastos' analysis of the Protagoras. However, they think the BT is too 
weak to capture the view Socrates defends against Protagoras.^ They concur that 
Socrates believes that virtue is a composite of proper parts—both in the
3 Chapter Four, § A.
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Protagoras and other early dialogties—but they believe the relationship between 
the parts of virtue is stronger than Vlastos' BT indicates. For Brickhouse and 
Smith, the interpretive key in the Protagoras is the parts of gold analogy, not the 
biconditionality of the virtues. This analogy, along with the parts of a foce 
analogy, is put to Protagoras to clarify his claim that the various virtues' powers 
are distinct (i.e., that each can accomplish a distinct end). If one takes a bar of 
gold and separates it into pieces, each piece can be used to accomplish the same 
kinds of tasks as any other piece—assuming quantity or size is not important. 
Therefore, according to Brickhouse and Smith, Socrates asserts that virtue is like 
a bar of gold, and the parts of virtue are like the parts of gold. Just as the 
essential properties of each piece of gold are the same as any other, the essential 
properties of the virtues are the same. But what are the essential properties of 
the virtues that are shared in common?
The virtues, according to Brickhouse and Smith, are understood by 
Socrates to be the application of specialized craft knowledge (rex^n) with a 
specified goal (epya). What is common to all the virtues is that they are forms of 
knowledge or wisdom applied to different moral situations. Thus, in their view, 
the proper parts of virtue are arranged hierarchically with wisdom playing a 
dominant and unifying role. Wisdom is the essential aspect common to each 
particular virtue. Each virtue just is wisdom applied to a different set of moral 
circumstances. Just as a skill such as triangulation can be applied in different 
circumstances to create distinct crafts like navigation and global surveying, so 
too wisdom can be applied in diverse situations to create the distinct skills justice 
and courage. Justice is the application of wisdom in the field of human relations, 
and courage is the application of wisdom in fearful situations.
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Another example of the hierarchical nature of the virtues, according to 
Brickhouse and Smith, is seen in the relationship of justice to piety. Just as 
temperance, courage and justice are each parts of wisdom (i.e., the application of 
wisdom in diverse moral circumstances), so too is piety a proper part of justice. 
According to Brickhouse and Smith, Socrates understands the generic term 
'justice' to refer to wisdom applied to different relations. However, we can 
understand human relations in two different ways: hiunan-to-hiunan relations 
and human-to-divine relations; 'justice' is best predicated of the former, 'piety' of 
the latter. Thus, as Socrates seems to assert in the Euthyphro (12d), piety actually 
is a part of justice as justice is a part of virtue.
For Vlastos and Brickhouse and Smith, Socrates is committed to the PVD, 
but for Brickhouse and Smith the relationship—or unity—between the parts of 
virtue is much stronger than it is for Vlastos. According to Vlastos' view, the 
parts of virtue are essentially as well as nominally distinct, and the unity of the 
virtues is grounded in the fact that anyone possessing one must necessarily 
posses them all. For Brickhouse and Smith, the substance of all the virtues is the 
same—they are all just wisdom. What distinguishes the cardinal virtues in the 
latter view is how wisdom is applied in diverse moral circumstances, or more 
specifically, what we intend to accomplish with wisdom in diverse moral 
circumstances. According to my interpretation, however, both of these views are 
mistaken. In both cases, it is assumed that Socrates is committed to the PVD in 
several of the early dialogues, and, therefore, he must agree with Protagoras'
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initial assertion that 'virtue' names a composite thing. I think this view rests, in 
part, on a misreading of the text of the Protagoras.'^
If we carefully observe the logical structure of the passage in the 
Protagoras from which the UVD is derived (329djÇ0/ we see that both the parts of 
gold analogy and the biconditionality of the parts of virtue are intended to clarify 
Protagoras' view, not to articulate Socrates' position.^ This is not to say that 
these views are necessarily inconsistent with Socrates' doctrine. Indeed, if 
Socrates prefers the view that the cardinal virtues are simply d i f f e r e n t  names for 
the same thing (as I maintain along with Penner), it will be the case that Socrates 
could accept some of the implications of the pieces of gold analogy. By 
themselves, however, both the biconditionality of the virtues and the parts of 
gold analogy fail to capture the full strength of Socrates' conviction and, 
therefore, cannot be taken as adequate expressions of the UVD.
I would like to suggest that one of the important contributions I offer to 
Socratic scholarship is the observation that the logical structure of the argument 
presented by Socrates at Protagoras 329dj^ precludes either the pieces of gold 
analogy or biconditionality of the virtues as accurate interpretations of his view. 
Socrates presents Protagoras with three disjunctions; he is asked to choose one 
alternative from each. The structure of the argument breaks down in the 
following maimer:
The first disjunction offers that
Here I argue that Vlastos' and Brickhouse and Smith's reading of Prot. 329c^is 
inconsistent with the rest of the dialogue and therefore ought to be rejected. I will deal with the 
question of inter-dialogue consistency in § B.2.a, Zb, and Zc below.
 ^See Chapter Two, § B.l and Chapter Four, § B.2.
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PI) Virtue is a composite whole and justice, piety, temperance 
(courage and wisdom) are parts of it;
or
P2) Justice, piety, temperance (courage and wisdom) name the 
same thing.
The second disjunction is offered by Socrates to clarify PI) which Protagoras 
embraces:
Pl.a) The parts of virtue are like the parts of a face each with a 
distinct 8uvap.ig;
or
Pl.b) The parts of virtue are like the parts of a piece of gold, 
which do not differ from one another, or from the whole, 
except in size.
Because Protagoras asserts Pl.a), which Socrates still thinks is ambiguous, the 
third disjunction is put forward:
Pl.a.i) A person may possess one part of virtue without having 
all the rest;
or
Pl.a.ii) A person possessing one part of virtue must have all the 
rest.
Protagoras chooses PI), Pl.a), and Pl.a.i), expressing the view that virtue is 
composed of proper parts which have distinct functions and which may be 
possessed independently from one another. The important thing to notice about 
the structure of this argument is that the second and third disjunctions are 
proposed as clarifications of Protagoras' initial assertion and should not, 
therefore, be assumed to directly articulate Socrates' view. Yet this is precisely 
what many commentators conclude; Brickhouse and Smith take Pl.b) to 
articulate Socrates' position, while Vlastos argues it must be Pl.a.ii). It is easy to 
reject Pl.a.ii) as an adequate expression of Socrates' view since it is clearly
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intended as a clarification of PI.a), which Socrates rejects, as the rest of the 
dialogue makes clear. The case is not so clear with Pl.b), however. It could 
represent Socrates' view, but only if Socrates joins with Protagoras in asserting 
PI). However, the conclusion of the dialogue makes it doubtful that Socrates 
could embrace PI). In drawing aporatic conclusions about the teachability of 
virtue, Socrates identifies himself not with PI), but with P2). He understands 
himself to have defended the view which takes terms such as 'justice', 
'temperance', and 'courage' (and presumably 'piety' as well) to all refer to one 
and the same thing (Prot. 361b). So it seems that Socrates favors P2) not PI). 
Hence, Pl.b) could not be intended as an adequate expression of his view any 
more than Pl.a.ü). This leaves open the question of whether Socrates' view in 
the Protagoras is consistent with the view he holds in other dialogues. However, 
when we carefully observe the logical structure of the argument in the 
Protagoras, it becomes clear that Socrates must favor the claim that the five 
virtue terms are "all names for one and the same thing" (Prot. 329d).
B.2 The Coherence of the UVD in the Early Dialogues
Both Vlastos and Brickhouse and Smith think Socrates is committed, along 
with Protagoras, to the claim that the cardinal virtues are all proper parts of 
virtue as a whole (i.e., the PVD). As I mentioned above, this view is motivated, 
in part at least, because these commentators believe Socrates is committed to the 
PVD in other early dialogues, specifically the Meno. the Laches, and the 
Euthyphro. Daniel Devereux concurs that Socrates embraces the PVD in some of 
the early dialogues, though he thinks this view is rejected in the Protagoras. 
Devereux is therefore committed to the position that Plato's early dialogues are
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simply inconsistent on the matter of the UVD. I have argued that Devereux,^ 
Vlastos, and Brickhouse and Smith are all wrong to think that Socrates is 
committed to the PVD in any significant way in the early dialogues.
B.2.a The Laches
Devereux is primarily motivated to assert a Socratic commitment to the 
PVD based on evidence from the Laches. There are three passages where 
Socrates seems to assert that virtue proper is a complex entity compounded of 
the cardinal virtues. At Laches 190d, Socrates suggests to Laches that they 
should "first consider whether [they] have a sufficient knowledge of a part [of 
virtue]; the inquiry will thus probably be made easier." Again at 198a, Socrates 
seems to favor the position that "justice, temperance, and the like" are distinct 
parts of virtue. Finally, at 199c, Socrates points out to Laches and Nidas that the 
definition of courage they have derived is inconsistent with their earlier 
assertions that virtue is composed of proper parts. In each case, it is Socrates 
himself who raises the specter of the PVD, and commentators such as Devereux 
take this as strong evidence that he does in fact hold this position, at least in this 
dialogue.
The argument I offer against this interpretation of the Laches represents 
what I take to be the second important contribution I make to Socratic studies. A 
careful reading of the text of this dialogue makes it clear that, no matter what 
else Socrates might believe, it is extremely unlikely that he is committed to the 
PVD. My argument rests on two observations: first, Socrates introduces the
 ^See Chaper Five, § B.2.
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PVD as an hypothetical proposition and as such it is reasonable to doubt that he 
himself has a strong commitment to its truth. Not only is the proposition 
introduced hypothetically at the beginning of the dialogue, but Socrates also 
draws attention to the fact that this is an  assumed premise whenever it is 
restated. I take this to demonstrate the tenuous nature of the claim. The 
assertion that there are distinct parts of virtue is being held up for examination; it 
is as if Socrates is saying "look, we assumed this to be true, but is it really?" In 
the end, the assertion that virtue is composed of parts turns out to be inconsistent 
with a definition of courage that seems to be Socratic. The dialogue ends without 
deciding which claim should be rejected, but that does not mean we cannot infer 
which alternative Socrates would prefer.
The second observation that makes me dubious of Socrates' commitment 
to the PVD is the context in which it is introduced. If Socrates' introduction of 
the PVD at 190c is taken as an assertion of his own firmly held belief, we must 
also assert that Socrates believes that he knows "the nature of virtue" (190c). 
These two claims are made in the same context, and both are asserted with the 
same vigor by Socrates. However, if he knows the nature of virtue, he 
contradicts his own denial of significant moral wisdom (at 186e and 200e). It 
simply cannot be the case that he both knows the nature of virtue and at the 
same time does not know the nature of virtue. This passage is crucial in 
understanding the hypothetical status of the PVD in the Laches, and it is 
completely overlooked by commentators such as Vlastos, Devereux, and 
Brickhouse and Smith. Socrates introduces the PVD because he rightly believes 
that Laches, and most likely the other interlocutors as well, accept this belief. 
What we discover in the course of the dialogue, however, is that Socrates must
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rqect this very notion if he is to be consistent! Either Socrates is being ironic 
when he claims to know the nature of virtue, or he is being ironic when he claims 
that he does not know what courage is. It seems to me that the former is more 
likely to be the case than the latter, especially since the definition of courage 
reached at the end of the dialogue rests on principles we know Socrates accepts.
B.2.b The Meno
If my analysis of the Laches is correct, and Socrates is not committed to 
the PVD in that dialogue, what about Plato's other dialogues that seem to 
suggest such a commitment on his part? The Meno is a good example of such a 
dialogue. It too has led some commentators to the conclusion that Socrates 
endorsed the view that virtue is composed of distinct parts. I believe that a 
careful reading, however, demonstrates that it is no more likely that Socrates is 
committed to the PVD in this dialogue than in the Laches.^
The evidence for a Socratic commitment to the PVD in the Meno is found 
in the introductory section of the dialogue (70a-79e) and relies on the fact that 
from time to time Socrates and Meno both speak as if virtue has a composite 
nature. At 73e, it even appears that Socrates commits himself to the truth of this 
view. However, the prima fade evidence for such a commitment evaporates upon 
close scrutiny of the arguments in this section of the text. When asked to give an 
account of virtue, Meno offers various lists of virtues (71e, 74a), but as Socrates 
points out, this does not provide any insight into the nature of virtue itself (72cf, 
74a, d, 79a-d). Socrates speaks of virtue's parts only in response to Meno's
 ^See Chapter Two § B.Zb.
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inadequate answers to his standard "What is F-ness?" question. Thus, when 
Socrates refers to the parts of virtue (73b, 78d/, 79b), it is only to point out that 
Meno does not understand the nature of the question under discussion.
Nowhere in this dialogue does Socrates suggest that supposing virtue to have a 
composite structure is accurate or even helpful. There is simply no indication 
that Socrates is committed to the view that virtue is composed of parts in this 
dialogue.
I am dubious of the supposed evidence of a Socratic commitment to the 
PVD in the Meno for a further reason. The Meno is a transitional dialogue and as 
such it represents the emergence of distinctly Platonic doctrine. Even if we 
suppose the first third of the text was written during the early period and later 
spliced onto the rest of the text, there is no reason to suppose that Plato did not 
edit the earlier work to conform to his new thought. There is no way to be sure 
that the views we find expressed by Socrates in the Meno are more Socratic than 
Platonic. I, therefore, think it wise to be cautious about looking to the Meno for 
clarification of the views expressed in the Protagoras or other early dialogues.
Given the fact that Socrates does not unequivocally commit himself to the 
PVD in the Meno. and taking into account that this is a transitional dialogue, 1 
think we are justified in doubting that it provides evidence for a Socratic 
commitment to the PVD. As with the Laches, a prima facie reading might suggest 
that Socrates thinks virtue is composed of parts, but a careful examination of the 
text makes this less clear. Thus, it is far less likely, given the evidence from these 
two dialogues, at least, that Socrates could agree with Protagoras that virtue is 
best described as a composite of proper parts. There is, however, one other
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dialogue that seems to commit Socrates to the PVD that must be considered 
before we draw any final conclusions.
B.2.C The Euthvphro
The third dialogue that seems to suggest a Socratic commitment to the 
PVD is the Euthyphro. This is, in my opinion, the most troubling of all the texts 
that suggest the PVD. Unlike the Laches there are no passages in the Euthyphro 
which unequivocally indicate that Socrates could not be committed to the view 
he articulates. Further, while there is some evidence that the Euthyphro shows 
signs of the emergence of distinctive Platonic thought like the Meno (Eu. 5d, 6d- 
e), it is difficult to argue that the bulk of the text is not Socratic.* Nonetheless, I 
think we are justified in being suspicious of the claim that the Euthyphro 
commits Socrates to the PVD.
First, as I have already pointed out in relation to the Meno and the Laches. 
it is insufficient to conclude from Socratic assertions such as "I do not think that 
'where fear is, there too is reverence'" (12b) that Socrates actually held this view. 
If we take every case of such an assertion to be a truthful expression of Socrates' 
own views, we must also conclude that he thinks Euthyphro is a very wise 
person (Saj^ '^ , 9a, d, 12a, e, 14b, c, d, 15d). However, we have very good reason to 
believe that Socrates is being ironic when he extols Euthyphro's wisdom.
Socrates does not really believe that Euthyphro is wise, or even very bright.
Thus, when Socrates utters a declarative sentence, we have to interpret it in the
* See Chapter Four, § B.l.
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wider context of the dialogue, and perhaps other dialogues as well, to know if it 
really represents his considered opinion.
Second, there is some contextual evidence in the Euthyphro that should 
cause us to be hesitant about attributing the PVD to Socrates. As with the Laches 
and the Meno. the argument from which the evidence for the PVD is supposedly 
derived is couched in hypothetical assertions. The claims put forward by 
Socrates at llej^^are aimed at eliciting Euthyphro's knowledge of piety and may 
not really represent Socrates' considered opinion at all. Euthyphro has become 
frustrated in his attempts to offer a definition of piety and so Socrates takes over 
the conversation. However, as he does with Meno, Socrates takes over the 
conversation not to offer the right answer, but rather to demonstrate how one 
might go about answering his "What is f-ness?" question. Euthyphro fails to 
understand, just as Meno had failed to understand, how to answer Socrates' 
question. Socrates makes it clear that he is offering an hypothetical case to help 
Euthyphro understand the kind of answer he expects. He says, " . . .  I will make 
bold with you to show how you might teach me about holiness" (He). It is the 
method, not necessarily the content, which Socrates emphasizes in the following 
passages. Thus, we should be cautious when thinking about the content of such 
passages.
The hypothetical nature of Socrates' assertions about justice and piety 
become even more clear later in the argument. After demonstrating that we can 
differentiate between things in reference to their properties Socrates says: "Then 
see what follows, holiness is a part of justice, it seems to me that we must find 
out what part of justice it is" (my emphasis, 13d). The assumption that justice 
and piety have distinct properties in the same way that fear and reverence or
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numbers and odd numbers do parallels the assumption at the beginning of the 
Laches that courage is a part of virtue. But as we saw in that dialogue, the 
hypothetical assumption itself turns out to be open to question. It is true that 
Socrates seems to agree with Euthyphro when he articulates different properties 
for justice and piety (Eu. 13a), but he also seems to agree with Laches when he 
claims to know the nature of virtue (La. 190c). The point is that we have to look 
to the broader context to understand these assertions. In the Laches, it turned 
out that the assumption that courage is but a part of virtue was inconsistent with 
a Socratic definition of courage. Similarly, in the Euthyphro. the assumption that 
piety is a part of justice leads to a dead end (15b).
Given the kinds of parallels between the Laches. Meno. and the 
Euthyphro that I have pointed out, I think we are justified in rejecting Brickhouse 
and Smith's claim that Socrates is demonstrating a commitment to the PVD at 
Euthyphro llej^. There is, however, a final reason I would offer for rejecting 
their reading of the Euthyphro. If we suppose that dialogues such as the 
Charmides. Euthyphro. Laches. Meno. and Protagoras all address, in varying 
degrees, the nature of virtue, we can ask which, if any, are controlling. That is, 
should we use any of these dialogues as a paradigm by which to evaluate the 
others? If so, even if there are minor variations among the dialogues, these might 
be overlooked in light of the controlling doctrine we find expressed in the 
paradigmatic dialogue. Thus, is there any reason to think one of these dialogues 
should be taken as a paradigm for interpreting the others?
I would suggest that we have good reason to think the Protagoras 
provides us with the paradigmatic expression of Socrates' UVD, and we should 
look to it as the primary interpretive model. There are two reasons I am inclined
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toward this position. First, the Protagoras is the dialogue where the problem of 
the UVD is directly articulated, while in the Charmides. Euthyphro. Laches, and 
Meno it is at best a peripheral issue. Second, an analysis of the linguistic data 
suggests that the Protagoras provides a more thorough investigation of the issue 
than the other dialogues.^ The virtue terms occur more frequently in the 
Protagoras than any other early dialogue. It is true that it is the longest of these 
dialogues, but it is not significantly longer than the Meno. However, the relative 
frequency of the virtue terms is higher in the Protagoras than in the other 
dialogues. For example, in the Laches, 'courage' appears thirty-five times while 
'justice', 'piety', 'wisdom', and 'temperance' occur only eleven times between the 
four. The data indicates that courage is the central theme of the dialogue. In the 
Euthyphro. 'courage', 'justice', and 'temperance' do not appear at all while 
'piety' appears twenty-five times and 'wisdom' eight. Thus, the data shows 
that piety is the central theme of this dialogue. Similar results are found with the 
Charmides. In the Protagoras, however, each of the virtue terms appear with 
roughly equal frequency suggesting that the terms are equally important. In 
other words, while we find narrow discussions of virtue in most of the dialogues.
 ^I have organized the data I refer to here in Appendix II below.
It is an interesting feature of the Euthyphro. which distinguishes it from the other 
early dialogues where the UVD is discussed, that the abstract noun 6lKaL00TJvr| does not 
appear at all. Instead, Socrates uses TO ôlKaLOU ('the just', or the righf, or 'that which is 
nghrr This term and its cognates appears eighteen times in this dialogue (7d.l, eJZ, 7,9; 8d.9; 
lle .5 ,7; 12a.l, d.1,2,6,7, e.2 ,6,8), thirteen of which refer to the piety/justice relationship. It 
may even be a mistake to interpret the discussion from lle-12e as an argument for piety being 
a part of justice since the latter term does not appear. This however, is likely too restrictive a 
reading of the text It is worth noting, however, that Socrates favors the usage of ÔLKaLOOlJmj 
when the UVD is being discussed elsewhere.
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the Protagoras gives us a comprehensive discussion of the nature of virtue and 
the so-called "parts" of virtue.
The reasons listed above lead me to suggest that we can think of the 
Protagoras as the central dialogue in reference to Socrates' UVD. By itself, this 
would not be sufficient to disarm any inconsistencies we might find in other 
dialogues. However, when we add this to the other concerns 1 have raised, I 
think we are justified in arguing that Socrates holds a consistent doctrine of 
virtue in the early dialogues, and that this doctrine is the one we find expressed 
in the Protagoras. So what is the doctrine Socrates affirms in the Protagoras?
B.3 The Problem of Synonymy
If I am correct that the Protagoras represents the clearest articulation of 
Socrates' views on the nature of virtue, and if I am also correct that this view is 
confirmed by the majority of the other early dialogues which consider the issue, 
it only remains to clarify the position held there. This brings us to the most 
controversial part of my interpretation of the UVD. I take it that Socrates 
believes all the virtue terms are names of one and the same thing (rrdvra 
o v o g u T u  t o €  aÙ T oO  évoç ô v t o ç ,  Prot. 329d), and that, for him, there is no 
philosophically interesting distinction to be drawn between them. The 
consequence of this view is that Socrates has no reason to believe that one virtue 
term might not be exchanged for any other in a given context. To put the matter 
more directly, the virtue terms are, for Socrates, synonymous. The difficulty of 
this position lies in offering a reasonable account of, what seems to many, an
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absurd view that is neither ad hoc nor inconsistent with the other beliefs Socrates 
seems to hold.^i
Terry Penner was the first contemporary commentator to suggest that 
Socrates held the strong view of the unity of virtue. This view has come to be 
known as the Identity Thesis. However, like Vlastos before him, Penner believed 
that Socrates could not consistently believe that adequate answers to his '^What is 
F-ness?" questions could be definitions of F-ness and at the same time believe 
that all the virtue terms name one and the same thing. Such a view would imply 
that Socrates thinks the virtue terms are synonymous. Rather than giving up the 
strong sense of unity implied by the IT, Penner chose to give up Socrates' 
emphasis on definitions. If Socrates believed the virtues were all essentially the 
same, he could not be searching for the meaning of 'temperance', or 'courage', or 
'justice', or 'wisdom', or 'piety'. Instead, Penner argued that Socrates wanted to 
know what caused a person to be just, pious, wise, etc. By interpreting his 
mission as a search for the efficient causes of the virtues rather than their 
meaning, Socrates could be spared what seems to be a sophomoric oversight: 
thinking the virtue terms share the same meaning. The problem with this view is 
that it is at least as clear that Socrates is searching for definitions as it is that he 
thinks the various virtue terms name the same thing.
My solution to the problem of interpreting the UVD is to grasp both horns 
of the dilemma. I believe that when Socrates asks his "What is F-ness?" 
questions, he is seeking definitions. I also believe that Socrates embraces a strong 
sense of identity among the virtues. This means that Socrates must think that the
11 See Chapter 3, § B.2.
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virtue terms can be exchanged for one another without equivocating. Thus, for 
Socrates, the virtue terms are synonymous. This thesis seems grossly absurd to 
contemporary philosophers, myself included, because when we predicate 
synonymy of two terms, we focus on the meaning of the terms. We say that two 
terms may be exchanged for one another if they share the same meaning. Thus, 
'temperance' and 'courage' may be exchanged for one another in a single context 
if and only if they share the same definition. Because we believe that the virtue 
terms do not mean the same thing, they cannot be exchanged with one another 
without equivocation.
However, for Socrates the emphasis is different. In reference to xexvp, it is 
his linguistic practice to exchange one term for another if it relies on the same 
èTriarnuTi (I. 537d). More precisely, because the skill labeled 'virtue' depends on 
the knowledge of good and bad, and because the various virtue terms all turn 
out to be the application of the knowledge of good and bad, there is no real 
distinction to be made with the designations 'courage', 'justice', 'temperance', 
'piety', or 'wisdom'. According to Socrates, we can only distinguish between 
skills if there is different knowledge behind the skill. The mistake that Socrates' 
interlocutors repeatedly make is to suppose that the virtue terms refer to 
different kinds of knowledge (e.g., the knowledge of how to be brave, or just, or 
pious, etc.). I suspect that Socrates would be quite happy to do away with these 
terms altogether and just use the word 'virtue'. However, because those around 
him insist on using these terms, he is content to show that they are all the same 
skill because they are all the same kind of knowledge—the knowledge of the 
good and the bad.
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Thus, when in the Protagoras Socrates challenges the great sophist on the 
nature of the various virtue terms, he is defending the position that each of the 
terms used to describe virtuous action not only refer to the same thing, but also 
mean the same thing. Insofar as 'virtue' has a meaning, it is "to act in accordance 
with the knowledge of the good and the bad." The same is true for each of the 
so-called cardinal virtues: 'courage' just means "to act in accordance with the 
knowledge of the good and the bad," 'piety' just means "to act in accordance 
with the knowledge of the good and the bad," etc. It is true that the context of 
the application of the knowledge of good and bad can differ from situation to 
s i t u a t i o n . as Socrates makes clear in the Ion, the context has nothing to do 
with the distinction between different kinds of skills. For Socrates it is the 
knowledge that is being incorporated in a given situation that warrants the 
designation. If we are exercising the same kind of knowledge in different 
circumstances, we are, according to him, exercising the same kind of skill, and 
thus we are justified in using the same label for that skill. For example, if I am 
exercising the knowledge of good and bad in the contexts of religion and the 
battlefield I am being virtuous. If an interlocutor insists on using the terms 
'piety' and 'courage', then Socrates would say that I could refer to the former as 
courage and the latter as piety without equivocation because the knowledge we 
employ is the same in both cases.
*2 On this point Brickhouse and Smith were very close to the correct interpretation of 
Socrates' doctrine. Unfortunately, they failed to recognize Socrates' commitment to the IT 
which led them to try to distinguish between the virtues in much the same way many of his 
interlocutors did.
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C  Final Thoughts
I have argued that when Socrates asserts that the virtues are one, he 
understands the unity of the virtue terms in the strongest possible way. He 
believes that temperance, piety, justice, wisdom, and courage are all names for 
one and the same thing, i.e., virtue. This interpretation allows us to understand 
the aporetic nature of many of the early dialogues as the interlocutor's feilure to 
grasp why their investigation has foiled. For example, if we assume that courage 
is only a part of virtue, as Laches and Nidas do, then the observation that 
courage is the knowledge of the good and bad will not be helpful. If temperance 
is assumed to be distinct from the other virtues, as Critias assumes, then it will 
appear that it will be insuffident for happiness. If we assume along with 
Protagoras that the virtues are distinct kinds of things with distinct powers as 
well as names, it wül prove difficult to see how virtue could be taught. In each of 
these cases, the aporatic condusion of the dialogue rests on the interlocutor's 
assumption that the virtues are distinguishable in some philosophically 
significant way. If we remove these assumptions, we come to the condusion that 
virtue is simply knowing the difference between the good and the bad. And, 
regardless of the context in which we apply the knowledge of good and bad, we 
apply the same knowledge. The various words we use to refer to the application 
of this knowledge in different contexts all refer to, and, for Socrates, mean the 
same thing. Thus, Socrates might argue that for darity's sake we should 
dispense with the different names of virtue and simply utilize the word 'virtue'.
If the analysis of the UVD I have offered is correct, there remain some 
important and interesting questions to be explored. For example, does my 
position commit me to the daim that Socrates has significant moral knowledge?
202
If so, we can ask what this tells us about his general epistemology. We should 
also address how this knowledge coheres with his ubiquitous denials of 
significant moral wisdom. Is Socrates merely being ironic when he claims not to 
know the answers to his "What is F-ness?" questions where virtue is the subject? 
Another interesting question that remains to be explored is whether, and how, 
Plato differs from Socrates on the interchangeability of terms. Plato will offer an 
alternative account of virtue in the middle dialogues—especially in the 
Republic—but does Plato move closer to a conception of synonymy that we 
would hold? Does the theory of Forms create a metaphysical groundwork upon 
which later formulations of synonymy rest? Does Socrates' lack of such a 
metaphysical view prevent him from clearly articulating the concept of 
synonymy? That is, does Socrates' UVD seem odd to us precisely because we 
make metaphysical assumptions, Platonic or otherwise, that he did not? All of 
these questions are deserving of attention, but go for beyond the scope of this 
work. I can only hope that what I have offered here will prove fertile ground for 
further inquiry into Socrates' enigmatic thought on the nature of virtue.
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APPENDIX I
Virtue Terms in Plato s Dialogues Listed by Individual Passage^
The following lists represent occurrences of the Greek terms for the 
virtues found in Plato's dialogues. I originally collected this data to help me 
identify useful passages for my research. I realized that it might be helpful for 
others as well, and thus decided to include it as an appendix to the main text. I 
was primarily interested in the abstract nouns and their derivatives and thus 
excluded their verbal, adjectival, and adverbial cognates (with the exception of 
ôaïoç which seems to be preferred to ooioTqg in the early dialogues). In this 
appendix I show those locations where Plato may be involved in an analysis of 
the virtues, not simply where the concepts appear. I have organized the terms by 
two criteria: 1) alphabetical occurrence of terms (and their derivatives) by 
dialogue, and 2) dialogues by philosophical development. These lists are not 
intended to be exhaustive but rather representative of Plato's usage of the virtue 
terms. I have thus neglected to note multiple occurrences of terms within 
individual passages.^
1 The data contained in this appendix, and Appendix H below, I distilled from Leondard 
Brandwood, A Word Index to Plato (Leeds, England: Maney and Son, 1976).
2 For example, the Greek term translated 'courage' (dvS pe ia) occurs at La. 194a lines 3 
and 5. There are several such instances but 1 have only listed the passages where the terms occur, 
not each individual occurrence.
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di/ôpeia -  Courage ('manliness'):
Early -
La, 190d e; 192b,c, d; 193d; 194a, e; 199a, b, c, d, e 
330a, b; 349b, d; 350b,c; 351b; 359b; 360d; 361b 
Crat. 413e; 414a
Middle -  
M- 74a; 88b 
Phdo. 68c; 69b, c 
Rep. IV 429a; 431e 
Rep. VI 490c; 494b
dvôpeiai/:
Early -
Gorg. 492a; 495c, d
La. 190d; 191e; 192b, c, d; 193d; 194c, d; 196d, e; 197e; 198a, c; 199c, e 
Prot. 310d; 350d; 351a; 359b; 360c
Middle-  
M-88a 
Phdo. 68d 
Rep.n  361b 
Rep. IV 429c; 430b, c 
Rep. VI 491b 
Rep. Vn 536a 
Rep. Vm 561a 
Sym. 194b; 196c; 212b; 219d
Late -
Phil. 55b
dvSpgiaç:
Early -
La. 193e; 194b; 195a; 197b; 199c; 200a 
Prot. 353b
Middle -  
Crat. 413e 
Rep. m  402c 
Rep. IV 426d; 433b 
Rep. VI 487a; 504a 
Sym. 192a; 196d
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Late-
Tim. 70a
dvôpeLo:
Early - 
Ap. 35a 
La. 198a 
Prot. 342b
Middle -  
Phdo. 115a 
Rep. IV 433d
dpe-rn -  Virtue
Early -
Ap. 18a; 30b 
Cr. 53c 
Eud. 274e
Gorg. 479b; 492c; 504c, e; 506d, e; 512d
H. Ma. 248a
La. 190b;198a; 199e
Prot. 320c; 326e; 327b; 328c; 329c; 360e; 361a, b
Middle-
Crat. 386d; 415a, b
M. 70a; 71a, c, e; 72a, d; 73a, c, d, e; 74a; 77a, b; 78b, d, e; 79a, c; 81e; 86c,
d; 87b, c, d, e; 88c; 89c, d; 93b, e; 94e; 96c; 98d; 99a, e; 100b
Phdo. 69b; 93e
Phdr. 253d; 256b
Rep. 1335c; 351a; 353b, c; 354b, c
Rep, m  407c; 409d
Rep. IV 444d
Rep. Vm 550e; 551a; 554e;
Rep. X 601d; 617e
Late -
Phil. 64e 
Tht. 176c
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apeiT]v:
Early -
Ap. 20b; 29e; 35b
Eud. 273d; 274e; 283a, b; 285d; 287a 
Gorg. 492e; 499d; 503c; 517e; 519e; 526a; 527d, e 
H. Ma. 283c, e; 284a 
La. 190b
Prot. 319e; 320b; 324a, b, c, d; 325a, c; 328b; 329b; 340e; 349e; 361c
Middle -
Crat. 395a, b; 404a; 411a; 415e
M. 71a, d, e; 72a; 73a; 74b; 75c; 76b; 77b; 78c, d; 79a, b, e; 87d; 88d; 89a;
91b; 92d; 93b, d; 95b; 100a
Phdo. 69a; 82b; 93b,c
Phdr. 232d; 234b; 256e; 270b
Rep. 1335b, c; 348c; 350d; 353c, d, e
Rep, n  378e
Rep, m  407a; 409d
Rep. rV 433d; 441d; 445b
Rep. V 457a
Rep. VI 492a, e
Rep, v m  5 4 ^ ; 459b; 550e
Rep. X 598e; 600d; 613b; 618c
Sym. 179a, d; 180a; 184c, d, e; 185b; 209a, e; 212a
Late -
Phil. 55c 
Tht. 145b; 176b 
Tim. 34b
apeTT|o:
Early -
Ap. 20b; 30b; 31b; 38a; 41e 
Cr. 45d; 51a 
Eud. 275a; 278 
Gorg. 506d; 519c 
H.M i. 370e; 374c
La. 188c; 189b; 190c, d; 198a, 199d, e
Prot. 322d; 323a, c; 324a; 326e; 327a, d, e; 328a; 329d, e; 349a, c, d; 353b; 
359a, b; 360e
Middle -  
Crat. 406b
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M. 71b, 72a, d; 75a, b; 77a; 78e; 79a, b, c, d, e; 80b, d; 81c; 86d; 87b; 89e;
90b; 91a, b; 93a, c, e; 95b, e; 96c; 97b
Phdo. 93e; 114c
Rep. 1342a; 348e; 353c, e
Rep. n  363d; 364b; 365a, c; 381c
Rep. IV432b; 444e; 445c
Rep. VI 484d; 500d
Rep. VU 536a
Rep. v m  549b; 556a, c
Rep. IX 585c; 586a
Rep. X 599d; 600e; 608b, c; 619d
Sym. 180b; 181e; 184c; 185b; 196b; 208d; 209b; 212a; 222a
Late-
Phil. 63e
Soph. 223a; 224c, d; 227d; 247b; 267c 
Tht. 167e 
Tim. 18b
ape-rri:
Early - 
Ap. 35a 
Charm. 158a 
La. 184c 
Prot. 320a; 323b
Middle -  
M.87a
Rep. 1335d; 349a; 353c 
Rep. m  402e; 403d 
Rep. VI 498e
Rep. IX 576c, d; 580b; 588a 
Rep. X 612c
ÎMte -
Phil. 45e; 48e 
Tim. 24d, e; 25b; 34c
opérai:
Middle -  
M. 72a, c 
Rep. v n  518d
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dperda:
Middle-  
M. 73e, 74a
Late-
Soph. 251a 
Tim. 87d
dpeTwu:
Middle -  
M. 72a, c
Late-
Phil. 49a
a p e r a ia :
Early -
Prot. 328a
Middle -
Rep. X 618b
SiicaLOCTTjwi -  Justice:
Early -
Cr. 48a; 53c
Gorg. 464c; 504d, e; 507d 
H.M a. 287c 
H.ML 375d
Prot. 325a; 327b; 329c; 330b, c; 331a, b, c, d; 333b; 349b; 361b
Middle -
Crat. 411a; 412c 
M.73d 
Phdo. 69b, c
Rep. 1.332d, e; 333d, e; 334b; 335c; 336a; 343c; 351a, c, d; 352c 
Rep, n  358e, 364a; 366c, e; 367b, e; 368b, e; 371e 
Rep, m  392b, c
Rep. rV 427d; 430d; 432b; 433a, b; 434a, c, d; 442d; 443c; 444c
Rep. V 472b
Rep, v m  545a
Rep. X 612c; 614a
Sym. 209a
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SncaiomvM]!/:
Early -
Gorg. 464b; 465c; 492b; 519d; 527e 
H. Mi. 375e 
La. 198a
Prot. 329c; 331b, c
Middle -  
Crat. 413d
M. 73e; 78d; 79a, b; 88a 
Phdo. 82b 
Phdr. 247d
Re^. 1331c; 332d; 333a, d; 336e; 345b; 348c, e; 350d; 353e
Re£. n  357d; 358c, d; 361b, c; 362e; 363a, d; 366b, c, e; 367c, d; 369a;
372e; 376d
Re^. IV 420b; 430c, d; 433c, d; 434d; 435a; 443b; 444a, c, d; 445b
Rep. V 472b, c
Rep. v n  517e
Rep. v m  545b
Rep. IX 591b
Rep. X 612b; 621c
ôiKaLoat3vT|s:
Early - 
Cr. 54a
Gorg. 460e; 470e; 492b, c; 508b; 519a 
H. Mi. 376a 
La. 199d 
Prot. 323a
Middle-
M. 73b; 78e; 79b, c 
Phdr. 250b; 276e
Rep. 1331d, e; 337d; 343c, 344c; 345a; 348b; 351a, b, c; 354a, b
Rep. n  358c; 359a, b; 360d, e; 361c, d, e; 363e; 365b; 366e; 367a, d; 368a
Rep. iV 435b; 443c
Rep. VI 487a; 500d; 504a, d; 506d
Rep. IX 576b
Rep. X 608b; 612b, d
Sym. 188d; 196d
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Late -
Parm. 131a 
Phil. 62a
Soph. 247a, b; 267c 
Tht. 175c
SiKaioavvT):
Early -
Gorg. 478a 
H. Ma. 287c 
Prot. 323b
Middle -  
M-73b 
Phdo. 115a 
Rep. 1335c
Rep, n  360b; 362d, 368b 
Rep. IV 247e;
Rep. X 612b 
Sym. 196c
SiKaiomjvag:
Middle -
Rep. X 611c
geyaXoTrpéîreia - Dignity (or, Tiigh-mindedness')
Middle -  
M. 74a
Rep. VI 486a; 490c; 494b
gey aXoTTpeTTe L av :
Middle -  
M.88a 
Rep, v n  536a 
Rep, v m  561a
geyaXoTTpeireLas:
Middle ~
Rep, m  402c
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ôaiornç — Piety (or TiolinessQ:
Early -
Hu. 13b, c, d; 14d, e;
Prot. 329c; 330b, e; 331a, b, c; 333b; 349b
oaiOTTiTa:
Early - 
Eu. 14c
Prot. 330d; 331b, c
Middle -  
M-78e
oaioTTiTos':
Early - 
La. 199d
ôa iÔ T T |T i:
Early -
Prot. 331b, d
ooLos -  that which is Pious (or that which is Holy):^
Early - 
Eu. 7a
oaia;
Early - 
Ap. 35d
Eu. 6d, e; 8a; 12e; 14b; 15e 
Gorg. 507b
Middle -
Rep. 1344a
3 Plato also uses the term exxjé^eia (Eu. 13b), eiiaePeiav (Symp. 188d, 
193d), and eùcrepeias (Rep. X 615c) as alternatives to oaiornç. These terms 
seem to be used interchangeably, but are obviously much more rare.
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Rep, n  380c 
Rep, m  391e; 416e 
Rep. V 463d
Late-
Tht. 172a
o o r io v :
Early - 
Cr. 51c 
Eud. 283e
Eu. 5d; 6d, e; 7a; 8a; 9c, d, e; 10a, d , e; 11a, b, e; 12a, d, e; 13c; 14c; 15b, c, 
d ,e
Gorg. 507b;
Prot. 325a, d; 330d, e; 331a, b, c, e
Middle -  
Phdo. 62a 
Rep, n  368b; 378c 
Rep, m  391a 
Rep. IV 427e 
Rep. V 458e; 461a 
Rep. X 607c
Late-
Phil. 28e 
Tht. 176b
0(7101:
Middle-
Rep. X 615b
o o L o i ç :
Middle -
Rep, n  363a
Late-
Tht. 172b
ooLou:
Early -
Eu. 4e; 5d; 9d; lOd; lie
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Middle -  
Phdo. 75d 
Rep, n  363d
OCTLOUÇ:
Middle -
Rep, m  395c
àaî(üv:
Early -
Eu. 4e; 6d
Middle -
Rep, n  363c 
Rep. V 479a
ôaiwç:
Early -
Gorg. 523b; 526c
Middle -  
M.78d
Phdo. 113d; 114b 
Rep. I 331a
ÔCTiùJTepoi/:
Early - 
Cr.54b
ao<j)ia — Wisdom (sometimes 'Knowledge'):
Early -
Ap. 20d, e; 23a
Eud. 271c; 279d; 280a; 281d, e; 282c; 300d
H. Ma. 283c; 296a, e 
La. 194e; 195a 
Ljr. 212d
Prot. 330a; 332a; 333a, b; 341a; 349b; 350c, e; 358c; 350d
Middle -
Crat. 404d; 412b
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M- 71a; 74a
Rep. 1338b; 351a, c; 354b 
Rep. IV 428b: 431e 
Rep. X 605a 
Sym. 175d, e; 204b
Late-
Phil. 30c 
Tht. 145e; 176c
ao<j)Lav:
Early -
Ap. 20d, e; 22d, e; 23b; 29d
Eud. 271c; 272d; 274a; 275c; 278c; 279c; 283a; 288b; 296e; 297c; 301b; 
304c; 305e 
Eu. 3d
Gorg. 467e; 487c 
H. Ma. 281 d
H. Mi. 364a; 368b
I.542a
La. 194d; 197d
Prot. 321d; 342b; 343a; 350d; 352d
Middle -
Crat. 404d;428d 
M-93e
Phdr. 236b; 258a 
Rep. 1350d 
Rep. n  365d 
Rep. IV 429a; 443e 
Rep. VI 493a, b, d 
Rep. X 602a 
Sym. 184c, e; 197a
Late-
Phil. 30b
Tht. 145b; 162c, e; 165e; 166d; 170b; 172b; 180d; 201a
ao<|)Las:
Early -
Eud. 272b; 274d; 276d; 278d; 280b; 281b; 282b; 294e; 299a; 300b; 303c; 
305d
Eu. 3c, 4b; 12a; 14d 
Gorg. 487c, e
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H. Ma. 282d; 283a 
Hi Mi. 364b; 368c; 372b 
La. 188c 
Ly. 214a 
Prot. 337d; 343b
Middle-
Crat. 396c, d; 401e; 410e 
M. 70c; 91a, d 
Phdo. 96a; 101e 
Phdr. 274e; 275a 
Rep. 1348e 
Rep. m  398a; 406b 
Rep. V 457b; 475b 
Rep. VI 504a 
Rep. VU 516c
Sym. 175e; 196d; 202a; 203e
Late -
Phil. 15e; 49a 
Tht. 150c; 161e
ao<j)ia:
Early -
Ap. 22b; 35a 
Charm. 153d 
Eud. 301e 
Eu. 9b; l ie
H. M a. 281c; 287c; 289b; 291a; 300d 
H. M i. 368e; 372b 
La. 200a
Prot. 332e; 342b; 343c; 361e
Middle -
M. 70b; 81c; 90a; 99b 
Phdr. 229e 
Rep. 1349a 
Rep. IV 433d 
Rep. VI 485c 
Rep. X 600d 
Sym. 206b
Late -
Tht. 145d; 161c
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ao<|)iaL:
Late-
Tht. 176c
CT(ü<})poaTjvTi -  Temperance (or 'self-controT):
Early -
Charm. 158b, e; 159a, b, c, d; 160b, c, d, e; 161a, b; 162a; 165c, d; 166b; 
167a; 170d; 171c, e; 172d, e; 173, d; 174d; 175a 
Gorg. 504d, e; 507d
Prot. 325a; 329c; 330b; 333b; 349b; 361b
Middle -  
Crat. 41 le  
M. 74a; 88b 
Phdo. 68c; 69b, c 
Phdr. 237e; 256b 
Rep, n  364a
Rep. IV430d, e; 431e; 442d 
Sym. 196c; 209a
aoj<J)poaT3vTiv:
Early -
Charm. 157a; 158b; 159a; 160e; 161d; 162a, d, e; 163a, e; 164d; 165b;
169a, b; 171d; 172b, c; 173c; 175b, d, e
Gorg. 492a; 507d; 508a
La. 198a
Prot. 323b
Middle -
M. 78d; 79a; 88a 
Phdo. 68c, d, e; 82b 
Phdr. 241a; 247d 
Rep, m  390a; 404e; 410a 
Rep. IV 430d; 432a 
Rep. VI 490c; 491b 
Rep, v n  536a 
Rep, v m  555c; 560d 
Rep. DC 591b 
Sym. 219d
Late-
Phil.55b
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cxa)<j)poaiiuns:
Early -
Charm. 157b, d; 158c; 161b; 162c; 165d; 166b, e; 169c; 171d. e; 172a, c; 
175a, e
Gorg. 492b, c; 508b; 519a 
La. 199d
Prot. 323a; 326a; 332d, e; 333a
Middle-  
M.73b
Phdr. 244d; 250b; 253d; 254b
Rep, m  389d; 402c
Rep.IV430d:433b
Rep. VI 487a; 500d; 504a; 506d
Rep. IX 573b
Sym. 188d; 196c, d; 216d
Late-
Tim. 27c
a(i)<j)poCTTJv'T):
Early -
O iarm . 170c, e; 171c 
Prot. 332b
Middle-  
M.73b 
Phdo. 144e 
Phdr. 256e 
Rep, in  402e 
Rep. IV 433d
APPENDIX n
N um ber of Passages C ontaining the C ardinal V irtue Terms Listed by
Dialogue
This appendix is intended to demonstrate the contrast of occurrences of 
virtue terms in Plato's dialogues/ As in Appendix I above, these lists are not 
intended to be exhaustive, but rather to demonstrate the distribution of 
references to the virtues in Plato's early works (I have included the middle and 
later works for contrast). It is evident that the Protagoras contains the most 
numerous references to the cardinal virtues in Plato's early period. While not 
conclusive by itself, it is some evidence for the claim that the Protagoras should 
be taken as a controlling dialogue for interpreting the Unity of Virtue Doctrine.
Early -
Ap.
Courage -1 
Justice -  0 
Knowledge -1 
Piety -1 
Temperance - 0 
Wisdom -11
Charm.
Courage - 0 
Justice -  0 
Knowledge - 83 
Piety - 0
Temperance - 65 
Wisdom -1
* I am including in these lists the occurrences of èmoTTigT| and its cognates 
because Socrates often uses this term synonymously with ao4)ia. However, I 
have listed them under the more literal translation 'knowledge' so as to avoid 
confusion.
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Çr.
Courage - 0 
Justice -  3 
Knowledge - 0 
Piety - 2 
Temperance - G 
Wisdom - 0
Eud.
Courage - 0 
Justice -  G 
Knowledge - 34 
Piety - 1 
Temperance - G 
Wisdom - 33
Eu.
Courage - G 
Justice -  G 
Knowledge - 2 
Piety - 25 
Temperance - G 
Wisdom - 8
Gorg.
Courage - 3 
Justice -1 6  
Knowledge -13 
Piety - 4
Temperance -10 
Wisdom - 4
H. Ma.
Courage - G 
Justice -  2 
Knowledge - 0 
Piety - G 
Temperance - G 
Wisdom -11
H. Mi.
Courage - G 
Justice -  3 
Knowledge - 5 
Piety - G 
Temperance - G
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Wisdom - 7
I.
Courage - 0 
Justice -  0 
Knowledge - 6 
Piety - 0 
Temperance - 0 
Wisdom -1
La.
Courage - 35 
Justice -  2 
Knowledge - 20 
Piety -1 
Temperance - 2 
Wisdom - 6
Ly.
Courage - 0 
Justice -  0 
Knowledge - 0 
Piety - 0 
Temperance - 0 
Wisdom - 2
Prot.
Courage -17 
Justice -1 7  
Knowledge - 23 
Piety - 21 
Temperance -13 
Wisdom - 21
Middle -
Crat.
Courage - 3 
Justice -  3 
Knowledge - 5 
Piety - 0 
Temperance -1 
Wisdom - 8
M.
Courage - 3 
Justice -1 2
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Knowledge - 38 
Piety-2  
Temperance - 7 
Wisdom -10
Phdo.
Courage - 5 
Justice -  4 
Knowledge -19 
Piety - 4 
Temperance - 8 
Wisdom - 2
Phdr.
Courage - 0 
Justice -  3 
Knowledge - 9 
Piety-0 
Temperance - 9 
Wisdom - 5
Rep. I
Courage -1 
Justice -  35 
Knowledge - 3 
Piety - 2 
Temperance - 0 
Wisdom - 6
Rep, n
Courage -1 
Justice -  42 
Knowledge - 2 
Piety - 6 
Temperance -1 
Wisdom -1
Rep, m
Courage -1 
Justice -  2 
Knowledge - 2 
Piety - 4 
Temperance - 6 
Wisdom - 2
Rep. IV
Courage - 8
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Justice -  26 
Knowledge - 26 
P iety-1 
Temperance - 9 
Wisdom - 5
Rep. V
Courage - 0 
Justice -  3 
Knowledge -12 
Piety - 4 
Temperance - 0 
Wisdom - 2
Rep. VI
Courage - 5 
Justice -  5 
Knowledge - 7 
Piety - 0 
Temperance - 6 
Wisdom - 5
Rep, v n
Courage -1 
Justice -1  
Knowledge -14 
Piety - 0 
Temperance -1 
Wisdom -1
Rep, vm  
Courage -1 
Justice -  2 
Knowledge - 0 
Piety - 0 
Temperance - 2 
Wisdom - 0
Rep. DC
Courage - 0 
Justice -  2 
Knowledge - 3 
Piety - 0 
Temperance - 2 
Wisdom - 0
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Rep. X
Courage - 0 
Justice -1 1  
Knowledge - 3 
Piety-2  
Temperance - 0 
Wisdom - 3
Symp.
Courage - 6 
Justice -  4 
Knowledge -14 
Piety - 0 
Temperance - 7 
Wisdom -11
Late-
Parm.
Courage - 0 
Justice -1  
Knowledge - 23 
Piety - 0 
Temperance - 0 
Wisdom - 0
Phil.
Courage -1 
Justice -1  
Knowledge - 35 
Piety -1 
Temperance -1 
Wisdom - 4
Soph.
Courage - 0 
Justice -  3 
Knowledge -11 
Piety - 0 
Temperance - 0 
Wisdom - 0
Tht.
Courage - 0 
Justice - 1  
Knowledge -119 
Piety - 3
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Temperance - 0 
Wisdom -16
Tim.
Courage -1 
Justice — 0 
Knowledge - 2 
P iety-0  
Temperance -1  
Wisdom -  0
APPENDIX in  
On the Appropriate Translation of Koko?
It is not uncommon for translators of Plato's texts to render k o k o s  and its 
cognates 'evil'.l I, however, do not find this an acceptable translation for Plato's 
works, especially for the Socratic dialogues. I think we should be careful to be as 
faithful to the author's intent as possible by using the most precisely equivalent 
expressions in our vocabulary for translations. And, I do not think 'evil' 
accurately captures w hat Socrates/Plato had in mind.
First, in the context of theodicy, we draw a distinction between two types 
of evil: natural and moral. Natural evil refers to events in nature or events 
caused by natural law which cause human suffering. This includes a wide range 
of events including disease and death, as well as natural catastrophes. Any event 
whose causal roots lie in non-human action that inflict physical and/or mental 
anguish on human beings can be referred to as natural evil. Moral evil, on the 
other hand, refers to events that cause human suffering where the cause of the 
suffering is an action willed by a moral agent. In both these cases we see the 
word 'evil' employed to refer to situations where hum an suffering occurs; we 
differentiate the two cases based on the cause of the suffering. In Plato's early 
dialogues there is very little attention paid to the problem of natural evil.
Socrates himself asserts that he has very little interest in the investigation of the 
natural world, and disavows any knowledge of the workings of the natural
 ^Examples of this practice are so numerous I will offer only a few as examples: Hugh 
Tredermick, 29b; Benjamin Jowett, Charm. 156e, Rosamond Kent Sprague, La. 199d; W.KC. 
Guthrie, Prot. 351d.
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world (Ap. 19c). Thus, we are safe in asserting that Socrates has no interest in 
what we would call natural evil.
If Socrates is not interested in what theodidsts call natural evil, he is 
keenly interested in moral evil. More specifically, Socrates is concerned w ith 
discovering the nature of morality so that we m ay avoid actions that are 
immoral. It is certainly true that immoral acts can cause both mental and 
physical anguish, but does that mean we should think of all immoral acts as evü?
The English language enables us to distinguish between at least three 
levels of moral disapproval: "had', 'w icked', and 'evü'. Broadly speaking we 
predicate 'bad ' of any action (or person) which violates an established normative 
standard. The term clearly expresses disapproval of a particular action, but our 
disapproval is muted. For instance, we might say that a chüd has behaved badly 
by disregarding her father's admonition not to eat a cookie before dinner. A 
colleague may be thought to behave badly when he fails to keep secret an 
intimacy related by a coworker, broadcasting it instead to the entire office via 
emaü. A spouse may be properly denominated 'bad ' for failing to remember the 
birthday anniversary of her husband. A soldier is bad if he deserts his post. In 
each of these cases we express moral dissatisfaction both with the action and the 
agent. However, our dissatisfaction in these types of cases does not reach the 
level of moral outrage. We expect that the offending behavior can be corrected 
given the appropriate sort of motivation.
When an action causes a sense of moral outrage in us we do not lim it the 
sigrüfication of our disapproval to 'bad'. Rather we move on to the much 
stronger term 'w icked'. Here we not only express our disapproval of the 
behavior, but we also indicate the possibility of a moral defect in the character of
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the agent. Everyone violates the moral order at one time or another, thus, "to 
err is human." A wicked act, however, evokes an entirely different level of moral 
antinomy. The teenager who tortures and mutilates animals, the adult who 
derives genuine pleasure from causing and /or observing suffering in others, the 
swindler who bilks the elderly and the vulnerable out of their sustenance, all 
exemplify a morally damaged character.^ These types of cases demonstrate not 
the insensitivity associated with bad acts, but actually signify moral rfesensitivity. 
We not only disapprove of the character and behavior of the wicked individual, 
we wonder whether she can be reformed at all.
The highest form of moral disapproval can be expressed in English w ith 
the term 'evil'. An evil action is one that is recognized to be wrong and is 
willfully chosen, not in spite of its antinomy with the moral code, but because of 
its antinomy with the moral code. What is most disturbing about evil actions, or 
more specifically—agents, is that they are, apparently, rational. Evil acts are 
directed against the moral code itself in an attem pt to overthrow it.^ If we adopt 
the Hebraic m etaphor we might say evil is the attem pt to make chaos out of 
order.
It is perhaps impossible for modem English speakers to separate this last 
concept 'evil' from its roots in the Christian tradition. Historically speaking, 
Christianity has provided the substance of the dominant moral code as well as
2 What it is that causes the kind of damage to a person's character that allows them to 
engage in such actions is a topic for Psychology, and I w ill not venture to offer any explanation. 
I am only interested here in how we differentiate between these kinds of moral violations in  
our language.
3 To be more specific, evil is the attempt to eliminate morality altogether, not just 
replace one moral code with another. Thus, a cultural critic like Frederick Nietzsche is not 
promoting evil when he suggests we abandon the Western moral code which is so entwined 
with Christianity. Even Nietzsche's nobleman cannot live without a moral code, he merely 
does not submit to a heteronomous morality. Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil. Walter 
Kauhnann. trans., ed. (New York: The Modem Library, 1968), 394-398.
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the mythology for Western society and, therefore, speakers of English. It 
gained ascendancy over Hellenistic (i.e., Greco-Roman) morality in the Fifth 
Century of the Common Era and has feced few, if any, challenges until the 
Twentieth Century. Christian morality is thus deeply rooted in the Western 
mind.
Because the Christian scriptures (i.e., the New Testament) were written in 
Greek we can highlight the similarities and differences between the Christian 
concept of 'evil^ and the Platonic view of moral transgression.^ For the authors 
of the New Testament the most popular word translated as 'evil' is Troinripos. 
Appearing over fifty-six times, and used in both the gospels and epistles, it is the 
favorite designator for demonic powers, the devil, and even the febled 'Cain' 
from Hebrew mythology. By comparison, KUKog (Plato's favored term) appears 
thirty-six times and refers almost exclusively to the realm of human action. In 
this restriction to human action we see a similarity with Plato's use of the term. 
However, this similarity is superficial as a more thorough investigation of the 
Christian doctrine of evil makes clear. For the authors of the New Testament, 
human evil is caused not simply by poorly informed decisions or a deficient 
moral character, but a malevolent spiritual power. The cause of moral evil lies 
with the fall of humanity (Rom. 5:12jf), which was fostered by Satanic temptation 
(2 Cor. 11:3).5 Thus, immorality is a symptom of the demonic attempt to undo
^ It should be noted that the New Testament texts were written in common (KOLi/l)) 
Greek of the Rrst Century C.E., which is different in some minor respects from the Classical 
Greek of Plato. However, these differences are relatively minor and do not impact the 
comparison being made here.
5 There are certainly many ways of interpreting the mythology of Genesis. However, 
the preferred orthodox Christian interpretation has been that die serpent in the Garden of Eden 
was an incarnation of Satan (Rev. 12:9). Thus Christian mythology holds that malevolent 
spiritual forces have, from the very beginning, tried to undo the good works of a benevolent 
creator in part by persuading humanity to violate God's moral order.
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the good and orderly creation of God.^ Immorality represents a kind of 
warfare between the powers of good and evil. Given the doctrine of collective 
guilt, moral short-comings are thus shared by humanity equally, and spiritual 
rebirth is the only avenue of escape from the divine justice which follows death.
In Plato we find no hint of inherited moral guilt or a malevolent 
supernatural agency which contributes to our downfall. Further, Greek 
mythology generally is free of the radical dualism so central to the Christian 
worldview. There are no gods who are by nature evil or good; the gods, like us, 
must make moral choices.^ Sometimes they choose correctly, sometimes not. 
Hence, the supernatural forces of Greek mythology are not defined as good or 
evil, but rather define their own character by the choices they make. To put it 
another way, there is no personification of evil in Greek mythology as there is in 
Christian mythology.®
Because the Christian worldview has been seminal to the Western mind 
for at least fourteen-hundred years, it has shaped many of the concepts we take 
for granted. The concept of evil is one significant example; it is so deeply 
entwined with the Christian metaphysical view, that it looses most of its 
meaning if imported into another cultural context. Thus, because the concept we 
encapsulate in the term 'evil' is so foreign to the Classical Greek mind, I strongly 
doubt it should be used to render the thought of Plato. 'Bad' or 'wicked' seem 
appropriate translations of kukov depending on the context. However, I do not
® Jeffrey Burton Russell, The Devil: Perceptions of Evil from Antiquity to Primitive 
Christianity. (Ithica: Cornell University Press, 1977), 221-249. See also Jeffrey Burton Russell, 
Satan: The Earlv Christian Tradition. (Idea: Cornell University Press: 1981).
 ^Russell, The Devil. 123.
® Russell, The Devil. 122-173.
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think 'evil' can be effectively used without fundamentally misconstruing 
Plato's thought.
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